7^ 


2 
^1 


THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF 
WATERLOO 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

mW  YOXK  •   BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •   DALLAS 
ATLANTA  •  SAN  FRANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limitbd 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNE 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ltdi. 

TORONTO 


The 
Lost  Fruits  of  Waterloo 


BY 

JOHN  SPENCER  BASSETT,  Ph.D.,  LL.D. 

Author  of  "Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,*'  **A  Short  History 

of  the  United  States,"  "The  Middle  Group 

of  American  Historians,'*  "The 

Federalist  System,'*  etc. 


Hiem  flork 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1918 

A.II  rightt  reserved 


J3 


4/^ 


3^' 


Copyright,  1918 
By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  printed.     Published  April,  1918 


PREFACE 

This  book  was  begun  under  the  influence 
of  the  enthusiasm  aroused  by  President  Wilson's 
address  to  Congress  on  January  22,  1917.  It 
was  then  that  he  first  gave  definite  utterance  of 
his  plan  for  a  league,  or  federation,  of  nations  to 
establish  a  permanent  peace.  The  idea  had  long 
been  before  the  world,  but  it  was  generally  dis- 
missed as  too  impracticable  for  the  support  of 
serious  minded  men.  By  taking  it  up  the  Presi- 
dent brought  it  into  the  realm  of  the  possible. 
In  the  presence  of  the  great  world  catastrophe 
that  hung  over  us  it  seemed  well  to  dare  much 
in  order  that  we  might  avoid  a  repetition  of 
existing  evils.  And  if  the  idea  was  worth  trying, 
it  was  certainly  worth  a  careful  examination  in 
the  light  of  history.  It  was  with  the  hope  of 
making  such  a  careful  examination  that  I  set 
to  work  on  the  line  of  thought  that  has  led  to 
this  book. 


Ti  PREFACE 

As  my  work  has  progressed  the  great  drama 
has  been  unfolding  itself  with  terrible  realism. 
New  characters  have  come  upon  the  stage,  char- 
acters not  contemplated  in  the  original  cast  of 
the  play.  At  the  same  time  some  of  the  old 
parts  have  undergone  such  changes  that  they 
appear  in  new  relations.  I  am  not  unmindful 
of  the  fact  that  events  now  unforeseen  may  make 
other  and  radical  changes  in  the  dramatis 
personce  before  this  book  is  placed  in  the  hand 
of  the  reader.  But  always  the  great  problem 
must  be  the  same,  the  prevention  of  a  return  to 
the  present  state  of  world  madness.  That  end 
we  must  ever  keep  in  mind  as  we  consider  the 
arguments  here  advanced,  and  any  inconsistency 
discovered  between  the  argument  and  the  actual 
state  of  events  will,  I  hope,  be  treated  with  as 
much  leniency  as  the  transitions  of  the  situation 
seem  to  warrant. 

As  I  write,  many  things  indicate  that  the  great 
conflict  is  approaching  dissolution.  The  ex- 
haustion of  the  nations,  the  awakening  voices 
of  the  masses,  the  evident  failure  of  militarism 
to  lead  Germany  to  world  empire,  the  rising 
spectre   of  the   international   solidarity   of  the 


PREFACE  vii 

laborers,  and  many  other  portents  seem  to  show 
that  the  world  will  soon  have  to  say  "y^^"  or 
"no"  to  the  plain  question:  "Shall  we,  or  shall 
we  not,  have  a  union  of  nations  to  promote  per- 
manent peace?" 

The  warning  that  they  must  answer  the  ques- 
tion is  shouted  to  many  classes.  Bankers  are 
threatened  with  the  repudiation  of  the  securities 
of  the  greatest  nations,  manufacturers  may  soon 
see  their  vast  gains  swallowed  up  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  forms  of  credit  which  hitherto  have 
seemed  most  substantial,  churches  and  every 
form  of  intellectual  life  that  should  promote 
civilization  may  have  their  dearest  ideals  swept 
away  in  a  rush  toward  radicahsm,  and  even  the 
German  autocracy  is  fighting  for  its  life  against 
an  infuriated  and  despairing  proletariat.  Are 
not  these  dangers  enough  to  make  us  ask  if  the 
old  menace  shall  continue? 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  answer  all  the  ques- 
tions I  ask.  It  is  sufficient  to  unfold  the  situa- 
tion and  show  how  it  has  arisen  out  of  the  past. 
If  the  reader  finds  that  mistakes  were  once  made, 
he  will  have  to  consider  the  means  of  correcting 
them.     No  pleader  can  compel  the  opinions  of 


VIU 


PREFACE 


intelligent  men  and  women.  It  is  enough  if  he 
lays  the  case  before  clear  and  conscientious  minds 
in  an  impersonal  way.  More  than  this  he  should 
not  try  to  do:  as  much  as  this  I  have  sought  to 
do.  If  the  world  really  lost  the  fruits  of  its 
victory  over  a  world  conqueror  at  Waterloo,  it  is 
for  the  citizen  of  today  to  say  in  what  way  the 
lost  fruits  can  be  recovered. 

Many  friends  have  aided  me  in  my  efforts  to 
present  my  views  to  the  public,  and  among  them 
Dr.  Frederick  P.  Keppel,  Dean  of  Columbia 
University,  deserves  special  acknowledgment.  I 
am  also  under  obligation  to  Dean  Ada  C.  Corn- 
stock,  of  Smith  College,  for  very  careful  proof- 
reading. But  for  the  opinions  here  expressed 
and  the  errors  which  may  be  discovered  I  alone 
am  responsible. 

John  Spencer  Bassett. 
Northampton,  Massachusetts, 
February  5,  1918. 


INTRODUCTION 

The  nations  of  Europe  fought  a  great  war  to  a 
finish  a  hundred  and  two  years  ago,  defeating  a 
master  leader  of  men  and  ending  the  ambitions 
of  a  brilliantly  organized  nation.  They  were  so 
well  satisfied  with  their  achievement  that  they 
imagined  that  peace,  won  after  many  years  of 
suffering,  was  a  sufficient  reward  for  their  sac- 
rifices. To  escape  impending  subjugation 
seemed  enough  good  fortune  for  the  moment. 
They  forgot  that  it  was  a  principle  and  not 
merely  a  man  they  had  been  contending  against, 
and  when  they  had  made  sure  that  Napoleon  was 
beyond  the  possibility  of  a  return  to  power,  they 
thought  the  future  was  secure.  But  the  prin- 
ciple lived  and  has  come  to  life  again.  It  was 
the  inherent  tendency  to  unification  in  govern- 
ment, a  principle  that  appeals  to  the  national 
pride  of  most  peoples  when  they  find  themselves 
in  a  position  to  make  it  operate  to  the  supposed 
advantage  of  their  own  country.     It  has  been 


X  INTRODUCTION 

seized  upon  by  the  Germans  in  our  own  genera- 
tion, to  whom  it  has  been  as  glittering  a  prize  as  it 
was  to  the  Frenchmen  of  the  early  nineteenth 
century.  To  conquer  the  world  and  win  a  place 
in  the  sun  is  no  mean  ideal;  and  if  the  efforts  of 
the  Entente  allies  succeed  in  defeating  it  in  its 
present  form,  it  is  reasonably  certain  that  it  will 
appear  again  to  distress  the  future  inhabitants  of 
the  earth,  unless  sufficient  steps  are  taken  to 
bind  it  down  by  bonds  which  cannot  be  broken. 

This  conviction  has  led  to  the  suggestion  that 
when  Germany  is  beaten,  as  she  must  be  beaten, 
steps  should  be  taken,  not  only  to  insure  that  she 
shall  not  again  disturb  the  earth,  but  that  no  other 
power  coming  after  her  shall  lay  the  foundations 
and  form  the  ambition  which  will  again  put  the 
world  to  the  necessity  of  fighting  the  present  war 
over  again.  When  the  North  broke  the  bonds  of 
slavery  in  the  South  in  1865  it  was  filled  with 
a  firm  determination  that  slavery  should  stay 
broken.  In  the  same  way,  when  the  nations  shall 
have  put  down  the  menace  of  world  domination 
now  rampant  in  Europe,  they  should  make  it  their 
first  concern  to  devise  a  means  by  which  the 
menace  shall  stay  broken. 


INTRODUCTION  xi 

To  kill  a  principle  demands  a  principle  equally- 
strong  and  inclusive.  No  one  nation  can  keep 
down  war  and  subjugation;  for  it  must  be  so 
strong  to  carry  out  that  purpose  that  it  becomes 
itself  a  conqueror.  It  would  be  as  intolerable  to 
Germany,  for  example,  to  be  ruled  by  the  United 
States  as  it  would  be  to  the  United  States  if  they 
were  ruled  by  Germany.  The  only  restraint  that 
will  satisfy  all  the  nations  will  be  exercised  by 
some  organ  of  power  in  which  all  have  fair  repre- 
sentation and  in  which  no  nation  is  able  to  do 
things  which  stimulate  jealousy  and  give  grounds 
for  the  belief  that  some  are  being  exploited  by 
others.  This  suggestion  does  not  demand  a  well 
integrated  federal  government  for  all  the  func- 
tions of  the  state  but  merely  the  adoption  of  a 
system  of  cooperation  with  authority  over  the 
outbreak  of  international  war  and  strong  enough 
to  make  its  will  obeyed.  It  is  federation  for  only 
one  purpose  and  such  a  purpose  as  will  never 
be  brought  into  vital  action  as  long  as  the  feder- 
ated will  is  maintained  at  such  a  point  of  strength 
and  exercised  with  such  a  degree  of  fairness  that 
individual  states  will  not  question  that  will. 

This  principle  of  federated  action  for  a  specific 


xii  INTRODUCTION 

purpose  was  adopted  by  the  United  States  in 
1789,  and  though  hailed  by  the  practical  states- 
men of  Europe  as  an  experiment,  it  has  proved 
the  happiest  form  of  government  that  has  yet 
been  established  over  a  vast  territory  in  which  are 
divergent  economic  and  social  interests.  In  it 
is  much  more  integration  than  would  exist  in  a 
federated  system  to  prevent  war,  where  the 
action  of  the  central  authority  would  be  limited  to 
one  main  object.  If  it  could  be  formed  and  put 
into  operation  by  the  present  generation,  who 
know  so  well  what  it  costs  to  beat  back  the  spectre 
of  world  conquest  it  might  pass  through  the  pre- 
liminary critical  stages  of  its  existence  success- 
fully. At  any  rate,  the  world  is  full  of  the  feel- 
ing that  such  things  may  be  possible,  and  it  would 
be  unwise  to  dismiss  the  suggestion  without  giv- 
ing it  fair  and  full  consideration. 

The  discussion  brings  up  what  seems  to  be  a 
law  of  human  activities,  that  as  the  ages  run  and 
as  men  develop  their  minds  they  (Combine  in 
larger  and  larger  units  for  carrying  on  the  par- 
ticular thing  they  are  interested  in.  And  they 
make  these  combinations  by  force  or  through 
mutual  agreement.     We  have  before  us  the  con- 


INTRODUCTION  xiii 

sideration  of  the  most  important  form  of  this 
unifying  process,  the  unification  of  nations, 
which  has  generally  come  through  force,  but 
sometimes  has  come  through  agreement. 

In  recent  industrial  history  is  a  parallel  process 
so  well  illustrating  the  point  at  issue  that  I 
can  not  refrain  from  mentioning  it.  In  his  book, 
My  Four  Years  in  Germany,  Mr.  James  W. 
Gerard  contrasts  great  industrial  combinations  in 
the  United  States  and  Germany.  In  one  coun- 
try are  trusts,  in  the  other  great  companies 
known  as  cartels.  The  development  of  the  trust 
we  know  well.  It  came  out  of  a  process  of  com- 
petitive war.  Some  large  manufacturer  who 
possessed  ability  for  war,  formed  an  initial  group 
of  manufacturers  with  the  prospect  of  controlling 
a  large  part  of  the  market.  He  was  careful  to 
see  that  his  own  group  had  the  best  possible  or- 
ganization, central  control,  and  a  loyal  body  of 
subordinates.  Then  he  opened  his  attack  on  his 
smaller  rivals,  and  in  most  cases  they  were  driven 
into  surrender  or  bankruptcy.  It  was  a  hard 
process,  but  it  led  to  industrial  unity  with  its 
many  advantages. 

The  cartel  began  with  co-operation.     All  the 


xiv  INTRODUCTION 

persons  or  companies  manufacturing  a  given 
article  were  asked  to  unite  in  its  creation.  They 
pooled  their  resources,  adopted  common  buying 
and  selling  agencies,  and  shared  the  returns 
amicably.  They  proved  very  profitable  for  the 
shareholders,  and  they  strengthened  the  national 
industry  in  its  competition  against  foreigners. 
In  the  United  States  the  trust  has  been  unpopu- 
lar, despite  its  many  economic  advantages.  The 
reason  is  the  battle-like  methods  by  which  it  de- 
stroyed its  rivals.  The  result  was  the  enactment 
of  laws  to  restrain  its  development,  laws  so  con- 
trary to  the  trend  of  the  times  that  they  have 
been  very  tardily  enforced.  The  cartel,  estab- 
lished with  the  co-operation  of  the  whole  group 
of  manufacturers,  aroused  no  antagonism  and 
obtained  the  approval  of  the  laws.  It  is  not  nec- 
essary to  say  which  is  the  better  of  these  two 
methods  of  arriving  at  the  same  object. 

Turning  to  the  subject  with  which  we  are  here 
chiefly  concerned,  it  is  interesting  to  note  that 
Germany  has  undertaken  in  the  last  years  to 
carry  forward  her  world  expansion  by  methods 
that  are  entirely  different.  While  she  has  feder- 
ated in  industrial  life  she  appears  in  her  foreign 


INTRODUCTION  xv 

relations  as  a  true  representative  of  the  spirit 
that  built  up  the  trusts.  She  means  to  unify 
her  competitor  states,  not  as  she  has  united  her 
industries,  but  as  the  American  trusts  secured  the 
whole  field  of  operations.  First  she  forms  a 
small  group  with  herself  at  the  head.  In  the 
group  are  Germany,  Austria,  Turkey,  and,  later 
on,  Bulgaria.  At  this  stage  of  her  progress  she 
has  gone  as  far  as  the  Standard  Oil  Company  had 
gone  when  Mr.  Rockefeller  had  perfected  the 
idea  of  the  "trust"  in  1882.  Her  next  step  was 
to  attack  her  rivals.  France  she  would  crush  at 
a  blow,  first  lulling  Great  Britain  to  inactivity 
by  feigned  friendship  and  the  promise  of  gains 
in  the  Near  East.  Then  she  would  do  what  she 
would  with  Russia.  With  these  two  nations  dis- 
posed of,  Britain,  the  unready,  could  be  easily 
brought  to  terms,  and  the  United  States  would 
then  be  at  her  mercy.  The  mass  of  German  peo- 
ple had  not,  perhaps,  reasoned  the  process  out  in 
this  way;  but  it  was  so  easily  seen  that  it  could 
not  have  escaped  the  minds  of  the  leaders  of  the 
German  military  party.  No  trust  builder  ever 
made  fairer  plans  for  the  upbuilding  of  his  enter- 
prise than  these  gentlemen  made  for  putting 


xvi  INTRODUCTION 

through  their  combination,  before  which  they 
saw  in  their  minds  the  states  of  the  world  top- 
pling. So  well  were  the  plans  made  and  so 
efficient  were  the  strokes  that  the  utmost  efforts 
of  the  rest  of  the  world  have  become  necessary  to 
defeat  the  German  hopes. 

The  United  States  have  approached  the  prob- 
lem of  world  relations  in  another  spirit.  Reject- 
ing the  spirit  of  the  trust  magnate,  which 
Germany  accepted,  we  have  turned  to  co-opera- 
tion as  the  means  of  avoiding  international 
competition  and  distrust.  President  Wilson's 
repeated  suggestions  of  a  federated  peace  are 
couched  in  the  exact  spirit  of  the  cartel.  He 
asks  that  war  may  be  replaced  by  co-operation, 
pointing  out  the  tremendous  advantage  to  all 
if  the  machinery  of  competition  can  be  discarded. 

Viewed  in  its  largest  aspects,  therefore,  the 
present  struggle  has  resolved  itself  into  a  debate 
over  the  amount  of  unity  that  shall  in  the  future 
exist  between  states.  It  does  not  seem  possible 
that  Austria  will  ever  be  a  thoroughly  sovereign 
state  again,  nor  that  Turkey  will  escape  from 
the  snare  in  which  her  feet  are  caught.  What 
degree    of   unity    this    will    engender    between 


INTRODUCTION  xvii 

France  and  Great  Britain,  if  the  old  system  of 
international  relations  continues,  it  is  not  hard 
to  guess.  And  as  for  the  small  states  of  Europe, 
their  future  is  very  perplexing. 

This  much  rests  on  the  assumption  that  Ger- 
many and  her  allied  neighbours  are  going  to 
make  peace  without  defeat  and  without  victory. 
If  they  should  be  able  to  carry  off  a  triumph, 
which  now  seems  impossible,  it  would  not  be  hard 
to  tell  in  what  manner  unification  would  come. 
However  the  result,  the  separateness  of  Euro- 
pean states  will  probably  be  diminished,  and 
their  interdependence,  either  in  two  large  group- 
ings or  in  some  more  or  less  strong  general 
grouping,  will  be  increased. 

No  wise  man  will  undertake  to  say  which  form 
of  interdependence  will  be  the  result.  But  it 
seems  certain  that  we  stand  today  with  two  roads 
before  us,  each  leading  to  the  same  end,  a  stronger 
degree  of  unity.  One  goes  by  way  of  German 
domination,  the  other  by  way  of  equal  and  mutual 
agreement.  I  do  not  need  to  say  which  will  be 
pleasanter  to  those  who  travel.  We  cannot 
stand  at  the  crossing  forever:  some  day  we  shall 
pass  down  one  of  the  roads.     It  is  said  that  the 


xviii  INTRODUCTION 

world  is  not  yet  ready  to  choose  the  second  road, 
and  that  it  must  go  on  in  the  old  way,  fighting 
off  attempts  at  domination,  until  it  learns  the 
advantages  of  co-operation.  It  may  be  so;  but 
meanwhile  it  is  a  glorious  privilege  to  strike  a 
blow,  however  weak,  in  behalf  of  reason. 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Introduction ix 

CHAPTER 

I  The  Question  of  Permanent  Peace  ...  1 

II  Early  Advocates  of  Universal  Peace     .      .  2S 

III  Problems  of  the  Napoleonic  Wars     ...  43 

IV  Europe  Under  the  Concert  of  the  Powers  65 

V  The  Later  Phases  of  the  Concert  of  Eu- 
rope         83 

VI  The  Balkan  States 108 

VII  German  Ideals  and  Organization     .      ,      .182 

VIII  The  Failure  of  the  Old  European  System  154 

IX  If  the  Submarines  Fail 184 

X  Obstacles  to  an  Enduring  Peace     .      .      .   205 

XI  Arguments  for  a  Federation  of  States  .      .   229 

XII  A  Federation  of  Nations 254 


THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF 
WATERLOO 

CHAPTER  I 

THE   QUESTION    OF   PERMANENT    PEACE 

When  war  broke  over  the  world  three  years 
ago  many  ministers  and  other  people  declared 
that  Armageddon  had  come.  They  had  in  mind 
a  tradition  founded  on  a  part  of  the  sixteenth 
chapter  of  Revelations,  in  which  the  prophet  was 
supposed  to  describe  a  vision  of  the  end  of  the 
world.  In  that  awful  day  seven  angels  appeared 
with  seven  vials  of  wrath,  and  the  contents  of  each 
when  poured  out  wiped  away  something  that  was 
dear  to  the  men  of  the  earth.  The  sixth  angel 
poured  out  on  the  waters  of  the  river  Euphrates, 
and  they  were  dried  up ;  and  then  unclean  spirits 
issued  from  the  mouths  of  the  dragons  and  of 
other  beasts  and  from  the  mouth  of  the  false 
prophet,  and  they  went  into  the  kings  of  the 
earth,  then  the  political  rulers  of  mankind,  and 


2        THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

induced  them  to  bring  the  people  together  "to 
the  battle  of  that  great  day  of  God  Almighty." 
And  the  armies  met  at  Armageddon  and  fought 
there  the  last  battle  of  time.  This  striking  fig- 
ure made  a  deep  impression  on  the  early  Chris- 
tians, and  out  of  it  arose  the  belief  that  some 
day  wbuld  come  a  great  and  final  war,  in  which 
the  nations  of  the  earth  would  unite  for  their 
mutual  destruction,  after  which  the  spirit  of 
righteousness  would  establish  a  millennial  reign 
of  peace.  And  so  when  most  of  the  nations  of 
the  world  came  together  in  war  in  1914,  many 
persons  pronounced  the  struggle  the  long  ex- 
pected Armageddon. 

It  was  easy  to  say  in  those  days  of  excitement 
that  this  war  was  going  to  be  the  last.  Madness 
it  certainly  was,  and  surely  a  mad  world  would 
come  back  to  reasonableness  after  a  season  of 
brutal  destruction.  Common  sense,  humanity, 
and  the  all  powerful  force  of  economic  interest 
would  bring  the  struggle  to  an  end,  and  then  by 
agreement  steps  would  be  taken  to  make  a  recur- 
rence of  the  situation  impossible. 

It  was  in  the  days  when  we  still  had  confidence 
in  civilization.     Humanity,  we  said,  had  devel- 


PERMANENT  PEACE  3 

oped  to  such  an  extent  that  it  could  not  return  to 
the  chaos  that  an  age  of  war  would  imply.  Inter- 
national law  was  still  considered  a  binding  body 
of  morality,  if  not  of  actual  law.  International 
public  opinion  was  believed  to  have  power  to  pun- 
ish national  wrong-doers.  We  who  teach  said  as 
much  to  our  classes  many  times  in  those  days  of 
innocence.  In  all  sincerity  we  felt  that  a  nation 
could  not  do  this  or  that  thing  because  public 
opinion  would  not  tolerate  it.  How  far  distant 
seem  now  the  days  of  early  summer  in  1914! 

We  had  adopted  many  specific  rules  to  re- 
strain needless  barbarity  in  war.  For  example, 
we  would  not  use  dum-dum  bullets,  nor  drop 
bombs  on  non-combatants,  nor  shell  the  homes  of 
innocent  dwellers  on  the  seashore.  It  was  con- 
sidered an  achievement  of  the  civilized  spirit  that 
an  army  occupying  enemy  territory  would  re- 
spect the  rights  of  the  non-combatant  inhabitants, 
set  guards  over  private  property,  protect  women 
and  children  from  injury,  and  permit  civilians  to 
go  about  their  business  as  long  as  they  did  not  in- 
termeddle with  military  matters.  In  three  and 
a  half  horrible  years  we  have  drifted  a  long 
way  from  these  protestations.     Those  of  us  who 


4        THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

once  studied  the  elements  of  international  law 
may  well  study  them  again  when  the  war  is  over, 
if,  indeed,  international  law  is  still  thought  worth 
studying. 

In  the  vision  the  angel  poured  out  his  vial  on 

the  great  river,  to  the  early  men  of  Mesapotamia 
the  symbol  of  the  great  waters.  In  our  own  day 
we  have  seen  strange  engines  of  wrath  placed  in 
the  great  waters,  foul  spirits  that  destroy  men 
and  ships  in  disregard  of  the  rules  of  fair  fighting. 
And  out  of  the  mouths  of  dragons  and  other 
loathsome  beasts,  and  of  false  prophets  as  well, 
evil  spirits  have  issued  in  these  sad  days.  They 
have  taken  their  places  in  the  hearts  and  minds 
of  self-willed  men  and  made  beasts  of  them;  so 
that  the  rest  of  humanity  have  had  to  fight  against 
them  and  suffer  themselves  to  be  killed  by  them, 
in  order  that  the  wicked  shall  not  triumph  over 
the  whole  earth. 

The  war  has  been  gruesome  beyond  the  imagi- 
nation of  man.  No  other  recorded  experience 
has  told  us  of  so  much  killing,  and  of  so  many 
different  ways  of  killing.  Men  have  been  slain 
with  swords,  cannon,  great  howitzers,  rifles, 
machine  guns,  tanks,  liquid  fire,  electrified  wires. 


PERMANENT  PEACE  5 

and  finally  with  the  germs  of  disease  deliberately 
planted.  Nothing  that  science  could  invent  for 
destroying  human  life  has  been  omitted,  except, 
possibly,  dum-dum  bullets;  and  in  view  of  the 
use  of  much  more  cruel  means  we  may  well  ask, 
"Why  not  dum-dums  also?" 

We  must  admit  that  if  the  author  of  the  Book 
of  Revelations  had  prophetic  insight  and  foresaw 
the  world  struggle  that  now  is,  he  did  not  over- 
paint  its  terrors.  And  so,  asks  the  man  of  faith, 
if  the  first  part  of  the  vision  comes  true,  why 
may  not  the  second  part  likewise  come  true? 
If  the  seer  could  foresee  the  war  and  its  horrors, 
may  he  not  also  have  spoken  truly  when  he  fore- 
told that  after  Armageddon  wars  would  be  no 
more;  for  God  would  wipe  away  the  desire  for 
them  from  the  hearts  of  men? 

To  this  question  I  answer:  If  a  man  is  left 
in  the  world  when  this  conflict  is  ended  who 
glories  in  deliberate  war,  he  is  too  bad  to  live  in 
civilized  society.  Certain  it  is  that  the  vast 
majority  of  men  and  women  are  already  con- 
vinced that  the  desire  for  war,  henceforth  and 
forever,  is  wiped  out  of  their  hearts.  In  the 
stress  of  actual  battle  or  in  the  preparations  to 


6        THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

sustain  those  who  fight  they  may  forget  the 
fundamental  folly  of  the  whole  thing  for  the  time ; 
but  it  is  always  at  the  bottom  of  their  hearts. 
What  is  the  human  power  of  reasoning  worth, 
if  it  is  not  able  to  devise  some  way  to  escape 
from  this  obsession  of  self -slaughter? 

Do  not  be  deceived  by  the  strut  of  Mars.  His 
Day  has  come  with  a  vengeance.  He  has  shot 
up  rapidly,  like  a  jimson-weed,  and  blossomed 
like  a  cactus.  We  may  have  laughed  at  him  in 
the  days  of  peace,  but  we  now  look  to  him  for 
protection.  We  cannot  decry  the  men  who  are 
dying  for  us,  dying  in  the  best  sportsmanslike 
manner.  But  we  do  not  like  their  business  as  a 
business,  and  we  wish  at  the  bottom  of  our  hearts 
that  it  were  abolished  as  a  peril  to  humanity. 
And  we  believe  that  of  all  who  hate  war,  none 
hate  it  more  than  those  who  are  actually  fighting 
in  this  struggle.  Let  us  give  Mars  his  Day  and 
all  the  glory  that  belongs  to  it,  but  let  us  not 
forget  peace  while  we  serve  war. 

Nor  should  we  be  deceived  by  the  pallid  paci- 
fist. He  has  his  counterpart  in  every  struggle; 
and  in  general  he  serves  some  good  purpose  in 
a  multitude  of  opinions.     But  the  day  of  stress 


PERMANENT  PEACE  7 

and  world  crisis  is  not  his  Day;  and  the  practical 
world  loses  little  time  in  putting  him  in  his  place. 
The  pacifist  does  not  represent  the  peace  move- 
ment in  its  freest  and  most  significant  form. 
The  advocates  of  peace  today  who  are  best  serv- 
ing its  promotion  are  those  who  are  out  in  the 
armies  bent  on  putting  down  that  nation  who  is 
the  most  dangerous  enemy  of  peace. 

These  men  are  not  mere  pieces  of  machinery 
in  a  great  driving  process.  They  are  thinking 
men  with  political  power  in  their  hands,  either 
actually  or  potentially.  War  is  a  great  school- 
teacher. It  has  lasted  in  our  own  time  nearly  as 
long  as  a  course  in  college.  The  soldiers  who 
survive  from  the  beginning  of  this  conflict  may 
now  be  considered  as  more  than  half  through 
their  senior  year.  They  know  what  war  is  and 
what  it  means,  and  they  know  something  about 
the  necessary  form  of  cooperation  that  must 
exist  in  any  society  before  the  will  of  the  people 
can  be  carried  into  effect.  They  knew  little 
about  war  four  years  ago :  they  now  know  all  the 
professors  know.  Behind  the  lines  and  here  in 
our  homes  one  never  sees  man  nor  woman  who 
does  not  admit  that  it  would  be  a  blessing  to 


8         THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

make  war  impossible ;  but  few  of  us  have  any  idea 
how  to  go  about  getting  it  anade  impossible. 
Many  of  us  think  we  shall  ne\er  get  people  to 
act  together  in  such  a  cause.  But  it  seems  un- 
reasonable to  expect  that  men  who  have  raided 
through  "No  Man's  Land,"  captured  trenches 
and  defeated  great  armies  through  organization 
and  initiative  should  quail  before  the  inertia 
of  opinion,  perhaps  the  chief  obstacle  confronting 
those  who  labor  for  a  cooperative  peace. 

The  example  of  the  Russians  is  a  useful  point 
in  this  connection.  At  the  beginning  of  the  war 
their  armies  were  as  machine-like  as  any  armies 
could  be.  The  privates  were  generally  peasants 
who  did  not  know  why  they  fought,  and  who  cer- 
tainly had  nothing  to  say  about  the  origin  of  the 
war.  They  were  typical  "cannon-fodder,"  and 
as  unthinking  as  any  modern  soldier  can  be. 
They  have  learned  much  from  less  than  three 
years  of  war.  They  slowly  acquired  purpose, 
a  sense  of  organization,  and  leaders  whom  they 
follow.  Having  made  this  progress  they  over- 
threw the  imperial  government,  drove  away  the 
great  nobles,  put  an  ensign  in  the  place  of  a 
former  grand  duke  and  two  exiles  in  the  seata 


PERMANENT  PEACE  9 

of  the  highest  officials,  and  stripped  the  high- 
est born  army  qfficers  of  their  titles  and  in- 
signia. 

At  the  present  writing  they  are  holding  out 
against  all  attempts  to  overthrow  them,  they  are 
playing  the  diplomatic  game  with  Germany 
without  discredit,^  and  they  are  reported  to  be 
shaking  the  foundations  of  autocracy  in  Austria. 
At  any  rate,  it  must  be  confessed  that  a  small 
group  of  the  Russian  "cannon-fodder"  have 
made  commendable  progress  in  the  process  of 
education  during  the  last  ten  months.  The 
process  seems  to  have  been  under  the  direction 
of  the  socialists,  a  small  but  well  organized  group 
of  intelligent  persons  who  do  not  lack  initiative. 
It  is  they  who  are  educating  the  Russian  peasants 
into  political  self-expression. 

The  possible  results  of  this  incident  are  tre- 
mendous. Nowhere  else  in  the  world  have  the 
agricultural  classes  fallen  into  one  party  with 
vigorous  and  trained  leaders.  If  Russia  is  now 
embarking  on  an  era  of  representative  govern- 

1  Since  the  above  was  written  events  have  occurred  in  Russia 
which  seem  to  discredit  the  diplomacy  of  the  revolutionists;  but 
the  general  situation  is  so  unsettled  that  no  conclusions  can  be 
drawn  at  this  time,  February  27,  1918. 


10      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ment,  as  seems  probable,  she  is  passing  through 
a  stage  in  which  political  parties  are  being 
crystallized.  So  far,  it  does  not  appear  that  any- 
considerable  party  is  organized  in  the  vast  empire 
on  what  we  should  call  a  conservative  basis.  It 
will  be  an  interesting  experiment  in  political 
history  if  Russia  has  a  great  peasant  party  in 
control  of  the  administration. 

The  party  that  now  controls  Russia  is  com- 
mitted to  the  idea  of  a  peace  through  the  co- 
operation of  the  nations.  It  is  true  that  inter- 
nationalism goes  further  than  mere  federation  of 
nations ;  for  it  also  implies  the  socialization  of  in- 
dustry, the  equal  distribution  of  property.  In 
short,  it  is  the  internationalism  and  unification  of 
the  industrial  classes  in  all  nations  for  a  com- 
bined opposition  to  capital.  With  these  aims 
we  shall,  probably,  not  be  pleased.  But  they 
imply  the  destruction  of  war;  and  it  now  seems 
possible  that  Russia  will  stand  before  the  world, 
at  least  until  the  radical  elements  fall  before 
conservatives,  as  the  most  prominent  champion 
of  cooperative  peace. 

As  to  the  socialistic  purpose  of  the  interna- 
tionalists, it  stands  apart  logically  from  that  fea- 


PERMANENT  PEACE  11 

ture  of  their  doctrine  that  relates  to  the  mere 
cooperation  of  nations.  They  would  say,  prob- 
ably, that  cooperation  is  but  incidental  to  their 
main  desire,  the  unification  of  the  workers  of 
the  world.  But  it  is  right  to  expect  that  they 
would  support  cooperation  among  the  nations 
to  obtain  the  destruction  of  war,  since  it  would 
make  it  easier  for  the  world  to  accept  their  other 
ideals.  On  the  other  hand  the  man  who  opposes 
internationalism  as  such,  could  accept  the  aid  of 
a  radical  Russia  in  obtaining  federated  peace, 
without  feeling  that  in  doing  so  he  was  necessarily 
contributing  to  the  promotion  of  the  socialistic 
features  of  internationalism. 

This  remarkable  shifting  of  power  in  Russia 
has  had  its  counterpart  on  a  less  impressive  scale 
in  other  countries.  Whether  it  comes  to  the 
point  of  explosion  or  not,  there  is  in  the  minds 
of  all — the  thoughtful  people,  the  working-men, 
and  all  intermediate  classes — a  growing  belief 
that  a  new  idea  should  rule  the  relations  of 
nations  among  themselves.  From  an  age  of  in- 
ternational competition  they  are  turning  to  the 
hope  of  an  era  of  international  agreement;  and 
it  does  not  appear  that  their  influence  will  be  un- 


12      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

heeded  when  men  come  to  face  steadily  the 
problems  the  war  is  sure  to  leave  behind  it. 

Most  notable  influence  of  all  in  behalf  of  a 
federated  peace  is  the  position  taken  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson.  In  the  beginning  of  this  conflict 
he  had  the  scholar's  horror  of  warfare,  and  he  has 
taken  more  than  one  opportunity  to  suggest  the 
formation  of  a  league  of  nations  to  prevent  the 
outbreak  of  future  wars.  His  address  to  Con- 
gress on  January  22,  1917,  was  a  notable  pre- 
sentation of  the  idea  to  the  world.  Enthusiastic 
hearers  pronounced  the  occasion  a  turning-point 
in  history.  Whether  a  league  of  nations  is  es- 
tablished or  not,  according  to  the  president's 
desires,  his  support  of  the  idea  has  given  it  a 
great  push  forward.  He  has  taken  it  out  of  the 
realm  of  the  ideal  and  made  it  a  practical  thing, 
to  be  discussed  gravely  in  the  cabinets  of  rulers. 

A  year  after  the  question  has  been  brought 
forward,  it  should  be  possible  to  form  an  opinion 
of  the  attitude  of  European  nations  in  regard 
to  the  suggestion.  From  all  of  them,  including 
Germany  and  Austria,  have  come  courteous 
allusions  to  the  idea  of  the  president;  and  the 
pope  has  given  it  his  support.     But  it  is  not 


PERMANENT  PEACE  13 

clear  that  all  are  sincerely  in  favor  of  a  logically- 
constituted  league  that  will  have  power  to  do 
what  it  is  expected  to  do.  That  President  Wil- 
son will  continue  to  urge  steps  in  this  direction 
is  to  be  taken  as  certain.  The  measure  of  his 
success  will  be  the  amount  of  hearty  and  sub- 
stantial support  he  has  from  that  large  class  of 
people  who  still  ask:  "Can't  something  be  done 
to  stop  war  forever?" 

When  this  page  is  being  written  the  news- 
papers are  full  of  a  discussion  of  the  two  speeches 
that  came  from  the  central  powers  on  January 
25,  1918,  one  from  Chancellor  von  Hertling  of 
Germany,  and  the  other  from  Count  Czernin,  of 
Austria.  In  the  former  is  the  following  utter- 
ance : 

"I  am  sympathetically  disposed,  as  my  political  activity 
shows,  toward  every  idea  which  eliminates  for  the  future 
a  possibility  or  a  probability  of  war,  and  will  promote 
a  peaceful  and  harmonious  collaboration  of  nations.  If  the 
idea  of  a  bond  of  nations,  as  suggested  by  President 
Wilson,  proves  on  closer  examination  really  to  be  conceived 
in  a  spirit  of  complete  justice  and  complete  impartiality 
toward  all,  then  the  imperial  government  is  gladly  ready, 
when  all  other  pending  questions  have  been  settled,  to 
begin  the  examination  of  the  basis  of  such  a  bond  of  na- 
tions." 


14       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

This  very  guarded  utterance  means  much  or 
little,  as  the  German  rulers  may  hereafter  deter- 
mine. By  offering  impossible  conditions  of  what 
they  may  pronounce  "complete  justice  and  com- 
plete impartiality  to  all"  they  may  be  able  to 
nullify  whatever  promise  may  be  incorporated  in 
it.  On  the  other  hand,  the  sentiment,  if  accepted 
in  a  fair  spirit  and  without  exaggerated  demands, 
may  be  a  real  step  toward  realizing  President 
Wilson's  desires.  If,  for  example,  Germany 
should  insist,  as  a  condition  for  the  formation 
of  a  "bond  of  nations,"  that  Great  Britain  give 
up  her  navy,  or  dismantle  Gibraltar,  while  she 
herself  retained  her  immense  Krupp  works  and 
her  power  to  assemble  her  army  at  a  moment's 
notice,  it  is  hardly  likely  the  demand  would  be 
granted.  We  can  best  know  what  Germany 
will  do  in  this  matter  when  we  see  to  what  ex- 
tent she  is  wiDing  to  acknowledge  that  her  war 
is  a  failure  and  that  her  military  policy  is  a 
vast  and  expensive  affair  that  profits  nothing. 
Moreover,  there  is  a  slight  sneer  in  the  chan- 
cellor's words,  as  though  he  does  not  consider  the 
president's  idea  entirely  within  the  range  of  the 
diplomacy  of  experienced  statesmen;  and  this  is 


PERMANENT  PEACE  15 

not  very  promising  for  the  outcome — unless, 
indeed,  the  logic  of  future  events  opens  his  eyes 
to  the  meaning  of  the  new  spirit  that  the  war  has 
aroused. 

Among  our  own  allies  the  suggestion  of  our 
president  has  found  a  kinder  reception.  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  has  announced  his  general  support 
of  the  proposition,  and  Lord  Bryce  and  others 
have  given  it  cordial  indorsement.  It  seems 
that  if  the  United  States  urges  the  formation 
of  a  league  of  peace,  she  will  have  the  coopera- 
tion of  Great  Britain.  As  to  the  position  of 
France  and  Italy,  the  matter  is  not  so  clear. 
They  probably  are  too  deeply  impressed  by  the 
danger  they  will  ever  face  from  powerful  neigh- 
bors to  feel  warranted  in  dismissing  their  armies, 
unless  the  best  assurance  is  given  that  Germany 
and  Austria  accept  federated  peace  in  all  good 
faith. 

As  the  contending  nations  approach  that  state 
of  exhaustion  which  presages  an  end  of  the  war, 
the  question  of  such  a  peace  becomes  increasingly 
important.  Everything  points  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  time  has  arrived  to  debate  this  subject. 
If  the  hopes  of  August,  1914,  that  Armageddon 


16       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

would  be  succeeded  by  an  era  of  permanent 
peace  are  to  be  realized,  they  will  not  come  with- 
out the  serious  thought  of  men  who  are  willing 
to  dare  something  for  their  ideals.  And  if  they 
come  out  of  the  present  cataclysm  it  is  time  to 
be  up  and  doing.  The  sentiment  that  exists  in 
this  country,  and  in  other  countries,  must  be 
organized  and  made  effective  at  the  critical 
moment.  There  is  nothing  more  dispiriting  to 
the  student  of  history  than  to  observe  as  he  reads 
how  many  favorable  moments  for  turning  some 
happy  corner  in  the  progress  of  humanity  were 
allowed  to  pass  without  effort  to  utilize  them. 
It  has  been  a  hundred  years  since  the  world  had 
another  opportunity  like  this  that  faces  us,  and 
if  it  is  not  now  tried  out  to  the  utmost  possibility, 
there  is  little  hope  that  the  next  century  will  be  as 
bloodless  as  the  past  has  been,  even  with  the 
present  conflict  included. 

Every  general  war  in  Europe  since  the  days 
of  the  Roman  Empire  has  brought  humanity 
there  to  a  state  of  exhaustion  similar  to  that 
which  now  exists.  So  it  was  with  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  with  the  wars  inaugurated  by  Louis 
XIV  to  establish  the  predominance  of  France, 


PERMANENT  PEACE  17 

and  with  the  Napoleonic  wars  a  century  ago. 
Each  of  these  struggles,  it  will  be  observed,  ex- 
tended to  a  larger  portion  of  Europe  than  its 
predecessor;  and  it  was  because  the  common  in- 
terests of  nations  were  progressively  stronger; 
for  it  was  ever  becoming  so  that  what  concerned 
one  state  concerned  others.  In  the  present  war 
the  interrelations  of  nations  is  such  that  Japan 
and  the  United  States  have  been  brought  into  the 
conflict,  along  with  China  and  several  of  the 
smaller  American  states.  If  the  conflict  recurs 
in  the  future  it  may  be  expected  to  involve  a 
still  wider  area. 

There  is  evidence  that  in  each  of  these  strug- 
gles the  humane  men  then  living  were  filled  with 
the  same  longing  for  permanent  peace  that  many 
men  feel  today.^  The  feeling  was  especially 
strong  during  the  last  stages  of  the  Napoleonic 
wars  and  immediately  after  they  ended.  Singu- 
larly enough  it  was  strongest  in  Russia,  due,  how- 
ever to  the  accident  that  an  enthusiastic  and 
idealistic  tsar  was  ruling  in  that  country.  He 
had  received  his  ideals  from  a  French  tutor  who 
was  deeply  imbued  with  the  equality  theories 

1  See  below,  pp.  46-62, 


18       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

of  the  revolution  that  swept  over  his  own  country. 
The  tsar  accepted  them  with  sincerity  and  spent 
several  years  of  conscientious  effort  in  his  at- 
tempts to  have  them  adopted.  More  singularly 
still,  they  found  their  only  sincere  indorsement, 
among  the  rulers  who  had  the  right  to  indorse  or 
reject,  with  the  king  of  Prussia,  who  at  that  time 
was  a  very  religious  man.  Most  peculiar  of  all 
they  found  very  strong  opposition  in  England, 
where  practical  statesmen  were  in  power.  As  I 
read  the  history  of  that  day  and  reflect  on  what 
has  been  the  train  of  events  from  the  battle  of 
Waterloo  to  the  invasion  of  Belgium  in  1914,  it 
is  hard  to  keep  from  wishing  that  a  better  effort 
had  been  made  in  1815  to  carry  out  the  sugges- 
tion which  the  tsar  urged  on  his  royal  brothers 
in  Europe. 

The  defeat  of  Napoleon  was  purchased  at  im- 
mense sacrifices.  To  the  people  of  the  day  the 
most  desirable  thing  in  the  world  seemed  to  be  a 
prevention  of  his  reappearance  to  trouble  man- 
kind. They  took  the  greatest  care  to  keep  his 
body  a  prisoner  until  he  was  dead;  but  they  did 
not  seriously  try  to  lay  his  ghost.  Probably 
they  did  not  think,  being  practical  men,  that  his 


PERMANENT  PEACE  19 

spirit  would  walk  again  in  the  earth.  They 
were  mistaken;  for  not  only  has  the  ghost  come 
back,  but  it  has  come  with  increased  power  and 
subtlety.  In  fact,  it  was  an  old  ghost,  and  having 
once  inhabited  the  bodies  of  Louis  XIV,  Augus- 
tus Cgesar,  and  Alexander  of  Macedon,  as  well  as 
that  of  Napoleon  I,  it  knew  much  more  than 
the  grave  gentlemen  who  undertook  to  arrange 
the  future  of  Europe  in  practical  ways  in  1815. 

As  we  approach  again  the  re-making  of  our 
relations  after  a  world  war,  it  is  worth  while  to 
glance  over  the  things  that  were  done  in  1815,  to 
understand  what  choice  of  events  was  presented 
to  the  men  of  that  day,  and  what  results  came 
from  the  course  they  deliberately  decided  to 
follow.  Thus  we  may  know  whether  or  not  the 
course  proved  a  happy  one,  and  whether  or  not 
it  is  the  course  that  we,  also,  should  follow.  And 
if  it  is  not  such  a  course,  we  ought  as  thinking 
people  to  try  to  adopt  a  better. 

We  should  always  remember  that  the  condi- 
tions of  today  are  more  suitable  to  a  wise  decision 
than  the  conditions  of  1815.  We  have,  for  one 
thing,  the  advantage  of  the  experience  of  the 
past  hundred  years.     There  is  no  doubt  in  our 


W       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

minds  as  to  how  the  old  plan  has  worked  and 
how  it  may  be  expected  to  work  if  again  followed. 
It  led  to  the  Concert  of  Europe  and  the  Balance 
of  Power,  both  of  which  served  in  certain  emer- 
gencies, but  failed  in  the  hour  of  supreme  need. 
Indeed,  it  is  probable  that  they  promoted  the 
crash  that  at  last  arrived. 

Another  advantage  is  that  we  have  today  in 
the  world  a  vastly  greater  amount  of  democracy 
than  in  1815.  The  people  who  pay  the  bills  of 
Mars  today  can  say  what  shall  be  done  about 
keeping  Mars  in  chains;  and  that  is  something 
they  could  not  do  in  1815.  It  is  for  them  to  know 
all  his  capers,  and  his  clever  ways  of  getting  out 
of  prison,  and  to  look  under  his  shining  armor  to 
see  the  grizzly  hairs  that  cover  his  capacious  ribs ; 
and  having  done  this  to  decide  what  will  be  their 
attitude  toward  him. 

It  is  not  the  business  of  an  author  to  offer 
his  views  to  his  reader  ready  made.  Enough  if 
he  offers  the  material  facts^(H!%|(f  wlj^sh  the 
reader  may  form  his  own  opinions.  That  is  my 
object  in  this  book.  I  do  not  disguise  my  con- 
viction that  some  of  the  fruits  of  the  war  that 
ended  at  Waterloo  were  lost  through  the  inex- 


PERMANENT  PEACE  21 

perience  of  the  men  who  set  the  world  on  its 
course  again.  Whether  or  not  the  men  were  as 
wise  as  they  should  have  been  is  now  a  profit- 
less inquiry.  My  only  object  is  to  set  before 
the  reader  as  clearly  as  I  can  the  idea  of  a  per- 
manent peace  through  federated  action,  to  show 
how  that  idea  came  up  in  connection  with  the 
war  against  Napoleon,  how  it  was  rejected  for  a 
concerted  and  balanced  international  system, 
what  came  of  the  decision  in  the  century  that 
followed,  and  finally  in  what  way  the  failure  of 
the  old  system  is  responsible  for  the  present  war. 
If  the  reader  will  follow  me  through  these  con- 
siderations, he  will  be  prepared  to  examine  in  a 
judicial  spirit  the  arguments  for  and  against 
President  Wilson's  suggested  union  of  nations 
to  end  war. 

As  these  introductory  remarks  are  written,  we 
seem  to  be  girding  up  our  loins  again  with  the 
firm  conviction  that  we  cannot  talk  of  peace  until 
Germany  knows  she  is  beaten.  The  decision  is 
eminently  wise.  But  if  it  is  worth  while  to  fight 
two  or  ten  years  more  to  crush  Germany's  con- 
fidence in  her  military  policy,  how  much  ought  it 
not  to  be  worth  to  make  the  nations  realize  that 


Sa       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

if  they  really  wish  to  destroy  war  they  can  do 
it  by  taking  two  steps:  first,  end  this  struggle 
in  a  spirit  of  amity ;  and  second,  make  an  effective 
agreement  to  preserve  that  state  of  amity  by  pre- 
venting the  occurrence  of  the  things  and  feelings 
that  disturb  it.  That  is  the  task  as  well  as  the 
opportunity  of  wise  men,  who  can  govern  them- 
selves; and  it  is  for  their  information  that  this 
volume  is  written  which  undertakes  to  point  out 
*'The  Lost  Fruits  of  Waterloo"  and  the  con- 
ditions under  which  we  may  seek  to  recover  them. 
It  is  not  a  book  of  propaganda,  unless  facts  are 
propagandists.  It  is  not  a  pacifist  book,  al- 
though its  pages  may  make  for  peace,  if  God 
wills.  It  is  only  a  plain  statement  of  the  les- 
sons of  history  as  they  appear  to  one  of  the  many 
thousands  of  puzzled  persons  now  habitants  of 
this  globe  who  are  trying  to  grope  their  ways  out 
of  this  fog  of  folly. 


CHAPTER  II 

EARLY  ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL.  PEACE 

Those  who  have  tried  to  point  the  world  to 
universal  peace  may  be  divided  into  two  schools : 
one  advocating  a  form  of  cooperation  in  which 
the  final  reliance  is  to  be  reason,  the  other  looking 
forward  to  some  effective  form  of  common  action 
behind  which  shall  be  sufficient  force  to  carry 
out  the  measures  necessary  to  enforce  the  com- 
mon will.  It  is  convenient  to  describe  the  former 
group  as  advocating  a  league  of  peace,  since  we 
are  generally  agreed  that  a  league  is  a  form  of 
concert  from  which  the  constituent  members  may 
withdraw  at  will,  and  in  which  does  not  reside 
power  to  force  them  to  do  what  they  do  not  find 
reasonable.  The  second  group  wish  to  have  a 
federation,  if  by  that  term  we  understand  a  united 
group  in  which  exists  power  sufficient  to  pre- 
serve the  common  cause  against  any  possible 
disobedient  member.  To  form  a  league  is  easier 
than  to  form  a  federation.     States  are  tenacious 

23 


24       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

of  sovereignty.  The  Swiss  cantons,  the  Dutch 
provinces,  and  the  original  thirteen  states  of 
North  America  are  the  most  striking  illustrations 
of  states  that  were  willing  to  submit  themselves 
to  the  more  strenuous  process  of  union.  They 
acted  under  stress  of  great  common  peril,  and 
their  first  steps  in  federation  were  short  and 
timid;  but  none  of  them  have  regretted  that  the 
steps  were  taken.  It  was  the  good  fortune  of 
these  groups  of  states  that  they  were  able  to 
unite  at  the  proper  time  and  that  their  actions 
were  not  overclouded  by  the  counsel  of  "prac- 
tical statesmen"  to  whom  ideals  were  things  to 
be  distrusted. 

In  other  states  in  periods  of  great  distress  from 
war  men  lived  who  dreamed  of  cooperation  to 
promote  peace,  but  their  voices  were  too  weak  for 
the  times.  The  most  notable  early  advocate  of 
this  scheme  was  the  Duke  of  Sully,  if  we  may 
accept  the  notion  that  he  wrote  the  work  known 
as  the  Grand  Design  of  Henry  IV.  In  that 
plan  was  contemplated  a  Christian  Republic, 
composed  of  fifteen  states  in  Europe,  only  three 
of  which  were  to  have  a  republican  form  of  gov- 
ernment.    They  were  to  give  up  warring  among 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      25 

themselves  and  to  refer  to  a  common  council, 
modeled  on  the  Ionic  League,  all  matters  of 
inter-state  relation  that  were  of  importance  to 
the  "very  Christian  Republic."  The  only  war 
this  republic  was  to  wage  was  the  common  war 
to  expel  the  Turks  from  Europe.  It  was  after 
Henry's  death  that  Sully  published  the  plan  with 
the  assertion  that  his  former  master  had  formed 
it  just  after  the  treaty  of  Vervins,  1598. 

Whether  it  was  the  work  of  king  or  duke,  no 
attempt  was  made  to  put  it  into  force.  In  1598 
Europe  was  in  the  throes  of  a  long  and  hopeless 
struggle  for  religion.  Cities  were  destroyed, 
men  and  women  were  butchered,  and  the  safety 
of  states  was  threatened.  The  Grand  Design 
represents  the  reaction  of  either  Henry's  or 
Sully's  mind  against  such  a  terror.  It  was  a 
thing  to  be  desired,  if  it  could  have  been  attained. 
One  of  the  marks  of  peace  that  it  displayed  was 
the  attitude  it  took  towards  the  branches  of  the 
Christian  faith.  Complete  tolerance  was  to 
exist  for  the  three  forms,  Catholicism,  Lutheran- 
ism,  and  Calvinism.  This  was  a  kind  of  idealism 
that  was  then  unattainable;  but  in  the  course  of 
time  it  has  been  achieved.     I  should  not  like  to 


^6      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

say  the  day  will  not  come  when  the  other  side  of 
the  scheme,  interstate  peace,  will  also  cease  to  be 
too  ideal  for  realization. 

The  next  important  suggestion  of  union  for 
peace  was  made  by  William  Penn  in  1693  in  an 
Essay  towards  the  Present  and  Future  Peace  of 
Europe.  At  that  time  the  Continent  was  racked 
with  war — a  result  of  the  ambition  of  Louis  XIV 
to  raise  France  to  a  dominating  position  among 
the  other  nations — ,  the  Palatinate  had  been  dev- 
astated, and  the  will  of  the  "Grand  Monarch" 
was  the  dreaded  fact  in  international  politics. 
Penn  realized  that  great  sacrifices  were  ahead; 
for  it  was  as  true  then  as  now  that  when  a  strong 
state  rises  to  a  position  in  which  it  can  threaten 
universal  rule,  there  is  nothing  for  the  other 
states  but  to  combine  and  fight  as  long  as  they 
can. 

Penn's  proposal  was  that  the  sovereigns  of 
Europe  should  form  a  Great  Diet  in  which  all 
their  disputes  should  be  adjusted.  If  any 
state  refused  to  submit  to  the  judgment  of  the 
diet  and  appealed  to  arms,  all  the  other  states 
were  to  fall  upon  it  with  their  armies  and  make 
it  rue  the  course  it  had  taken.     Quaker  though 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      27 

he  was,  he  would  have  war  to  prevent  war.  His 
proposal  made  no  impression  on  his  "practical" 
contemporaries;  but  he  was  prepared  for  that. 
Men  of  his  faith  were  used  to  "bearing  testi- 
mony" in  the  expectation  that  "the  world"  would 
scoff.  Although  it  was  not  included  in  the  origi- 
nal folio  edition  of  his  works  this  essay  remains 
to  this  day  the  best  known  thing  he  wrote.  It 
is  one  of  the  most  logical  arguments  for  peace 
that  we  have. 

From  1701  to  1714  was  waged  the  War  of 
the  Spanish  Succession,  the  last  of  the  series  of 
struggles  in  which  Louis  XIV  wore  out  his  king- 
dom in  trying  to  make  it  supreme  over  its  neigh- 
bors. It  left  France  exhausted  and  miserable, 
and  it  had  not  realized  the  king's  ambition. 
In  1713,  the  year  in  which  Louis  was  forced  to 
accept  the  Treaty  of  Utrecht  in  token  of  his 
defeat,  was  published  by  the  Abbe  Castel  de  St. 
Pierre  a  book  called  Pro  jet  de  Traite  pour  rendre 
la  Paix  Perpetuelle.  Like  the  utterances  of 
Sully  and  Penn,  it  was  wrung  out  of  the  mind  of 
the  author  by  the  ruin  that  lay  around  him.  It 
differed  from  them  in  nothing  but  in  its  more 
abundant  details.     The  abbe  had  taken  many 


^'      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

things  into  account,  and  the  union  of  nations  that 
he  proposed  was  to  do  six  important  things. 

1.  There  was  to  be  a  perpetual  alliance  of 
European  rulers  with  a  diet  composed  of  pleni- 
potentiary agents  in  which  disputed  points  were 
to  be  settled  amicably.  2.  What  sovereigns 
were  to  be  admitted  to  the  alliance  was  to  be  de- 
termined by  the  act  of  alliance,  which  was  also 
to  fix  the  proportion  in  which  each  should  con- 
tribute to  the  common  fund.  3.  The  union 
was  to  guarantee  the  sovereignty  of  the  con- 
stituent states  with  existing  boundaries,  and 
future  disputes  of  this  nature  were  to  be  referred 
to  the  arbitration  of  the  council.  4.  States 
offending  against  the  laws  of  the  diet  were  to  be 
put  under  the  ban  of  Europe.  5.  A  state  under 
the  ban  was  to  be  coerced  by  the  other  states 
until  it  accepted  the  laws  it  had  violated.  6.  The 
council  was  to  make  such  laws,  on  instruction 
from  the  sovereigns,  as  were  thought  necessary 
to  the  objects  for  which  the  perpetual  alliance 
was  created. 

Like  the  two  preceding  plans  the  abbe's  scheme 
was  too  strong  to  be  rated  as  a  league.  It  does 
not  allow  us  to  think  that  a  state  could  withdraw 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      29 

at  pleasure  from  the  alliance;  and  it  gave  to  the 
council  the  authority  to  lay  taxes,  make  laws  that 
were  binding,  and  punish  defiant  members.  It 
is  noteworthy  for  the  large  amount  of  power  it 
gave  to  the  sovereigns,  since  the  members  of  the 
council  were  their  agents  and  acted  only  on  in- 
structions. Under  the  prevalent  notions  of  the 
divine  right  of  kings  no  other  method  of  selecting 
the  members  of  the  council  would  have  been 
considered  in  France,  Spain,  or  Germany.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  abbe's  scheme  was  less  liberal 
in  this  respect  than  Penn's,  which  provided  that 
the  wisest  and  justest  men  in  each  nation  should 
be  sent  to  the  council.  It  was  also  a  part  of 
Penn's  plan  that  the  council  should  be  a  really 
deliberative  body,  a  parliament  of  Europe  as 
truly  as  there  was  in  England  a  parliament  of  the 
realm. 

We  have  no  evidence  that  the  arguments  of  the 
good  abbe  made  a  profound  impression  upon 
any  of  the  sovereigns  upon  whose  favor  the 
scheme  depended.  The  Treaty  of  Utrecht  was 
followed  by  a  season  of  peace.  So  deeply 
wounded  was  Europe  by  conflict  that  it  had  no 
stomach  for  war  during  a  generation.     It  was  a 


30      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

time  of  great  industrial  prosperity  in  England, 
France,  and  Prussia.  Walpole,  the  wise  guard- 
ian of  peaceful  society,  dominated  the  first  of 
these  nations,  Fleury,  also  a  man  of  peace,  was 
for  a  large  part  of  the  time  the  guiding  hand 
in  the  second,  and  Frederic  William  I  directed 
the  development  of  the  third  with  a  sure  sense  of 
economy  and  the  efficient  use  of  resources.  At 
the  same  time  Austria  was  under  the  direction  of 
Charles  VI,  a  peaceful  monarch  who  had  too 
many  anxieties  at  home  to  think  of  wars  against 
the  Christian  sovereigns  around  him.  The  small 
struggles  that  occurred  were  without  signifi- 
cance; and  it  was  not  until  1740,  when  a  new 
generation  was  on  the  scene,  that  Europe  again 
had  a  period  of  general  war,  precipitated  by  an 
imaginative  young  king  who  could  not  resist 
the  temptation  to  use  the  excellent  tool  with 
which  his  father  had  provided  him.  Out  of  the 
twenty  years'  struggle  that  now  followed,  no 
new  plan  arose  for  a  system  of  cooperation  to 
secure  peace,  but  one  of  the  great  philosophers 
of  the  time  made  a  new  statement  of  the  Abbe 
St.  Pierre's  plan,  which  served  as  a  new  proposi- 
tion. 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      31 

It  was  during  the  last  years  of  the  Seven 
Years'  War  that  Rousseau  received  the  papers 
of  the  good  abbe,  with  the  expectation  that  he 
would  prepare  them  for  publication  in  a  more 
popular  form  than  the  twenty-one  volumes  in 
which  the  author's  thoughts  were  buried.  He 
eventually  gave  up  the  task,  but  he  produced  two 
short  summaries,  one  of  which  was  entitled 
Extrait  du  Projet  de  Paix  perpetuelle  de  M. 
UAhhe  de  Saint-Pierre,  The  "extract"  proper 
was  followed  by  a  "judgment"  in  which  Rousseau 
voiced  his  own  views.  He  advocated  the  creation 
of  a  confederacy  mutually  dependent,  no  state  to 
be  permitted  to  resist  all  the  other  states  united 
nor  to  form  an  alliance  with  any  other  state  in 
rivalry  with  the  confederacy.  The  scope  of  the 
central  authority  was  defined,  and  there  was  to 
be  a  legislature  to  make  laws  in  amplification 
of  that  authority,  such  laws  to  be  administered 
by  a  federal  court.  No  state  was  to  withdraw 
from  the  union.  Thus,  Rousseau  made  his  pro- 
posed confederacy  rest  on  force.  In  his  mind  it 
was  to  be  vitally  efficient  government,  capable 
of  doing  all  it  was  created  to  do. 

All  the  plans  I  have  mentioned  contemplated 


3^      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

the  creation  of  a  central  authority  strong  enough 
to  make  itself  obeyed.  They  implied,  therefore, 
that  each  constituent  state  should  relinquish  a 
part  of  its  sovereignty  in  order  to  form  the  fed- 
eration. Now  this  was,  as  at  the  present  time,  a 
strong  objection  to  the  scheme.  No  one  has  met 
it  better  than  William  Penn,  who  said : 

"I  am  come  now  to  the  last  Objection,  That  Sovereign 
Princes  and  States  will  hereby  became  not  Sovereign:  a 
Thing  they  will  never  endure.  But  this  also,  under  Cor- 
rection, is  a  Mistake,  for  they  remain  as  Sovereign  at  Home 
as  ever  they  were.  Neither  their  Power  over  their  People, 
nor  the  usual  Revenue  they  pay  them,  is  diminished:  It 
may  be  the  War  Establishment  may  be  reduced,  which  will 
indeed  of  Course  follow,  or  be  better  employed  to  the  Ad- 
vantage of  the  Publick.  So  that  the  Soveraignties  are  as 
they  were,  for  none  of  them  have  now  any  Soveraignty 
over  one  another :  And  if  this  be  called  a  lessening  of  their 
Power,  it  must  be  only  because  the  great  Fish  can  no 
longer  eat  up  the  little  ones,  and  that  each  Soveraignty  is 
equally  defended  from  Injuries,  and  disabled  from  com- 
mitting them." 

A  quarter  of  a  century  later,  in  the  beginning 
of  the  French  Revolution,  Jeremy  Bentham,  the 
English  philosopher,  advocated  the  union  of 
states  in  behalf  of  common  peace,  but  he  rested 
his  argument  on  morality,  not  on  force.     There 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      33 

was  to  be  a  league  of  states,  with  a  legislature 
and  courts  of  justice,  but  the  decisions  were  to 
be  executed  by  the  states  themselves.  He  held 
that  after  the  court  gave  a  decision  in  a  specified 
case  and  published  the  evidence  and  arguments, 
public  opinion  would  be  strong  enough  to  en- 
force the  judgment.  By  discarding  force  Ben- 
tham  had  the  advantage  of  preserving  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  states,  a  thing  that  is  particularly 
esteemed  by  an  Englishman.  He  is  to  be  con- 
sidered the  first  of  a  series  of  eminent  peace 
advocates  who  look  no  further  than  a  league  of 
states  bound  together  by  their  plighted  word  and 
relying  on  the  weight  of  public  opinion  to  coerce 
the  individual  states. 

He  had  given  his  life  to  the  task  of  fixing  the 
sway  of  law  in  the  minds  of  humanity,  and  it  was 
a  part  of  his  general  idea  that  a  high  court  of  jus- 
tice, investigating  a  controversy,  and  exposing 
all  the  sides  of  it  before  a  world  of  fair  minded 
observers,  would  lessen  the  asperity  of  opposing 
passions  so  that  the  verdict  of  the  court  would  be 
received  as  saving  credit  and  honor  to  the  party 
who  had  to  yield.  It  is  out  of  this  attitude  that 
our  whole  doctrine  of  arbitration  as  an  expedient 


34.       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

for  escaping  war  has  its  rise,  a  doctrine  of  sucli 
importance  in  our  general  subject  that  no  peace 
advocate  would  dare  reject  it  wholly. 

Bentham's  opinion  was  expressed  in  a  stray 
pamphlet  that  made  little  impression  in  his  time 
and  has  nearly  escaped  the  notice  of  posterity. 
A  more  conspicuous  achievement,  and  nearly 
contemporary,  was  an  essay  by  Immanuel  Kant, 
philosopher  at  Konigsberg,  in  Prussia.  In  1795 
he  published  Zum  ewigen  Frieden,  an  outline  for 
a  league  of  perpetual  peace.  There  was  a  time, 
he  argued,  when  men  lived  by  force  under  the 
laws  of  nature,  each  regulating  his  own  conduct 
toward  his  neighbors,  the  strongest  man  having 
his  way  through  his  ability  to  overawe  his  asso- 
ciates. Then  came  the  state  and  the  rule  of  law, 
and  with  their  arrival  one  saw  the  exit  of  personal 
combat.  Kant  applied  the  same  argument  to 
the  intercourse  of  the  nations,  saying  they  were 
in  a  state  of  nature  toward  one  another.  He 
proposed  to  organize  a  super-state  over  them, 
with  authority  to  bring  them  under  a  law  pro-j^ 
hibiting  wars  among  themselves.  He  would  as- 
sign a  definite  field  of  action  to  the  new  power, 
with  the  function  of  making  laws  in  enforcing 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      35 

that  authority,  and  it  would  have  the  neces- 
sary administrative  and  judicial  officers.  The 
law  made  by  the  united  government  was  to  be  as 
good  law  for  its  own  purposes  as  the  law  made 
by  the  individual  states  for  their  purposes. 

Kant's  suggestion  was  closely  kin  to  Rous- 
seau's ideas  of  the  state,  but  he  wrote  at  a  time 
when  the  world,  stampeded  by  the  excesses  of 
the  Jacobins,  was  turning  away  from  all  the  po- 
litical theories  that  underlay  the  French  Revolu- 
tion. It  had  no  use  for  the  idea  that  govern- 
ment was  the  outcome  of  a  social  contract;  and 
if  this  idea  was  not  accepted  for  the  state  itself, 
how  much  less  would  it  be  accepted  as  a  means  of 
organizing  the  international  state!  The  world 
suffered  too  much  at  the  hands  of  Napoleon  to 
like  ideas  that  were  responsible  for  the  very  be- 
ginning of  the  letting  out  of  the  waters.  And 
this  was  especially  true  in  Prussia,  where  the  foot 
of  the  French  conqueror  was  extremely  heavy. 

At  the  moment  when  Kant's  ideas  were  at 
the  height  of  unpopularity  came  the  young 
philosopher,  Hegel,  who  announced  a  philo- 
sophical view  of  war  that  pleased  the  govern- 
ing class  of  Prussia,  bent  on  establishing  a  system 


36       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

of  military  training  that  would  be  sufficient  for  a 
redeemed  country.  He  taught  that  war  through 
action  burns  away  moral  excrescences,  purifies 
the  health  of  society,  and  stimulates  the  growth 
of  manly  virtue.  This  idea  became  the  basis  of 
much  German  reasoning,  and  it  is  not  improb- 
able that  its  defenders  in  trying  to  discern  the 
virtues  they  argued  for,  were  led  to  develop 
them.  But  in  their  enthusiasm  they  came  to  ex- 
aggerate these  virtues  into  habits  that  were  often 
mere  manifestations  of  an  exalted  egoism.  As 
to  the  claim  that  war  burns  up  the  effete  products 
of  society,  it  may  be  met  by  the  undeniable  as- 
sertion that  it  also  burns  much  that  is  best.  One 
does  not  biirn  a  city  to  destroy  the  vermin  that 
are  in  it. 

The  next  attempt  to  bring  about  a  system  of 
cooperation  to  secure  peace  among  the  nations 
was  the  formation  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  a  futile 
attempt  to  apply  principles  like  those  just  de- 
scribed, made  by  Alexander  I,  of  Russia,  at  the 
close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars.  It  is  considered  at 
length  in  the  chapter  following  this,  where  it 
finds  its  proper  setting.  The  extremely  religious 
spirit  in  which  it  was  conceived  was  a  drawback 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE     37 

to  success,  but  it  is  not  likely  that  it  would  have 
fared  better  than  it  did  fare,  even  if  stripped  of 
all  its  pious  fantasy,  since  the  world  was  not 
educated  to  its  acceptance  as  a  purely  political 
idea. 

At  this  stage  one  must  notice  the  development 
of  peace  societies.  Organized  at  first  as  local 
bodies  they  were  drawn  together  into  national 
organizations  in  the  early  decades  of  the  nine- 
teenth century.  It  was  in  1816  that  such  a 
society  was  created  in  Great  Britain,  and  in  1828 
that  the  American  Peace  Society  was  formed  out 
of  local  societies  in  the  United  States.  In  the 
same  year  was  established  at  Geneva  the  first 
peace  society  on  the  Continent,  the  second  being 
organized  at  Paris  in  1841.  The  influence  of 
such  societies  was  weak  for  a  long  time;  but 
within  the  past  twenty  years  it  has  been  much 
stronger. 

One  of  the  most  striking  examples  of  the 
prevalence  of  the  peace  idea  in  recent  times  is  the 
growing  use  of  arbitration  as  a  means  of  settling 
international  disputes.  Another  is  the  meeting 
of  the  Hague  conferences  to  promote  peace. 
The  first  was  called  by  the  tsar,  Nicholas  II,  in 


38       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

1899  and  laid  a  broad  outline  of  the  work  that 
such  conferences  ought  to  do.  A  second  as- 
sembled in  the  year  1907,  and  a  third  was  about 
to  convene  when  the  Great  War  began  in  1914. 
The  conferences  devoted  their  strongest  efforts 
to  the  reduction  of  armaments  and  the  checking 
of  militarism;  but  in  each  case  they  found  the 
German  Empire  planted  boldly  across  their  path, 
and  in  this  respect  their  efforts  were  futile.  It 
is  not  to  be  doubted  that  the  attitude  of  Germany 
contributed  much  to  develop  the  widespread  sus- 
picion of  that  country  which  has  been  one  of  her 
handicaps  in  the  present  war. 

The  "peace  movement,"  as  the  totality  of  these 
activities  is  called,  has  thus  gained  strength,  and 
it  would  seem  that  it  must  eventually  prevail  in 
public  opinion.  It  received  an  important  mo- 
mentum in  1910,  when  Mr.  Andrew  Carnegie 
gave  $10,000,000  to  establish  the  Carnegie  En- 
dowment for  International  Peace,  an  organiza- 
tion which  has  contributed  powerfully  to  the  pro- 
motion of  peace  ideas.  It  acts  on  scientific 
principles,  seeking  to  gather  and  publish  such 
facts  bearing  on  international  relations,  the  laws 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      39 

of  economics  and  history,  and  the  science  of  in- 
ternational law,  as  will  show  in  what  respect  war 
is  to  be  removed  from  its  hold  on  society. 

The  careless  enthusiasm  with  which  a  great 
many  people  hailed  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1914 
swept  the  peace  advocates  into  the  background 
and  was  the  occasion  of  some  sarcasm  at  their 
expense.  But  as  the  struggle  grew  in  grimness 
and  horrors  the  advocates  of  peace  on  principle 
returned  to  their  old  position  in  public  esteem, 
and  have  steadily  gained  on  it.  It  seems  un- 
deniable that  the  war  has  done  more  to  convince 
the  world  of  the  madness  of  war  than  many  dec- 
ades of  agitation  could  do. 

One  of  the  manifestations  of  the  rebound 
here  mentioned  was  the  organization  in  June, 
1915,  of  "The  League  to  Enforce  Peace."  This 
society  was  created  in  a  meeting  of  representa- 
tive men  assembled  in  Carpenters'  Hall,  Phila- 
delphia, the  place  in  which  the  Declaration  of 
Independence  was  adopted.  Its  principles  are 
embraced  in  the  following  proposals:  1.  A 
judicial  tribunal  to  which  will  be  referred  judi- 
ciable  disputes  between  the  signatory  powers. 


4^0      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

subject  to  existing  treaties,  the  tribunals  to  have 
power  to  pass  on  the  merits  of  the  disputes  sub- 
mitted as  well  as  on  its  jurisdiction  over  them. 
2.  The  reference  of  other  disputes  between  the 
signatory  states  to  a  council  of  conciliation,  which 
will  hear  the  cases  submitted  and  recommend 
settlements  in  accordance  with  its  ideas  of  jus- 
tice. 3.  If  any  signatory  state  threatens  war 
before  its  case  is  submitted  to  the  judicial  tri- 
bunal or  the  council  of  conciliation,  the  other 
states  will  jointly  employ  diplomatic  pressure  to 
prevent  war;  and  if  hostilities  actually  begin 
under  such  circumstances  they  will  jointly  use 
their  military  forces  against  the  power  in  con- 
tempt of  the  league.  4.  The  signatory  states 
will  from  time  to  time  hold  conferences  to  formu- 
late rules  of  international  law  which  are  to  be 
executed  by  the  tribunal  of  arbitration  unless 
within  a  stated  time  some  state  vetoes  the  pro- 
posal. 

The  system  of  cooperation  embodied  in  these 
proposals  is  not  a  federation,  within  the  meaning 
that  I  have  given  to  that  term.  It  is  what  it 
pretends  to  be,  merely  a  league.  It  seems  to 
concede  the  right  of  a  state  to  secede  from  the 


ADVOCATES  OF  UNIVERSAL  PEACE      41 

league  at  will.  As  to  what  would  happen  under 
it  if  a  signatory  state  refusing  to  abide  the  decis- 
ion of  the  tribunal  or  council  of  conciliation  should 
attempt  to  withdraw  and  make  war  at  once,  we 
can  have  little  doubt.  In  such  a  case  the  attempt 
to  secede  would  probably  be  considered  defiance 
and  steps  be  taken  to  reduce  the  state  to  sub- 
mission. Nevertheless  it  might  happen  that  a 
state  within  the  league,  finding  its  action  re- 
stricted so  that  it  could  not  adopt  some  policy 
which  it  considered  essential  to  its  welfare,  might 
proceed  to  withdraw  in  view  of  a  line  of  conduct 
it  intended  to  take  at  a  later  time.  In  that  case 
it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  league  could  resist 
unless  it  was  willing  to  take  the  position  that  it 
had  a  kind  of  sovereignty  over  all  interstate  rela- 
tions, a  position  that  involves  more  concentration 
than  the  form  of  the  league  seems  to  imply. 

At  this  point  in  our  inquiry  into  the  subject  of 
cooperation  to  secure  universal  peace  an  inviting 
field  of  speculation  opens  before  us,  but  we  must 
turn  aside  for  the  time,  in  order  to  consider 
various  phases  of  the  process  by  which  the  world 
has  arrived  at  the  crisis  now  before  it.  This 
chapter  will  serve  its  purpose  if  it  gives  the  reader 


42      THE  I.OST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

a  view  of  the  earliest  suggestions  of  systems  of 
common  action  and  if  it  makes  clear  the  differ- 
ences between  the  two  general  plans  that  have 
been  formulated,  the  league  and  the  federation. 


CHAPTER  III 

PROBLEMS   OF   THE   NAPOLEONIC    WARS 

The  career  of  Napoleon,  which  has  long  com- 
manded the  greatest  interest,  not  to  say  en- 
thusiasm, of  students  of  history,  aroused  grave 
fears  in  the  minds  of  most  of  the  thoughtful 
men  of  his  day  who  did  not  live  in  France.  His 
design  to  conquer  all  his  neighbors  was  most 
evident,  and  his  apparent  ability  to  carry  it  into 
execution  caused  him  to  be  regarded  as  the  em- 
bodiment of  greed  and  insatiable  ambition. 
Not  since  the  days  of  Louis  XIV  had  Europe 
felt  such  thrills  of  danger  and  horror.  All  its 
energy  was  called  into  play  to  withstand  his  at- 
tacks. Wars  followed  wars  in  a  series  of  cam- 
paigns that  ended  after  many  years  of  extreme 
anxiety  in  his  ruin,  only  when  France  had  been 
worn  out  by  his  repeated  victories.  When  he 
began  his  wars  he  was  at  the  head  of  the  best 
prepared  nation  in  the  world.  He  struck  with 
sudden  and  vigorous  blows  against  nations  that 

43 


44       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

were  not  united,  defeating  one  after  the  other 
with  startling  effect.  Their  lack  of  preparation 
was  most  marked  and  was  probably  the  most 
effective  cause  of  his  initial  success.  After  years 
of  conflict  they  learned  how  to  oppose  him. 
From  his  own  example  they  learned  the  value  of 
organization  and  method  in  fighting,  and  from 
their  own  disasters  they  at  last  acquired  the  sense 
of  union  that  was  necessary  to  give  him  the  final 
blow  that  made  him  no  longer  a  menace  to  their 
national  integrity.  It  was  not  until  1815  that  he 
was  finally  defeated  and  reduced  to  the  state  of 
ineffective  personal  power  from  which  he  had 
risen. 

From  the  beginning  of  the  struggle  he  was  to 
his  opponents  the  incarnation  of  all  that  was 
hateful  in  government.  Few  of  the  epithets 
now  hurled  at  the  kaiser  were  not  as  lavishly  cast 
at  Napoleon.  He  was  tyrant,  robber,  brute,  and 
murderer  in  turn,  and  it  was  pronounced  a  serv- 
ice to  humanity  to  suppress  him.  In  the  begin- 
ning of  the  wars  his  pretensions  were  treated  with 
disdain,  but  as  his  victories  followed  one  another 
in  bewildering  rapidity,  his  power  was  treated 
with  more  respect,  although  there  was  no  greater 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     45 

disposition  to  contemplate  his  triumph  with  com- 
placency. As  the  struggle  became  fiercer,  the 
other  states  than  France  began  to  think  of  some 
permanent  form  of  cooperation  for  restraining 
him;  and  they  even  began  to  speculate  on  the 
possibility  of  some  permanent  arrangement  by 
which  the  world  might  be  saved  from  a  recur- 
rence of  such  a  vast  waste  of  life  and  treasure  as 
was  involved  in  the  struggle.  It  was  thus  that 
suggestions  were  made  during  the  Napoleonic 
era  for  abolishing  war  through  international  ef- 
fort. For  us,  who  are  today  burdened  with  the 
ruin  of  a  similar  but  more  stupendous  struggle, 
these  efforts  have  a  special  interest,  and  the  space 
of  a  single  chapter  is  none  too  much  to  give  to 
their  consideration. 

It  is  singular  that  these  plans  should  have 
found  their  most  conspicuous  supporters  in 
the  heads  of  the  two  governments  most  widely 
apart  with  reference  to  the  popular  character 
of  their  institutions.  It  was  in  autocratic 
Russia  that  one  found  the  most  advanced  idea 
of  dealing  with  the  future,  and  in  Great  Britain, 
the  most  liberal  of  the  great  powers,  that  the 
most  conservative  design  was  held.     Each  plan 


4f6      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

was  supported  by  the  head  of  these  two  gov- 
ernments respectively,  each  ran  through  its 
own  development  while  the  armies  were  locked 
in  deadly  struggle,  and  each  was  debated  with 
seriousness  in  the  moment  of  victory  when  the 
statesmen  of  the  winning  powers  met  to  arrange 
for  the  future  relations  of  the  states  whose 
victories  made  them  the  arbiters  of  Europe. 

The  initiative  was  taken  by  Alexander  I,  of 
Russia.  He  was  a  man  of  the  best  intentions, 
and  throughout  the  period  with  which  we  are 
now  dealing  he  showed  himself  persistently  fa- 
vorable to  views  which,  to  say  the  least,  were  a 
hundred  years  ahead  of  his  time.  By  tempera- 
ment he  was  imaginative  and  sympathetic.  In 
his  personal  life  were  irregularities,  but  not  as 
many  as  in  Napoleon's,  Louis  XIV's,  or  Talley- 
rand's. He  lacked  the  royal  vice  of  despotism, 
and  his  escape  from  it  was  probably  due  to  the 
influence  of  Frederic  Cesar  de  La  Harpe,  an 
instructor  of  his  youth,  who  arrived  in  Russia 
with  his  head  full  of  the  dynamic  ideas  of  the 
French  philosophers  of  the  pre-revolutionaiy 
period. 

While  "liberty,  equality,  and  fraternity"  mad- 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     47 

dened  France,  long  oppressed  by  the  dull  repres- 
sion of  the  ancient  regime,  La  Harpe  was  con- 
verting his  royal  pupil  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
"Rights  of  Man."  So  well  was  the  lesson  taught 
that  a  long  series  of  encounters  with  the  solid 
wall  of  Russian  autocracy  was  necessary  before 
the  pupil  ceased  to  try  to  do  something  to 
ameliorate  the  condition  of  his  people.  His- 
torians have  called  Alexander  a  dreamer,  but 
what  is  a  man  to  do  who  is  born  a  tsar  and  has 
the  misfortune  to  believe  in  the  doctrines  for 
which  we  honor  Lincoln  and  Jefferson?  I  am 
willing  to  call  him  impractical,  but  I  cannot  with- 
hold sympathy  from  a  man  who  tried,  as  he,  to 
strike  blows  in  behalf  of  the  forms  of  government 
which  makes  my  own  country  a  home  of  liberty. 
Alexander  I  came  to  the  throne  of  Russia  in 
1801,  anxious  to  carry  out  his  liberal  plans. ^  In 
1804,  through  his  minister  in  London,  he  sug- 
gested to  Pitt,  the  prime  minister,  a  plan  for 
settling  the  affairs  of  Europe  after  the  defeat  of 
Napoleon.     France,  he  said,  must  be  made  to 

1  For  an  excellent  treatment  of  the  events  discussed  in  this 
chapter  see  W.  A.  Phillips,  The  Confederation  of  Europe,  London, 
1914. 


48       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

realize  that  the  allies  did  not  war  against  her 
people  but  against  Napoleon,  from  whose  false 
power  they  proposed  to  set  her  free.  Once  liber- 
ated she  was  to  be  allowed  to  choose  any  gov- 
ernment she  desired.  From  La  Harpe  he  had 
imbibed  a  deep  repugnance  to  the  government  of 
the  Bourbons,  and  in  all  his  future  discussions 
of  the  subject  he  showed  no  enthusiasm  for  re- 
storing that  line  to  their  throne. 

One  of  the  charges  often  made  by  the  allies 
was  that  Napoleon  overthrew  international  law. 
It  was  a  part  of  Alexander's  plan  to  reestablish 
its  potency  and  to  have  the  nations  see  to  it  that 
no  future  violations  of  it  could  occur.  He  also 
suggested  that  the  firm  agreement  then  existing 
between  Russia  and  Great  Britain  should  con- 
tinue after  the  establishment  of  peace  and  that 
other  great  powers  should  be  brought  into  it  so 
that  there  should  be  a  means  of  securing  common 
action  in  affairs  of  mutual  significance.  At  this 
time  he  had  not,  it  seems,  fully  determined  just 
what  form  of  cooperation  ought  to  be  adopted, 
but  in  the  suggestion  of  1804  can  be  found  the 
germ  of  all  his  later  designs  for  permanent  peace. 

At  that  moment  Pitt  was  looking  for  the  re- 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS      49 

newal  of  the  European  war  and  he  expected  the 
formation  of  the  great  coalition  of  1805,  in  which 
Russia,  Great  Britain,  Austria,  and  Sweden  un- 
dertook to  defeat  France.  He  did  not  dare, 
therefore,  reject  the  tsar's  proposals  outright. 
He  gave  approval  to  the  suggestion  in  regard  to 
the  restoration  of  international  law,  but  he  quali- 
fied his  sanction  of  the  scheme  for  a  future  league 
of  nations.  Napoleon  crushed,  he  said,  it  would 
be  for  the  states  to  guarantee  such  an  adjustment 
of  European  affairs  as  they  should  agree  upon  in 
solemn  treaty.  Looking  into  these  two  state- 
ments it  is  seen  that  the  tsar  had  in  mind  the 
formation  of  some  kind  of  league  of  nations, 
with  well  defined  powers  and  duties,  while  Pitt 
looked  forward  to  that  kind  of  international  co- 
operation which  was  later  described  by  the  term 
"Concert  of  Europe."  In  the  subsequent  deal- 
ing of  Alexander  with  the  British  leaders  over 
this  matter  there  was  always  this  difference  be- 
tween them. 

In  1807  Napoleon  won  the  battle  of  Friedland 
over  Russia  and  occupied  a  large  part  of  the 
tsar's  domain.  Then  came  the  Treaty  of  Tilsit 
in  which  Alexander  and  Napoleon  standing  face 


50       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

to  face  came  to  an  unexpected  agreement  to 
divide  the  accessible  part  of  the  world  between 
them,  Alexander  ruling  one  half  and  Napoleon 
ruling  the  other.  It  is  certain,  however,  that 
the  tsar  had  in  his  mind  that  both  he  and  his  new 
ally  would  rule  their  respective  halves  in  the 
spirit  of  La  Harpe's  teaching.  Napoleon  baited 
his  trap  with  no  less  attractive  a  morsel  than 
self-government  under  a  wise  monarch  in  order 
to  catch  Alexander  I. 

The  Moscow  campaign  brought  the  tsar  to  his 
senses.  He  himself  said  that  it  was  the  burning 
of  the  ancient  city,  1812,  that  illuminated  his 
mind  and  enabled  him  to  see  the  true  character  of 
the  Corsican.  For  five  years  he  had  been  lulled 
into  inactivity  by  the  belief  that  some  form  of  per- 
manent peace  was  coming  to  the  world  through 
Napoleon.  He  now  realized  that  he  had  been 
duped,  and  after  making  due  acknowledgment 
of  his  error  turned  to  the  task  of  destroying  the 
deceiver.  From  that  time  he  did  not  waver  in  his 
determination. 

Russia  and  Great  Britain  were  thus  in  close 
alliance,  and  immediately  began  consideration  of 
a  permanent  alliance  looking  toward  a  regulation 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     61 

of  affairs  in  Europe  after  the  war  was  ended. 
The  British  cabinet  took  up  the  question  and  in 
1813  passed  a  resolution  in  which  occurs  the  fol- 
lowing declaration:  "The  Treaty  of  Alliance 
[between  the  states  which  were  united  against 
Napoleon]  is  not  to  terminate  with  the  war,  but 
is  to  contain  defensive  engagements,  with  mutual 
obligations  to  support  the  Power  attacked  by 
France  with  a  certain  extent  of  stipulated  suc- 
cors. The  casus  foederis  is  to  be  an  attack  by 
France  on  the  European  dominions  of  any  one 
of  the  contracting  parties."  ^  This  provision  was 
kept  secret  for  the  time,  but  it  remained  the 
basis  of  the  British  policy  throughout  the  negotia- 
tions that  followed.  Castlereagh,  in  ability  and 
character  the  greatest  statesman  of  his  day,  was 
then  at  the  head  of  the  British  cabinet,  and  it 
seems  certain  that  he  inspired  its  policy. 

He  was  already  suspicious  of  the  position  of 
the  tsar  in  reference  to  France.  That  sover- 
eign had  in  no  way  relaxed  his  friendship  for  the 
French  people.  Hating  the  Bourbons  he  would 
have  prevented  their  restoration  to  the  throne, 
and  he  had  a  project  for  allowing  the  French  to 

1  Phillips,  loc.  eit.j  67. 


52      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

determine  whom  they  would  have  for  king  after 
Napoleon.  If  he  could  carry  this  plan  through 
he  would  make  himself  very  popular  in  France 
and  would  have  a  strong  position  with  the  ruler 
whose  selection  he  should  thus  make  possible. 
To  Castlereagh  this  was  nothing  but  a  shrewd 
piece  of  policy  for  laying  the  foundation  of  a 
Franco-Russian  alliance  which  would  have  over- 
weening influence  in  Europe,  and  he  set  himself 
against  its  execution.  He  was  forced  to  proceed 
cautiously,  however,  since  Napoleon  was  not 
beaten  and  the  aid  of  the  tsar  was  essential. 
There  is  nothing  to  suggest  that  Alexander  did 
not  entertain  his  French  views  in  all  singleness 
of  purpose.  The  worst  his  enemies  said  of  him 
was  that  he  was  a  dreamer ;  but  he  was  not  given 
to  a  policy  of  calculation. 

To  thwart  Alexander  and  carry  through  his 
own  views  Castlereagh  set  himself  to  "group"  the 
tsar,  that  is,  to  draw  him  into  an  agreement  with 
other  sovereigns  in  which  such  a  policy  was  ac- 
cepted as  would  serve  to  deflect  the  whole  group 
of  allies  from  the  direct  course  which  the  tsar 
would  have  followed  if  left  alone.  Early  in 
1814  a  treaty  was  signed  at  Chaimiont  by  Great 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     53 

Britain,  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia  in  which  all 
the  problems  then  before  the  allies  were  taken 
up.  The  sixteenth  article  of  the  treaty  dealt 
with  the  point  which  had  caused  Castlereagh  so 
much  anxiety.     It  ran: 

"The  present  Treaty  of  Alliance  having  for  its  object 
the  maintenance  of  the  Balance  of  Europe,  to  secure  the  re- 
pose and  independence  of  the  Powers,  and  to  prevent  the 
invasions  which  for  so  many  years  have  devastated  the 
world,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  have  agreed  among 
themselves  to  extend  its  duration  for  tw;enty  years  from 
the  date  of  signature,  and  they  reserve  the  right  of  agree- 
ing, if  circumstances  demand  it,  three  years  before  its 
expiration,  on  its   further  prolongation."  ^ 

By  this  means  Alexander  was  "grouped"  with 
his  three  allies  in  the  support  of  a  kind  of  co- 
operation which  was  not  what  he  had  hitherto 
insisted  upon.  It  is  probable  that  he  did  not 
realize  how  completely  he  was  outplayed,  when 
he  was  forced  by  the  logic  of  events  to  set  his 
hand  to  a  treaty  that  provided  for  the  Concert 
of  Europe,  and  not  for  the  league  to  which  he  had 
long  looked  forward.  At  any  rate,  he  did  not 
give  up  his  ideals  and  he  seems  to  have  thought 
that  in  the  hour  of  victory  he  could  do  what  he 

1  Phillips,  loc.  cit.,  78. 


54}      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

had  not  been  able  to  do  in  the  hour  of  necessity. 
The  Treaty  of  Chaumont  was  followed  by  the 
battle  of  Leipzig,  and  that  was  followed  by  sev- 
eral smaller  battles  in  which  the  allies  fought 
their  way  through  French  territory  until  they 
stood  before  the  gates  of  Paris  in  the  autumn  of 
1814.  Napoleon  fled  the  Nemesis  that  had  over- 
taken him,  the  city  was  opened  to  his  enemies, 
and  Alexander  I,  at  the  head  of  his  splendid 
guard,  led  the  conquering  army  down  the  broad 
avenue  of  Champs  Elysee,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
city  cheering  the  radiant  pageant.  Men  reflected 
that  two  years  earlier  a  great  French  army  had 
penetrated  to  the  Russian  city  of  Moscow  and 
found  it  smoking  ruins;  and  they  could  but 
observe  the  contrast.  It  was  worthy  of  the  great- 
ness of  the  tsar  of  the  Russias  to  show  a  gen- 
erous face  to  a  beaten  foe;  and  the  Frenchmen 
were  gallant  enough  to  receive  the  friendship  of 
the  tsar  in  the  spirit  in  which  it  was  given.  A 
lenient  treaty  by  which  France  was  saved  from 
humiliation  and  Napoleon  was  given  Elba,  was 
also  due  chiefly  to  the  good  will  of  Alexander. 
An  Englishman  on  the  spot,  who  did  not  see 
things  with  the  broad  vision  of  the  prime  min- 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     65 

ister,  wrote  that  the  tsar  "by  a  series  of  firm 
and  glorious  conduct  has  richly  deserved  the 
appellation  of  the  liberator  of  mankind."  But 
as  Alexander  continued  to  "play  the  part 
of  Providence  in  France"  the  same  writer  became 
alarmed  and  ^ve  days  later  wrote  to  London 
urging  that  Castlereagh  come  to  the  French 
capital.  The  hint  was  taken,  and  soon  the  manly 
stride  of  the  handsome  tsar  was  intercepted  by 
the  deftly  woven  webs  of  the  skilled  diplomat. 
Erelong  France  was  handed  over  to  the  Bour- 
bons, who  came  back  to  show  that  they  had 
learned  nothing  and  forgotten  nothing. 

The  center  of  interest  now  shifted  to  the  Con- 
gress of  Vienna,  whose  sessions  lasted  from 
September  10,  1814,  to  June  9,  1815.  Europe 
had  looked  forward  to  it  for  many  years  as  the 
means  of  effecting  a  wise  and  just  reform  in 
all  the  evils  that  afflicted  the  continent.  "Men 
had  promised  themselves,"  said  Gentz,  "an  a""- 
embracing  reform  of  the  political  system  of 
Europe,  guarantees  for  universal  peace,  in  one 
word,  the  return  of  the  golden  age."  Thus 
Alexander  was  not  entirely  ahead  of  his  time. 
There  were  enlightened  men  then,  as  now,  who 


56       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

hoped  for  a  spirit  that  would  rise  above  mere 
diplomatic  self-interest;  and  we  may  look  upon 
the  tsar  as  their  exponent.  But  they  were  to  be 
disappointed.  Spoils  were  to  be  divided  and  in 
the  disputes  that  the  expected  division  engen- 
dered, the  spirit  of  reform  was  dissipated. 
Alexander  spent  his  energy  in  trying  to  reestab- 
lish the  kingdom  of  Poland  with  liberal  institu- 
tions, but  his  desire  that  it  should  be  under  his 
protection  aroused  the  keenest  opposition  from 
the  neighboring  nations.  If  a  victorious  Russia 
stood  as  protector  of  a  reestablished  France  and 
a  renewed  Poland,  who  could  foretell  her  power 
in  future  dealings  among  nations?  Considering 
the  extent  to  which  jealousy  carried  the  conten- 
tions of  the  states  at  Vienna,  it  is  enough  that 
the  congress  did  not  break  up  in  an  appeal  to 
arms. 

Gentz,  whom  we  recall  as  the  secretary  of  the 
congress,  was  one  of  the  men  who  had  entertained 
hopes  that  it  would  give  a  new  and  better  form  to 
the  political  structure  of  Europe.  He  avowed 
his  disappointment  at  the  results  in  saying: 

"The  Congress  has  resulted  in  nothing  but  restorations, 
which  had  already  been  effected  by  arms,  agreements  be- 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     67 

tween  the  Great  Powers  of  little  value  for  the  future 
balance  and  preservation  of  the  peace  of  Europe,  quite  ar- 
bitrary alterations  in  the  possessions  of  the  smaller  states; 
but  no  act  of  a  higher  nature,  no  great  measure  for  public 
order  or  for  the  general  good,  which  might  compensate 
humanity  for  its  long  sufferings  or  pacify  it  for  the  future. 
.  .  .  But  to  be  just,  the  treaty,  such  as  it  is,  has  the  un- 
deniable merit  of  having  prepared  the  world  for  a  more 
complete  political  structure.  If  ever  the  Powers  should 
meet  again  to  establish  a  political  system  by  which  wars 
of  conquest  would  be  rendered  impossible,  and  the  rights 
of  all  guaranteed,  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  as  a  preparatory 
assembly,  will  not  have  been  without  use.  A  number  of 
vexatious  details  have  been  settled,  and  the  ground  has  been 
prepared  for  building  up  a  better  social  structure."  ^ 

Looking  back  over  the  past  century  it  is  hard 
to  find  justification  for  Gentz's  optimism.  The 
respite  that  Europe  had  for  a  generation  from 
war  was  due  in  a  sense  to  the  lesson  learned 
in  the  Napoleonic  struggle;  but  it  was  not  a 
permanent  lesson.  We  shall  proceed  to  examine 
the  expedients  that  came  to  be  used  for  the  end 
specified;  but  it  is  certain  that  they  did  not 
achieve  permanently  the  end  desired.  Had  the 
Congress  of  Vienna  done  all  that  was  expected 
of  it,  the  world  might  today  be  at  peace.     If  not 

1  See  Phillips,  loc.  cit.,  118. 


58      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

at  peace,  we  might  at  least  say  that  the  men  of 
the  Congress  did  all  they  could  to  secure  peace. 

If  we  ask  for  the  fundamental  cause  of  the 
failure  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna  to  satisfy  the 
hopes  of  liberal  men  in  constructing  what  Gentz 
called  "a  more  complete  political  structure,"  the 
answer  must  lie  in  the  illiberal  views  of  the  ruling 
classes  in  the  European  states.  Self-govern- 
ment was  less  developed  than  in  the  most  con- 
servative state  of  today.  Had  the  people  of  these 
states  been  in  power,  and  had  they  been  to  a  fair 
degree  trained  in  the  principles  of  good  govern- 
ment, the  result  could  hardly  have  been  as  it  was. 
But  the  ignorant  bureaucrats  and  arbitrary 
rulers  were  in  power,  men  who  in  their  own  lives 
never  knew  the  burdens  of  war,  and  to  whom 
national  egotism  appeared  a  high  virtue;  and 
they  thought  only  of  gaining  territory  for 
their  states.  They  placed  such  things  above  the 
high  opportunity  to  reform  the  political  structure 
of  Europe.  They  turned  to  the  future  with  the 
old  principles  still  dominant,  hoping  that  by  a 
system  of  concert  among  the  great  states  they 
could  stave  off  war  for  an  indefinitely  long  period. 
They  could  place  self-interest  against  self -in- 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     59 

terest,  forgetting  that  a  time  was  likely  to  come 
when  self-interest  might  lead  the  strongest  to 
dare  the  rest  of  the  world,  hoping  to  move  quickly 
in  a  moment  of  temporary  advantage  and  thus 
gain  ends  that  only  the  most  severe  sacrifices 
could  take  away.  But  that  is  a  story  reserved 
for  another  chapter. 

Before  we  take  up  the  Concert  of  Europe  we 
must  deal  with  the  Holy  Alliance,  which,  though 
but  an  interlude  in  the  play,  is  so  frequently  men- 
tioned in  the  books  that  it  cannot  be  omitted 
from  this  discussion.  It  was  signed  at  Paris, 
November  20,  1815,  and  may  be  considered  only 
one  of  the  forms  in  which  the  tsar's  ideal  was 
embodied.  Its  religious  character  made  it  the 
butt  of  ridicule  for  the  "practical"  statesmen 
of  the  day,  and  the  historian  has  been  prone  to 
look  at  it  from  their  standpoint.  But  it  was  then 
popular  to  express  political  principles  in  reli- 
gious phrases,  and  the  alliance  is  to  be  inter- 
preted by  the  purpose  that  lay  underneath,  rather 
than  by  the  mere  form  in  which  it  was  set  forth. 

As  we  have  seen,  Alexander  I  had  formulated 
his  plan  for  a  league  of  states  long  before  the  end 
of  the  war.     He  had  relaxed  his  intentions  in  no 


60       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

sense  when  he  met  Baroness  Kriidener  in  June, 
1815.  This  remarkable  woman,  though  nobly 
born,  was  a  religious  enthusiast  who  to  the  faculty 
of  intense  conviction  added  the  gift  of  preaching. 
Wherever  she  went  she  found  followers  who  hung 
on  her  words  and  yielded  themselves  to  her  im- 
passioned appeals  for  religious  devotion.  In  the 
height  of  her  enthusiasm  she  came  to  think  that 
she  had  revelations  from  God.  Many  a  popular 
revivalist  of  recent  times  could  be  compared  with 
her;  and  if  we  are  tolerant  of  their  undoubtedly 
well-meant  efforts  to  stir  humanity  to  righteous- 
ness, we  may  allow  her  also  a  fair  share  of  our 
esteem  as  a  would-be  agent  of  good  through  the 
employment  of  human  means  to  attain  human 
ends. 

Like  the  other  religious  teachers  of  the  day 
she  was  deeply  impressed  by  the  calamities  of  the 
war.  She  knew  of  the  tsar's  desire  to  establish 
a  regime  of  peace  and  came  to  believe  she  was 
divinely  called  to  induce  him  to  take  a  conspicu- 
ous step  in  that  direction.  At  first  Alexander, 
who  was  not  always  religious,  refused  to  see  her ; 
but  in  June,  1815,  an  interview  was  arranged 
while  he  was  at  Heilbron,  on  the  campaign.     He 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NA?#tE@NTC  WARS     m- 

was  deeply  impressed  and  asked  her  to  remain 
near  him.  When  he  went  to  Paris  after  the 
second  defeat  of  Napoleon  she  was  given  quarters 
near  his  palace,  and  it  was  there,  in  the  following 
autumn,  that  he  drew  up  the  plan  of  the  Holy 
Alliance. 

The  "Alliance"  was  expressed  in  the  spirit  of 
a  mediseval  religious  brotherhood.  The  signa- 
tory sovereigns  pledged  themselves  to  take  the 
will  of  God  for  highest  law,  to  give  aid  to  an  im- 
periled brother  sovereign,  and  to  hold  the  Alliance 
as  "a  true  and  indissoluble  fraternity."  The 
constituent  states  were  to  make  "one  great  Chris- 
tian nation"  and  their  sovereigns  were  to  act 
"as  delegates  of  Providence"  in  ruling  their  re- 
spective states.  If  such  an  ideal  could  have 
been  accomplished  at  all,  a  stronger  grip  of  the 
church  on  the  springs  of  government  would  have 
been  necessary  than  existed  in  that  day.  The 
tsar  proclaimed  the  Holy  Alliance  on  November 
26,  1815.  It  was  signed  by  all  the  states  of 
Europe  except  Turkey,  Great  Britain,  and  the 
Papal  State.  Great  Britain's  refusal  to  sign 
was  due  to  Castlereagh,  to  whom  the  tsar  seemed 
mentally  unbalanced.     He  gave  as  his  justifica- 


62       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

tion  that  the  prince-regent,  ruling  in  the  place  of 
his  insane  father,  had  no  authority  to  sign,  but 
said  that  he  would  support  the  principles  of  the 
Alliance.  As  it  was  to  be  a  union  of  Christian 
states  the  sultan  was  not  invited  to  sign.  The 
Pope  was  not  asked  because  of  his  overwhelming 
influence  in  matters  connected  with  religion. 
Frederick  William,  of  Prussia,  was  a  religious 
man  and  is  believed  to  have  signed  in  good  faith. 
Metternich  advised  the  emperor  of  Austria  to 
sign  but  said  that  the  document  was  mere  ver- 
biage. 

In  all  I  have  said  hitherto  about  the  tsar's  idea 
of  preserving  peace  no  definite  plan  has  been 
mentioned.  His  most  specific  utterance  was  to 
ask  for  a  league  of  nations,  but  he  said  nothing 
of  its  powers,  its  specific  organization,  or  the 
limits  of  its  action.  The  suggestion  was  vague, 
probably  because  the  mind  of  its  author  was  itself 
vague.  If  taken  seriously  it  could  be  made  to 
serve  as  the  foundation  of  a  unified  state  of 
Europe  which  might  hold  all  other  states  under 
its  hand,  a  unified  state  largely  under  the  domi- 
nation of  Russia.  That  its  author  had  no  such 
object  in  view  is  not  to  be  doubted  for  an  in- 


PROBLEMS  OF  THE  NAPOLEONIC  WARS     63 

stant;  but  who  could  tell  how  long  he  would 
remain  in  his  existing  state  of  mind,  and  how 
soon  he  might  be  succeeded  by  a  tsar  of  far  other 
spirit?  As  a  plan  for  permanent  peace  the  Holy 
AHiance  was  impossible,  not  only  because  it  was 
cast  in  religious  forms  and  thrown  to  a  world  in 
which  the  authority  of  religion  had  lost  much  of 
its  ancient  hold  on  the  minds  of  men  of  influence, 
but  because  its  indefinite  form  made  it  a  possible 
instrument  of  greater  evils  than  war. 

Beneath  its  defects,  however,  was  the  great 
idea  of  a  unified  Europe,  in  which  justice  has  the 
place  of  suspicion  and  intrigue,  in  which  runs  one 
law,  one  order,  and  one  obedience  to  the  majesty 
of  the  state.  Alexander  not  only  believed  in  such 
an  ideal,  but  he  was  willing  to  cast  his  nation  into 
the  melting-pot  in  order  to  fuse  such  a  state.  He 
could  have  given  no  better  proof  of  his  support  of 
his  ideal.  Of  course,  it  was  ahead  of  the  time, 
how  much  so  it  is  hard  to  say.  The  widespread 
popular  longing  for  permanent  peace  would  have 
gone  far  in  accepting  unification  of  the  states, 
and  in  this  sphere  of  opinion  the  religious  cast 
of  the  scheme  was  not  a  great  disadvantage.  The 
thing  which  stood  firmly  in  its  way  was  the  dull 


&4f      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

practicality  of  the  upper,  ruling  class.  If  it 
could  have  passed  these  lions  in  the  way,  it  might 
have  had  a  chance  of  working  its  way  forward 
into  some  acceptable  forai  of  a  league  in  per- 
petuity. But  it  is  a  big  if  that  I  have  used. 
Upper  ruling  classes  know  more  about  govern- 
ment than  the  lower  classes,  and  that  is  a  source 
of  conservatism.  The  lower  classes,  knowing 
little,  usually  act  upon  their  impulses;  the  mem- 
bers of  the  upper,  ruling  class,  having  informa- 
tion in  varying  degrees,  usually  strike  an  aver- 
age of  mediocre  enlightenment,  and  it  is  a  difficult 
thing  for  a  new  idea  to  gain  possession  of  them. 
In  1815  the  upper,  ruling  class  was  well  settled 
in  power  in  Europe,  and  it  was  most  convinced 
of  its  superior  wisdom.  It  never  accepted  the 
tsar's  plan;  and  failing  to  get  its  acceptance  the 
plan  was  futile. 


CHAPTER  IV 

EUROPE  UNDER  THE  CONCERT  OF  THE  POWERS 

Having  disposed  of  Alexander's  plan  for  a 
federation  of  nations  it  now  remains  to  consider 
the  other  plan  which,  under  the  name  of  "Con- 
cert of  Europe,"  was  adopted  by  Castlereagh  and 
Metternich,  though  not  for  the  same  purpose  as 
that  which  had  inspired  the  tsar.  Its  funda- 
mental idea  had  been  in  the  positions  taken  by 
Pitt  and  Castlereagh  when  replying  to  the  tsar's 
proposals,  but  it  found  its  official  basis  in  a  Treaty 
of  Alliance  signed  by  Great  Britain,  Russia, 
Austria,  and  Prussia  at  Paris,  November  20, 
1815,  the  same  day  they  accepted  the  Holy 
Alliance.  Its  chief  provisions  were  as  follows: 
1.  The  Powers  bound  themselves  to  see  that 
the  second  treaty  of  Paris,  regulating  affairs  be- 
tween France  and  the  allies,  was  executed.  2. 
They  agreed  to  meet  from  time  to  time  to  take 
cognizance  of  the  state  of  affairs  in  Europe.  3. 
They  promised  to  suppress  any  recurrence  of  the 

65 


66      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

revolutionary  activity  of  France.  4.  They  set- 
tled upon  the  quota  of  men  and  supplies  that  each 
nation  should  furnish  in  case  common  action  he- 
came  necessary.  5.  They  undertook  to  "con- 
solidate the  intimate  tie  which  unites  the  four 
sovereigns  for  the  happiness  of  the  world."  The 
most  important  of  these  provisions  for  the  pur- 
pose of  this  inquiry  was  the  second,  taken  in  con- 
nection with  the  fifth. 

The  first  meeting  that  may  be  said  to  have  been 
called  under  the  agreement  was  the  Conference 
of  Aix-la-Chapelle,  in  1818.  It  was  called  to 
determine  whether  or  not  France  should  be  re- 
lieved of  her  garrisons  of  occupation,  a  matter 
which  was  soon  adjusted.  Alexander  I  saw 
his  opportunity  and  urged  that  the  sovereigns 
should  take  steps  to  make  the  Holy  Alliance  a 
more  vital  kind  of  league.  But  Castlereagh  in- 
terposed, as  in  former  meetings,  and  turned  the 
efforts  of  the  tsar  aside  without  arousing  his  dis- 
pleasure. This  may  be  considered  the  last  gasp 
of  the  Holy  Alliance,  as  it  was  the  complete  tri- 
umph of  the  Concert  over  it.  At  the  same  time 
France  was  admitted  to  the  alliance  of  the  four 
powers,  which  henceforth  was  known  as  the  Quin- 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS     67 

tuple  Alliance.  But  if  ever  a  question  were 
to  come  up  in  which  France  was  at  variance  with 
the  four  other  Powers  over  matters  connected 
with  her  obligations  assumed  in  recent  treaties, 
these  four  Powers  would  continue  to  act  in  their 
old  capacity.  Mr.  W.  A.  Phillips  remarks  that 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  still  survived  as  "a  rod 
in  pickle  for  a  France  but  doubtfully  disciplined." 
For  us,  who  are  chiefly  concerned  to  see  the  result 
of  the  attempt  to  take  the  affairs  of  Europe  un- 
der the  protection  of  the  great  Powers,  it  is  suffi- 
cient to  remember  that  France  gave  no  further 
trouble  of  the  kind  anticipated,  and  that  the 
Quintuple  Alliance,  as  the  formal  expression  of 
the  Concert  of  Europe,  had  other  problems  to 
consider. 

The  first  arose  out  of  revolutions  in  Spain 
and  Naples,  where  armed  men  seized  the  power 
and  forced  the  kings  to  accept  liberal  constitu- 
tions. Alexander  I  and  Metternich  looked  on 
with  different  feelings.  The  former  had  been 
encouraging  the  liberals  in  Italy  and  was  not 
greatly  shocked  by  the  revolution  there,  but  he 
was  deeply  concerned  over  the  upheaval  in  Spain 
and  would  have  led  a  Russian  army  thither  to 


68      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

suppress  it.  The  suggestion  alarmed  Metter- 
nieh,  who  did  not  relish  the  idea  of  Alexander's 
marching  through  Austrian  lands  with  a  great 
body  of  men.  He  did  what  he  could  to  dis- 
courage the  expedition  against  Spain.  At  the 
same  time  he  believed  that  Naples  should  be 
disciplined,  since  its  revolution  endangered  the 
safety  of  Austrian  possessions  in  Italy.  It  is 
amusing  to  see  how  self-interest  ran  across  the 
currents  of  the  general  good  as  proclaimed  in  the 
Concert  of  Europe. 

The  tsar  thought  the  situation  warranted  call- 
ing another  conference  of  the  Quintuple  Alliance. 
Metternich  objected,  being  chiefly  concerned  by 
the  seeming  certainty  that  the  tsar  would  wish 
to  carry  into  the  situation  his  well-known  views 
in  support  of  liberalism.  To  him  it  seemed  suffi- 
cient that  the  powers  should  agree  severally  to 
give  their  arms  to  the  suppression  of  revolution, 
without  meeting  in  conference.  After  much 
discussion  a  conference  was  called,  at  Troppau, 
but  it  was  regularly  attended  by  only  three  of 
the  five  powers.  The  suppression  of  constitu- 
tional government  was  not  popular  in  Great 
Britain,  and  her  government  took  no  official  part 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS     69 

in  the  conference.  France  held  aloof  also;  she 
was  so  much  under  the  protection  of  Great 
Britain  that  she  did  not  dare  risk  British  dis- 
pleasure by  allying  herself  with  the  forces  of  re- 
pression. 

Did  the  absence  of  two  nations  from  Troppau 
presage  the  dissolution  of  the  Alliance?  Castle- 
reagh  gave  a  negative  reply.  His  nation,  he  said, 
was  not  bound  beyond  her  treaty  obligations,  the 
terms  of  which  were  clear  and  specific.  They 
were  embodied  in  the  Treaties  of  Chaumont  and 
Paris.  He  considered  the  project  of  dealing  with 
revolution  in  its  present  form  as  beyond  the  mean- 
ing of  these  agreements.  "If,"  he  said,  "it  is  de- 
sired to  extend  the  Alliance  so  as  to  include  all 
objects  present  and  future,  foreseen  and  unfore- 
seen, it  would  change  its  character  to  such  an  ex- 
tent and  carry  us  so  far,  that  we  should  see  in  it 
an  additional  motive  for  adhering  to  our  course  at 
the  risk  of  seeing  the  Alliance  move  away  from  us 
without  our  having  quitted  it."  These  frank 
words  show  that  the  Alliance  was  strained  but 
not  broken.  It  would  seem  that  a  system  like 
that  of  which  we  speak  should  have  at  bottom 
some  broad  common  principles.     In  purpose  it 


70      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

should  be  harmonious.  As  between  the  prevail- 
ing British  idea  of  liberty  and  Metternieh's  ideas 
of  legitimacy  there  was  no  ground  for  mutual 
support ;  and  out  of  this  divergence  of  views  was 
to  grow  the  disruption  of  the  Alliance,  as  we  shall 
soon  see. 

Up  to  this  time  the  two  ideas  that  had  run  side 
by  side  were  the  tsar's  plan  for  a  league  to  se- 
cure cooperation  of  a  general  nature  and  the 
British  plan  limiting  common  action  to  a  few 
specific  matters,  chiefly  connected  with  the  re- 
pression of  France  in  case  she  wished  to  return 
to  a  policy  which  would  threaten  the  peace  of 
Europe.  As  it  became  increasingly  apparent 
that  France  was  no  longer  a  menace  this  type  of 
union  became  less  important,  and  the  British 
ardor  for  it  cooled,  especially  since  it  was  becom- 
ing more  and  more  certain  that  the  Alliance  was 
being  used  to  support  repression. 

At  the  same  time  a  change  was  passing  through 
the  mind  of  the  tsar.  In  all  he  had  done  he  had 
been  supported  by  liberal  ministers,  against  whose 
influence  at  his  court  Metternich  did  not  hesitate 
to  intrigue.  Alexander's  conversion  to  the  cause 
of  repression  came  suddenly  and  completely  in 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS     71 

1820,  when  there  was  a  mutiny  in  a  favorite  reg- 
iment of  his  guard.  Sober  advisers  pointed  out 
to  him  that  the  action  of  the  regiment  had  no 
pohtical  significance,  but  he  would  not  be  con- 
vinced. He  insisted  he  would  not  countenance 
revolt  abroad,  lest  it  encourage  insurrection  at 
home.  All  the  fervor  he  had  shown  in  behalf  of 
liberal  ideas  he  now  manifested  in  behalf  of  re- 
pression. At  Troppau  he  met  Metternich  in  a 
spirit  of  profound  repentance  for  what  he  had 
done  in  the  past,  saying  with  an  outburst  of 
emotion:  "So  we  are  at  one.  Prince,  and  it  is  to 
you  that  we  owe  it.  You  have  correctly  judged 
the  state  of  affairs.  I  deplore  the  waste  of  time, 
which  we  must  try  to  repair.  I  am  here  with- 
out any  fixed  ideas ;  without  any  plan ;  but  I  bring 
you  a  firm  and  unalterable  resolution.  It  is  for 
your  Emperor  to  use  it  as  he  wills.  Tell  me  what 
you  desire,  and  what  you  wish  me  to  do,  and  I 
will  do  it."  The  speech  astonished  the  Prince 
as  much  as  it  pleased  him.  All  his  schemes  had 
lost  in  the  defection  of  Castlereagh,  and  probably 
more,  was  made  up  in  the  accession  of  his  new 
ally.  Not  only  was  the  cause  of  legitimacy,  as 
he  advocated  it,  made  safe;  but  the  danger  was 


7a      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

removed  of  a  Franco-Russian  alliance,  always 
a  thing  to  be  dreaded  by  the  great  Powers  in 
the  center  of  Europe. 

In  the  conference  at  Troppau,  Austria,  Russia, 
and  Prussia  now  acted  together.  Up  to  that 
time  Metternich  had  ignored  the  Holy  Alliance. 
He  now  brought  it  out  as  his  stalking  horse. 
The  three  sovereigns,  controlling  the  conference, 
issued  a  declaration  suspending  from  the  Alliance 
any  state  that  tolerated  revolution  in  its  borders 
and  declaring  that  the  other  Powers  in  the 
Alliance  would  bring  back  the  offending  state  by 
force  of  arms.  Under  the  indefinite  terms  of  the 
instrument  this  was  a  legal  interpretation  of 
power,  but  it  was  not  in  the  spirit  of  the  benevo- 
lent sovereign  who  made  the  Holy  Alliance  pos- 
sible. 

Those  of  us  who  now  favor  a  league  or  fed- 
eration of  states  as  a  means  of  preserving  peace 
perpetually  may  well  study  the  crisis  to  which  a 
similar  system  had  come  in  the  development  of 
international  relations  in  1820.  The  tsar's  ideal 
was  a  thing  of  glory  thrown  before  a  sordid 
world.  Not  even  he,  as  we  see,  was  proof  against 
the    debasement    of    his    surroundings.     If    his 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS     73 

plan  had  been  adopted  by  all  the  nations,  it  is 
likely  that  the  time  would  have  come  when 
the  confederation  thus  formed  would  have  be- 
come an  agency  for  reaction  against  which  liberal 
views  would  have  been  unable  to  contend. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  not  ignore  the 
weight  that  a  confederation  would  have  had  as 
an  idea  in  promoting  respect  for  liberal  govern- 
ment. If  it  had  been  established  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  tsar,  it  may  well  have  been  that 
Metternich  would  not  have  taken  up  the  crusade 
of  legitimacy,  that  the  tsar  and  Castlereagh 
acting  together  in  behalf  of  liberal  institutions 
would  have  insured  a  steadier  attitude  on  the 
part  of  the  former,  and  that  under  such  circum- 
stances the  kings  of  Spain  and  Naples  would 
have  been  less  inclined  to  the  severe  measures 
which  provoked  revolution.  Of  course,  these 
are  mere  conjectures,  but  it  is  only  fair  to  men- 
tion them  as  things  to  be  said  for  the  other  side 
of  the  question. 

When  we  come  to  apply  the  lessons  of  1815- 
1820  to  the  present  day,  we  must  not  forget  that 
conditions  are  now  very  greatly  changed.  It 
was  the  supremacy  of  arbitrary  government  in 


74      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Europe  that  made  the  hopes  of  1815  come  to 
naught.  Of  all  the  agents  who  then  controlled 
affairs  in  the  great  states  of  Europe,  Castlereagh, 
next  to  the  tsar,  was  the  most  liberal.  If  a  plan 
of  union  were  adopted  after  the  present  war,  it 
might  not  be  a  success,  but  the  failure  would  not 
be  for  the  same  reasons  as  those  that  brought 
the  Alliance  of  1815  to  a  nullity. 

Castlereagh  made  a  protest  against  the  pur- 
poses of  the  three  Powers  at  Troppau  in  which 
were  some  telling  arguments  against  such  a 
league  as  was  threatening.  They  were  well  made 
and  would  be  applicable  to  the  situation  today, 
if  it  were  proposed  to  establish  a  league  like  that 
which  found  favor  at  Troppau.  The  plan  pro- 
posed, said  he,  was  too  general  in  its  scope.  It 
gave  the  projected  confederation  the  right  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  independent 
states  on  the  ground  that  the  general  good  was 
concerned,  and  if  carried  out  the  Alliance  would, 
in  effect,  be  charged  with  the  function  of  policing 
such  states.  Against  all  this  he  protested,  and 
he  pointed  out  that  so  many  grounds  of  dissatis- 
faction lay  in  the  scheme  that  to  try  to  enforce 
it  would  surely  lead  to  counter  alliances,  the  end 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS     75 

of  which  would  be  war  It  ought  to  be  said,  also, 
that  Castlereagh  was  opposed  to  giving  up  war 
as  a  means  of  setthng  disputes.  "The  extreme 
right  of  interference,"  he  said,  "between  nation 
and  nation  can  never  be  made  a  matter  of  writ- 
ten stipulation  or  be  assumed  as  the  attribute  of 
an  alliance."  If  a  man  takes  that  position  he 
can  hardly  be  expected  to  see  good  points  in  any 
scheme  to  preserve  peace  perpetually. 

The  evils  he  pointed  out  are  largely  eliminated 
in  the  modern  plans  that  are  offered.  For  ex- 
ample, the  jurisdiction  of  the  proposed  leagues 
or  federations  is  strictly  limited  to  the  enforce- 
ment of  peace.  A  supreme  court  held  by  emi- 
nent judges  would  pass  upon  cases  as  they 
come  up  and  say  whether  or  not  the  central  au- 
thority should  employ  force.  Under  the  plan  it 
would  be  hard  to  bring  a  purely  internal  ques- 
tion before  the  court,  and  if  brought  there  it 
would  not  be  considered  by  the  judges,  since  the 
pact  of  the  federation  would  specify  that  such 
cases  were  not  to  be  tried.  The  pact  would  be 
the  constitution  of  the  federation,  and  the  court 
would  be  expected  to  pass  on  the  constitutionality 
of  measures  from  the  standpoint  of  that  instru- 


76       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

merit.  Under  a  system  like  that  recently  ad- 
vocated a  revolution  in  Naples  would  have  to  be 
submitted  to  a  court  whose  members  were  ap- 
pointed from  states  in  which  free  institutions 
are  in  existence.  It  could  not  be  the  tool  of 
a  Metternich.  Under  such  a  system  the  whim  of 
a  tsar,  if  such  a  ruler  ever  again  wears  a  crown, 
could  not  make  or  mar  a  question  like  that 
which  underlay  the  calling  of  the  Conference  of 
Troppau.  So  many  are  the  differences  that  it 
is,  perhaps,  not  profitable  to  dwell  longer  on 
this  point.  The  study  of  the  peace  problem  and 
the  attempt  to  solve  it  a  hundred  years  ago  is 
extremely  interesting  to  one  who  considers  the 
situation  now  existing,  but  it  is  chiefly  because 
the  mind,  having  grasped  the  development  of  the 
former  problem  and  become  accustomed  to  see 
the  process  as  a  whole,  is  in  a  better  state  to  un- 
derstand the  present  and  to  know  wherein  it 
differs  from  the  past  and  in  what  respect  old 
factors  are  supplemented  by  new  factors.  Such 
lessons  from  the  past  are  open  to  all  who  will  but 
read. 

These  reflections  should  not  make  us  forget  the 
main  thread  of  our  story,  which  became  relatively 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS     77 

weak  after  Troppau.  From  that  time  it  was 
clear  that  Europe  had  no  hopes  of  peace  through 
cooperation  under  either  of  the  two  plans  that 
had  been  suggested.  Almost  immediately  began 
a  train  of  events  which  gave  added  impulse  to  the 
dissolution  of  the  Alliance.  In  1821  began  the 
Greek  War  of  Independence.  Austria  was  in 
consternation  lest  the  revolution  should  spread 
to  her  own  people.  Russia,  however,  was  deeply 
sympathetic  with  the  Greeks,  partly  through 
religious  affiliations  and  partly  because  the  Rus- 
sian people,  looking  toward  the  possession  of 
Constantinople,  were  anxious  to  weaken  the 
Turk  in  any  of  his  European  possessions. 
Alexander  I  showed  signs  of  going  to  war  for 
the  Greeks,  and  Metternich  hastily  sought  to 
counteract  any  such  course. 

At  the  same  time  the  situation  in  Spain's 
American  colonies  was  becoming  more  urgent, 
because  the  weakness  of  the  government  had 
stimulated  the  South  American  revolutionists  to 
renewed  activity  until  Mexico  as  well  as  the  rest 
of  the  Continental  colonies  except  Peru  was  in 
successful  revolt.  Metternich  would  have  helped 
Turkey   against   the    Greeks    and   allowed   the 


78       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

tsar  to  carry  out  his  long  cherished  wish  of  inter- 
vening in  Spain,  as  a  means  of  keeping  him  quiet. 
The  situation  seemed  to  call  for  another  confer- 
ence and  after  some  discussion  a  meeting  was 
arranged  at  Verona,  1822.  France  was  anxious 
to  take  over  the  task  of  punishing  the  Spanish 
revolutionists,  and  as  Russia,  Austria,  and  Prus- 
sia agreed  to  her  plan,  four  of  the  five  Great 
Powers  now  stood  side  by  side  in  favor  of  repres- 
sion. They  would  have  gone  further,  and  settled 
the  fate  of  the  American  revolutionists,  but 
against  that  course  Great  Britain  made  such  a 
protest  that  the  question  was  left  open. 

It  was  not  definitely  closed  until  the  next  year, 
and  then  through  the  action  of  the  United  States, 
taken  in  association  with  Great  Britain.  For 
when  France  had  performed  her  task,  she  looked 
forward  to  taking  some  of  the  Spanish  colonies  as 
indemnity  for  her  expenses.  The  principle  of 
federation  among  the  Powers  was  working  so  well 
that  it  was  considered  only  a  natural  thing  to 
call  another  conference  at  which  France  could  be 
assigned  the  right  of  conquering  the  colonies. 
Canning,  at  the  head  of  the  British  government, 
was  genuinely  alarmed.     The  four  united  Powers 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS      79 

were  willing  to  defy  Great  Britain  if  she  stood 
alone.  He  turned  to  the  United  States  as  the 
only  ally  in  sight.  Would  we  support  him  in  op- 
position to  the  designs  of  the  Powers?  President 
Monroe,  influenced  by  John  Quincy  Adams' 
stout  patriotism,  replied  in  the  affirmative  and 
went  a  step  further;  for  he  insisted  that  the  de- 
fiance of  the  Powers  should  be  announced  in 
Washington,  not  as  a  mere  expedient  to  meet  an 
isolated  case,  but  as  a  general  policy  of  our  gov- 
ernment. The  Monroe  Doctrine  was  one  of  the 
things  that  broke  up  the  Quintuple  Alliance, 
already  weakened  by  the  alienation  of  Great 
Britain. 

The  last  blow  was  the  revolution  in  France 
in  1830,  which  drove  the  Bourbon  king  into  exile 
and  made  a  liberal  government  possible.  At  the 
same  time  so  strong  were  the  manifestations  of 
republicanism  in  other  countries  that  the  old  con- 
servatism was  lowered  in  tone  and  chastened  in 
pride.  From  France  the  revolutionary  move- 
ment passed  into  Belgium,  which  the  Congress  of 
Vienna  had  decreed  should  be  a  part  of  the  king- 
dom of  the  Netherlands.  So  completely  was  the 
revolution  successful  that  even  the  Great  Powers 


80       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

had  to  bow  to  it,  and  in  a  congress  at  London 
they  recognized  Belgium  as  a  separate  state  and 
saw  it  set  up  a  liberal  constitution  with  a  king  at 
the  head  of  the  government.  Several  of  the 
small  German  governments  also  adopted  more 
liberal  forms.  Poland  broke  into  rebellion  and 
before  its  power  of  resistance  was  crushed  by 
Russia  the  infection  spread  into  Lithuania  and 
Podolia.  At  last  the  arms  of  the  tsar  over- 
powered all  resistance  and  peace  reigned ;  but  the 
reactionaries  were  sobered,  and  the  dream  of  a 
league  to  enforce  repression  passed  away. 

Glancing  backward  we  may  see  through  what 
a  development  the  ideas  of  reform  had  passed. 
Europe,  distressed  by  the  wars  of  1800-1815, 
had  hungered  for  peace.  Having  issued  from  a 
decade  of  discussion  of  liberty  and  humanity,  the 
friends  of  freedom  were  more  than  ordinarily 
earnest  for  replacing  war  by  an  age  of  reason. 
In  our  own  day  the  cause  of  universal  peace 
stands  on  a  broader  and  better  laid  foundation 
than  a  hundred  years  ago,  but  it  is,  perhaps,  no 
more  impressive.  At  any  rate  the  philosophically 
inclined  men  of  the  earlier  period  supported  Kant 
and  Rousseau,  among  them,  Alexander  I.     A 


EUROPE  UNDER  CONCERT  OF  POWERS     81 

considerable  portion  of  the  world  believed  that 
the  outcome  of  the  war  madness  then  reigning 
must  be  an  era  of  sanity. 

We  have  seen  that  two  plans  of  improvement 
were  formed  in  the  minds  of  men  who  were  in 
position  to  have  practical  influence:  the  tsar's 
scheme  for  a  league,  or  federation,  that  was  so 
strongly  integrated  that  the  central  authority 
should  be  able  to  enforce  its  commands  upon  con- 
stituent states;  and  the  plan  of  Castlereagh  for 
prolonging  the  existing  system  of  cooperation  in 
a  form  which  we  may  call  the  Concert  of  the 
Great  Powers.  We  have  seen  that  the  tsar's 
plan,  ignored  at  first,  was  seized  on  by  Metter- 
nich  as  a  possibility  for  enforcing  a  system  of  re- 
action, that  it  met  the  opposition  of  Great  Brit- 
ain and  aroused  the  revolutionary  protest  of 
1830,  and  thus  it  came  to  an  end.  It  was  never 
the  dream  of  any  of  the  philosophers  that  a  fed- 
eration should  be  formed  which  might  become  an 
engine  of  despotism,  yet  practical  use  showed 
that  such  a  course  was  within  the  bounds  of  pos- 
sibility. The  mere  glimpse  of  such  a  thing  was 
enough  to  make  Europe  prefer  the  old  era  of 
wars. 


82       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

One  does  not  have  to  look  far  into  the  situation 
to  see  that  the  real  failure  of  the  plan  was  due 
to  the  wide  use  of  arbitrary  government  in  Eu- 
rope. Had  Austria,  Russia,  and  Prussia  been 
ruled  by  the  people,  either  as  republics  or  as  lib- 
eral monarchies,  the  great  alliance  of  Europe 
could  hardly  have  been  turned  to  the  side  of  re- 
pression; and  under  the  guidance  of  enlightened 
statesmen  it  might  have  been  the  beginning  of  a 
long  era  of  peace  and  international  good  will. 
The  failure  of  the  nineteenth  century,  therefore, 
does  not  prove  that  federation  is  essentially  im- 
possible. It  only  proves  that  a  century  ago  the 
world  was  not  ready  to  employ  it  successfully. 


CHAPTER  V 

THE  LATER  PHASES  OF  THE  CONCERT  OF  EUROPE 

The  revolutionary  movement  of  1830  did  not 
destroy  the  influence  of  Metternich  in  Europe. 
He  was  too  able  a  man  to  be  overthrown  as  leader 
of  the  legitimists  merely  because  the  people  were 
in  a  ferment.  To  his  party  he  was  still  the  man 
to  be  trusted,  and  as  legitimacy  managed  to  beat 
down  revolution  in  most  of  the  areas  in  which 
commotion  appeared,  the  scope  of  his  power  was 
wide,  although  it  was  evident  that  he  could  not 
use  it  with  former  impunity. 

At  the  same  time  he  gave  up  the  pretense  of 
making  the  Alliance  of  the  Powers  a  federation. 
He  was  content  to  try  to  secure  that  concert  of 
action  that  would  enable  the  states  that  leaned 
to  legitimacy  to  act  together  against  incipient 
revolution;  and  for  a  time  he  was  successful. 
In  anticipation  of  the  failure  of  the  plan  to  per- 
mit France  to  interfere  in  the  Spanish  colonies, 
Canning  exclaimed:     "Things  are  getting  back 

83 


84      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

to  a  wholesome  state  again.  Every  nation  for 
itself  and  God  for  us  all!"  But  the  cry  of  joy 
was  premature.  The  time  had  not  returned  in 
which  each  crisis  was  to  be  met  in  its  own  way, 
without  reference  to  a  recognized  concert  of  ac- 
tion, and  the  reason  was  the  deep  consciousness 
of  the  states  that  certain  grave  questions  that 
ever  hung  over  the  horizon  had  in  them  the  pos- 
sibilities of  general  war.  Let  one  of  these  ques- 
tions loom  large,  and  common  action  was  taken 
to  avert  the  threatened  danger.  In  such  way  the 
Concert  of  Europe  was  kept  alive,  and  remained 
something  to  be  reckoned  with  as  a  part  of  the 
background  of  European  policy.  In  spite  of 
its  temporary  disuse,  it  was  a  thing  to  be  brought 
forth  again  if  the  nations  decided  that  it  was 
needed  to  meet  an  emergency. 

In  fact,  it  reappeared  many  times  in  the  course 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  notably  in  1840,  when 
the  so-called  Eastern  question  became  promi- 
nent. At  that  time  Mehemet  Ali,  who  had  made 
himself  lord  of  Egypt  and  seized  Syria,  was 
threatening  Constantinople,  having  the  support 
of  France.  Russia  became  alarmed,  made  a 
close  alliance  with  the  sultan,  and  seemed  about 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCERT  85 

to  get  that  secure  foothold  on  the  Bosphorus  for 
which  she  had  striven  many  years.  Great  Brit- 
ain, Austria,  and  Prussia  resented  this  prospect 
and  took  steps  jointly  to  counteract  it.  Their 
object  was  to  preserve  Turkey  from  the  dangers 
that  threatened  to  divide  her.  Before  such  a 
combination  Russia  was  not  able  to  stand,  and 
she  gave  up  her  pretensions  in  order  to  join  the 
other  three  powers.  France,  however,  held  to 
her  purpose,  supporting  the  adventurer  of 
Egypt.  Thus  it  happened  that  the  four  Great 
Powers,  reviving  the  Concert  of  Europe,  but 
leaving  out  the  government  of  Louis  Philippe, 
had  a  conference  in  London  to  settle  Eastern 
affairs.  They  decided  to  offer  Mehemet  Ali  cer- 
tain concessions  and  to  make  war  on  him  if  he 
refused  to  accept  them.  He  spurned  their  coun- 
sel and  was  expelled  from  Syria  but  was  saved 
from  utter  destruction  by  the  interference  of 
France,  who  secured  a  settlement  by  which  he 
was  left  in  firm  possession  of  Egypt,  as  heredi- 
tary ruler  under  the  nominal  authority  of  Tur- 
key. All  the  powers  now  united  in  an  agree- 
ment by  which  Turkey  was  to  exclude  foreign 
warships  from  the  Dardanelles.     Thus,  by  an 


86      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

appeal  to  the  principle  of  the  Concert  of  Europe, 
a  grave  crisis  was  averted,  and  war  between 
Great  Britain  and  Russia  was  avoided. 

In  1848,  seven  years  after  the  conclusion  of 
these  negotiations,  Europe  was  thrown  into  con- 
vulsions by  the  appearance  of  a  new  era  of 
revolution.  France  became  a  republic,  and  Ger- 
many, Austria,  and  Hungary  went  through  such 
violent  upheavals  that  the  existence  of  arbitrary 
government  hung  for  a  time  in  the  balance.  Out 
of  the  struggle  emerged  Napoleon  III,  of 
France,  who  thought  some  military  achievement 
was  necessary  to  stabilize  his  power.  At  that 
time  Russia  was  asserting  a  protectorate  over  all 
Christians  in  Turkey,  and  it  was  generally  be- 
lieved that  she  was  about  to  establish  vital  politi- 
cal control.  Napoleon  took  up  the  sword  against 
her  and  Great  Britain  came  to  help,  the  result 
being  the  Crimean  War,  1854-1856. 

In  the  beginning  of  this  struggle  the  Concert 
of  Europe  seemed  to  be  dead,  but  two  years  of 
heavy  fighting  and  nearly  futile  losses  brought  it 
to  life  again.  The  war,  which  began  in  an  out- 
burst of  international  rivalry,  ended  in  the  Con- 
ference of  Paris,  1856,  in  which  all  the  Great 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCERT  87 

Powers  but  Prussia  undertook  to  settle  the 
Eastern  question  by  neutralizing  the  Euxine  and 
the  Danube  and  by  making  new  allotments  of 
territory  which  were  supposed  to  adjust  bound- 
aries in  such  a  manner  that  rivalries  would  dis- 
appear. The  Conference  went  on  to  take  up  the 
work  of  a  true  European  congress  by  agreeing 
upon  the  Declaration  of  Paris,  in  which  were 
assembled  a  body  of  rules  regulating  neutral 
trade  in  time  of  war.  England  gave  up  her  long 
defended  pretension  to  seize  enemy  goods  on 
neutral  ships  and  neutral  goods  on  enemy  ships, 
and  in  return  gained  the  recognition  that  priva- 
teering was  unlawful.  Thus  the  Crimean  War, 
fought  by  Great  Britain  and  France  against 
Russia,  and  in  support  of  Turkey — with  Austria 
and  Prussia  as  neutrals — was  at  last  ended  by 
an  agreement  between  all  the  parties  concerned. 
The  nations  undertook  to  settle  the  long  Eastern 
dispute  by  pledging  the  sultan  to  reforms  which 
it  was  not  in  his  nature  to  carry  out. 

The  next  three  wars  were  fought  without 
respect  to  the  Concert  of  Europe.  They  arose 
from  local  causes  and  were  soon  determined  with- 
out the  aid  of  the  Great  Powers.     They  were  the 


88      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

war  of  Austria  and  France  over  the  liberation  of 
Italy,  1859 ;  the  war  between  Prussia  and  Austria, 
1866,  in  which  Prussia  overthrew  the  Austrian 
predominancy  in  Germany;  and  the  Franco- 
Prussian  war  in  1870-1871,  in  which  Prussia 
crushed  France  and  made  herself  the  head  of  the 
German  Empire.  In  the  first  of  these  struggles 
no  state  could  gain  enough  power  to  become  a 
menace  to  the  other  states,  since  Italy  was  to  be 
the  recipient  of  all  territory  gained.  Had  the 
contest  gone  so  far  as  to  promise  the  vast  en- 
largement of  the  power  of  France  by  reason  of 
an  alliance  with  enlarged  Italy,  interference 
might  have  resulted.  In  fact,  the  German  states 
began  to  suspect  such  a  result,  and  the  realization 
of  it  was  one  of  Napoleon's  reasons  for  with- 
drawing very  unceremoniously  from  the  war. 
Here  we  see,  therefore,  that  the  principle  of  con- 
cert was  not  entirely  dead.  The  second  and  third 
wars  were  fought  by  a  brilliantly  organized  state, 
Prussia,  with  whose  successful  armies  no  nation 
cared  to  make  a  trial  of  strength. 

In  1877  Russia  made  war  on  Turkey  and  pro- 
ceeded with  such  energy  that  she  soon  forced 
the  sultan  to  sign  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano,  al- 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCERT  89 

together  in  favor  of  Russia.  The  particulars 
of  the  struggle  belong  to  another  chapter/  but 
here  it  is  only  necessary  to  point  out  that  the 
Concert  of  Europe  was  now  suddenly  revived  by 
the  Great  Powers,  and  Russia  was  forced  to  sub- 
mit her  well  won  victory  to  the  Congress  of  Ber- 
lin, which  scaled  down  the  awards  of  San  Stef  ano 
until  Russia  might  well  ask  what  was  left  of  her 
victory.  A  similar  thing  happened  in  the  Bal- 
kan War  of  1912-1913.  Here  the  parties  con- 
cerned had  fought  their  quarrel  out  to  the  end 
and  had  nearly  expelled  Turkey  from  Europe, 
dividing  the  spoils  among  themselves.  Then 
in  stepped  the  Great  Powers,  prescribing  in  a 
treaty  at  London  the  limits  of  gain  to  the  suc- 
cessful contestants.  They  acted  in  the  interest 
of  peace ;  for  Austria,  watching  the  actions  of  Ser- 
bia and  Greece,  let  it  be  known  that  she  would 
not  allow  Serbia  to  have  Albania,  and  the  Powers 
interfered  in  order  to  prevent  such  action  from 
kindling  a  great  European  war. 

Thus  in  three  notable  wars,  the  Crimean  War, 
the  Russo-Turkish  War,  and  the  Balkan  War, 
the  action  of  the  Great  Powers  was  not  to  pre- 

1  See  below,  p.  112. 


90      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

vent  war,  but  to  neutralize  its  gains.  So  far  did 
this  principle  go  that  writers  were  known  to  sug- 
gest that  war  would  no  longer  be  profitable  to 
nations,  since  in  a  Concert  of  Europe  the  Great 
Powers  would  ever  nullify  the  gains  of  the  con- 
testants. 

At  this  time  concert  had  come  to  mean  another 
thing  than  it  meant  in  the  decade  after  the  fall 
of  Napoleon.  Then  it  was  a  fixed  system  of  con- 
sultation and  decision  in  anticipation  of  some 
issue  that  threatened  war:  now  it  was  concerted 
action  to  keep  a  local  war  from  going  so  far 
as  to  involve  a  general  conflict.  It  was  a 
last  resort  in  the  presence  of  dire  danger.  A 
more  present  means  of  preserving  peace  was  the 
Balance  of  Power,  which  consisted  in  forming 
the  states  in  groups  one  of  which  balanced  an- 
other group  and  prevented  the  development  of 
overwhelming  strength.  The  principle  was  well 
known  in  the  past  history  of  Europe,  but  it  was 
never  so  clearly  defined  in  the  remote  past  as  in 
the  last  half  century.  For  our  purposes  its 
modern  phase  begins  after  the  Franco-Prussian 
War,  1870-1871. 

Before  that  time  Prussia  was  strong  in  Europe 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCERT  91 

but  not  over-whelmingly  great.  On  one  side 
was  Austria,  long  her  enemy,  and  on  the  other 
was  France.  Within  five  years  they  were  de- 
feated with  such  quick  and  crushing  blows  that 
the  world  was  startled  and  the  Germans  them- 
selves were  as  much  astonished  as  delighted. 
Out  of  this  brilliant  period  of  success  arose  the 
German  Empire,  with  Prussia  for  its  corner- 
stone and  Bismarck  for  its  builder  and  guardian. 
Immediately  a  singular  thing  happened.  One 
would  hardly  expect  that  a  beaten  state  would 
straightway  form  an  alliance  with  the  power  that 
had  humiliated  her;  yet  such  a  relation  was  es- 
tablished between  Germany  and  Austria,  and  it 
has  lasted  to  this  day.  Where  Germany  has 
loved  Austria  has  loved,  where  Germany  has 
hated  Austria  has  hated,  and  the  ambition  of 
one  has  been  supported  by  the  other.  Bis- 
marck's policy  had  this  state  of  friendship  in  view 
and  he  gave  Austria  generous  terms  of  peace  in 
1866,  when  she  was  at  his  feet.  Common  blood 
bound  the  two  states  together  and  later  led  to 
the  hope  of  unification  in  a  great  Pan-German 
empire. 

With  France,  however,  the  empire  which  Bis- 


92       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

marck  founded  was  to  have  no  such  state  of 
amity.  Between  them  was  no  brotherhood,  not 
even  in  the  tenuous  bonds  of  the  theory  of  the 
rights  of  man.  Back  of  1871  were  many  acts 
of  aggression,  many  bitter  wars,  and  some  very 
humihating  experiences  for  states  inhabited  by 
Germans.  And  now  the  tables  were  turned. 
France  was  weak  and  the  often  beaten  Germans 
were  strong  and  victorious.  Their  vengeance 
was  expressed  in  the  long  siege  of  Paris,  the 
proclamation  of  the  German  Empire  in  the 
chateau  of  the  old  French  kings,  the  humiliating 
indemnity  levied  on  the  French  people,  and  the 
annexation  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  so  long  in 
the  quiet  keeping  of  France  that  they  were  thor- 
oughly French  in  sympathy  and  political  pur- 
pose. Bismarck  usually  ruled  his  heart  with  his 
head,  but  he  lost  himself  for  the  moment  when 
he  sent  a  defeated  neighbor  under  the  yoke  of 
needless  disgrace,  and  Germany  has  paid  the 
price  many  times  over  in  maintaining  a  great 
army  and  parrying  the  diplomatic  thrusts  of 
France.  The  hostile  feelings  thus  engendered 
gave  rise  to  the  particular  kind  of  balance  of 
power  that  has  existed  in  Europe  since  1871; 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCERT  93 

for  on  whatever  side  Germany  was  found  France 
was  on  the  other,  and  however  the  elements 
shifted  in  the  grouping  of  nations  these  two  states 
were  always  opponents. 

It  was  Bismarck's  idea  to  form  an  alliance  so 
powerful  that  no  other  state  nor  group  of  states 
would  dare  attack  it,  and  by  holding  his  allies 
in  hand  to  preserve  peace.  That  was  the  way 
the  Balance  of  Power  was  to  serve  to  prevent 
war.  For  his  purpose  he  formed  what  was 
known  as  the  Three  Emperors'  League,  consist- 
ing of  the  rulers  of  Germany,  Russia,  and  Aus- 
tria. The  combination  was  weak  in  one  im- 
portant point;  for  Russia  and  Austria  had  rival 
hopes  of  territorial  gains  in  the  Near  East,  and 
they  were  not  likely  to  remain  permanently  in 
accord.  With  an  eye  to  such  a  disruption  of  the 
alliance  Bismarck  looked  about  for  another  state 
which  could  be  added  to  the  group.  He  turned 
to  Italy,  bound  to  him  because  he  had  befriended 
her  in  her  struggle  for  nationality. 

To  bring  Italy  into  the  alliance  was  not  easy; 
for  she  was  bitterly  hostile  to  Austria,  who  still 
held  the  unredeemed  part  of  the  Italian  people 
and  who  was  still  hated  in  the  peninsula  for  her 


94       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ancient  oppression  of  Italian  provinces.  The 
Iron  Chancellor  generally  carried  his  point, 
partly  because  of  his  personal  ability  and  partly 
because  it  was  felt  that  he  could  and  would  live 
up  to  his  promises.  He  showed  the  king  of  Italy 
the  advantages  the  kingdom  would  have  under 
German  protection,  which  would  support  it 
against  France,  strengthen  it  in  the  quarrel  with 
the  pope,  and  even  hold  back  Austria  if  that 
power  was  inclined  to  pay  off  old  scores.  These 
arrangements  were  completed  in  1882  and  gave 
rise  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  until  1914  a  strong 
factor  in  European  affairs.  The  greatness  of 
Bismarck  is  well  shown  in  the  fact  that  he  could 
carry  this  plan  through  and  still  retain  Russia 
in  cooperation  with  Austria  and  Germany. 
Until  he  retired  from  office  in  1890  he  had  the 
support  of  the  tsar. 

After  he  withdrew  the  union  of  the  three  em- 
perors was  dissolved.  But  for  his  strong  hand 
it  could  hardly  have  been  formed.  Russia  and 
Austria  were  at  bottom  rivals.  If  Germany 
supported  Russia  in  her  plans  for  the  Near  East 
she  would  offend  Austria,  and  if  she  lent  herself 
to  Austria  she  would  lose  Russia.     Moreover,  if 


LATER  PHASES  OP  CONCERT  95 

she  favored  Russia  openly  she  was  likely  to 
arouse  the  opposition  of  Great  Britain,  who  was 
at  that  time  very  suspicious  of  the  tsar's  designs 
on  Constantinople.  It  was  a  delicate  situation, 
and  it  was  only  good  luck  and  Bismarck's  char- 
acter that  kept  it  intact  for  more  than  fifteen 
years. 

After  1890  the  Triple  Alliance  continued  its 
existence,  Italy  suppressing  her  dislike  for 
Austria  as  well  as  she  could  in  view  of  her  need 
of  strong  friends  among  the  nations.  But  Rus- 
sia fell  away  and  in  1895  announced  that  she  had 
formed  a  Dual  Alliance  with  France,  a  thing 
which  Bismarck  had  been  very  solicitous  to 
prevent.  By  holding  Russia  in  hand  he  had  been 
able  to  isolate  France  in  Europe,  but  her  isola- 
tion was  now  a  thing  of  the  past.  The  Dual 
Alliance  confronted  the  Triple  Alliance  and  the 
result  was  peace.  At  the  same  time  the  rivalry 
of  Russia  and  Austria  over  Turkey  became  more 
energetic,  which  tended  to  increase  the  probability 
of  war. 

Succeeding  Bismarck  came  German  states- 
men who  were  not  so  steady  as  he,  and  their 
weaker  hold  on  the  situation  added  to  the  gravity 


96       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

of  the  prospects  of  peace.  It  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  the  fall  of  Bismarck  lessened  the 
prospect  that  Europe  would  remain  at  peace. 
The  Balance  of  Power,  which  took  so  clear  a 
form  with  the  organization  of  the  Dual  Alliance, 
was  not  as  good  a  guarantee  of  peace  as  it  seemed ; 
for  while  it  made  the  checking  of  powers  by 
powers  more  apparent,  its  very  existence  was 
evidence  of  a  state  of  stronger  rivalry  of  na- 
tions than  existed  before  the  Dual  Alliance  was 
formed.  At  the  same  time  the  men  who  now 
guided  the  fortunes  of  Germany  were  not  so  con- 
vinced as  Bismarck  that  the  country  should  have 
peace. 

While  these  things  happened  Great  Britain  re- 
mained generally  neutral.  She  was  busy  with 
trade  expansion  and  the  development  of  her 
colonies,  especially  in  Africa ;  and  her  chief  inter- 
est, so  far  as  the  schemes  of  the  Continental 
nations  were  concerned,  was  to  see  that  none  of 
them  interfered  with  her  progress  in  that  field 
of  endeavor.  Late  in  Bismarck's  time,  however, 
she  became  convinced  that  Germany  was  becom- 
ing a  rival  both  in  trade  and  colonization.  It  is 
true  that  France  was  also  a  rival,  and  between 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCERT  97 

her  and  Great  Britain  occurred  some  sharp  pas- 
sages; but  France  was  not  an  aggressive  nation 
and  had  no  strong  mihtary  resources  to  back  her 
ambitions  in  the  field  of  peaceful  activities.  Ger- 
many, on  the  other  hand,  was  increasingly  mili- 
taristic and  the  logic  of  events  seemed  to  indicate 
that  she  would  at  some  time  in  the  future  be 
willing  to  support  her  commercial  and  colonial 
ambition  with  a  formidable  appeal  to  arms. 
British  anxiety  was  quickened  when  the  young 
kaiser  began  to  build  a  great  navy,  with  the 
avowed  object  of  making  it  equal  to  the  British 
navy.  For  centuries  it  had  been  the  key-note 
of  British  policy  to  have  a  navy  that  could  con- 
trol the  seas ;  and  while  there  was  nothing  in  the 
will  of  Father  Adam  that  gave  Britons  the  do- 
minion of  the  seas,  the  kaiser  must  have  known 
that  he  could  not  challenge  their  superiority  on 
water  without  arousing  their  gravest  appre- 
hension. During  the  Boer  war  (1899-1902) 
Germany  gave  added  offense  to  Britain.  She 
showed  sympathy  openly  for  the  Boers,  and  it 
was  generally  believed  in  Great  Britain  that  she 
took  advantage  of  the  opportunity  to  try  to  form 
a  grand  alliance  to  curb  the  power  of  the  "Mis- 


98       THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

tress  of  the  Seas."  Rumor  said  that  the  plan 
was  defeated  only  by  the  refusal  of  France  to 
lend  her  assistance  unless  she  received  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  If  the  report  is  true,  it  only  shows 
what  a  costly  thing  to  Germany  was  the  hatred 
that  Bismarck  created  when  he  put  France  to 
the  humiliating  dismemberment  of  1871. 

During  this  period  Theophile  Delcasse  was 
head  of  the  French  foreign  office  (1898-1905). 
He  was  a  man  of  great  original  ability  and  was 
desirous  of  restoring  the  prestige  of  France. 
When  he  came  into  office  the  French  public  was 
excited  over  the  Fashoda  incident,  a  clash  of 
French  and  British  interests  in  the  Sudan  which 
seemed  to  threaten  war.  The  British  govern- 
ment took  a  strong  attitude,  as  it  was  likely  at 
that  time  to  do,  when  it  felt  that  it  was  dealing 
with  a  weaker  nation.  Delcasse!  realized  that 
the  true  welfare  of  his  country  demanded  friend- 
ship with  the  one  power  which  could  help  it 
against  Germany,  and  at  the  risk  of  denunciation 
at  home  he  gave  up  all  that  Great  Britain  de- 
manded in  the  Sudan.  He  thus  showed  that 
he  possessed  that  high  trait  of  statesmanship 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCERT  99 

which  consists  in  the  ability  to  convert  an  op- 
ponent into  a  firm  friend. 

The  opportunity  to  which  he  was  looking  for- 
ward came  when  Germany  set  her  plans  into 
operation  during  the  Boer  war.  He  not  only 
held  out  for  the  return  of  the  lost  provinces  but, 
that  faihng,  made  overtures  for  a  better  under- 
standing with  the  British.  It  was  a  time  when 
a  friendly  hand  was  gladly  received  by  the  Lon- 
don government.  The  result  was  a  series  of 
agreements  which  became  known  as  the  Entente 
Cordiale,  1904.  They  marked  the  reappearance 
of  Great  Britain  as  a  leading  power  in  Conti- 
nental affairs,  after  a  long  period  of  aloofness. 
She  had  become  an  active  part  of  the  Balance 
of  Power,  and  her  strength  was  thrown  to  the 
side  which  was  bent  on  restraining  the  vast  in- 
fluence of  Germany.  Her  action  caused  great 
alarm  at  Berlin,  where  her  motive  was  inter- 
preted as  commercial  jealousy,  the  statesmen  of 
that  city  apparently  forgetting  that  they  had  pro- 
voked it  by  their  unfriendly  attitude  in  the  Boer 
war. 

In  the  same  year  began  the  Russo-Japanese 


100     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

war  (1904-1905) .  At  first  glance  it  would  seem 
that  this  conflict  threatened  to  weaken  the  En- 
tente Cordiale,  for  Japan  was  allied  to  Great 
Britain  and  Russia  was  bound  up  with  France 
by  the  Dual  Alliance.  But  the  result  was  just 
the  opposite.  The  Entente  was  not  only  left  in- 
tact, but  it  was  actually  strengthened.  When 
Japan  defeated  Russia,  Great  Britain  ceased  to 
fear  Russian  aggression  in  the  Far  East,  which 
made  it  possible  for  her  to  draw  nearer  to  the 
Muscovite  power.  At  the  same  time,  Russia, 
always  seeking  an  outlet  to  the  sea,  turned  her 
eyes  with  greater  eagerness  than  ever  to  the 
Near  East,  which  brought  her  into  a  more  intense 
state  of  opposition  to  Austria  and  Germany. 
Delcasse  seized  the  opportunity  offered  him  and 
succeeded  in  bringing  together  these  two  great 
nations,  which  for  many  years  had  been  con- 
tinually ready  to  fly  at  one  another.  He  put 
into  motion  the  negotiations  out  of  which  was 
formed  the  Triple  Entente  (1907)  in  which 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Russia  announced 
that  they  had  settled  their  differences  and  would 
stand  together  in  future  crises. 

The  incidents  that  followed  the  culmination 


LATER  PHASES  OF  CONCMt^  ^   1(>1- 

of  Delcasse's  diplomacy  are  very  striking,  but 
they  must  be  deferred  until  I  reach  a  later  stage 
of  my  subject.  Here  it  is  only  proper  to  observe 
that  it  brought  the  theory  of  the  Balance  of 
Power  to  its  logical  development.  Delcasse  was 
in  a  world  in  which  one  great  and  most  efficiently 
armed  nation  stood  in  a  position  to  turn  sud- 
denly on  the  rest  of  Europe  and  sweep  it  into 
her  lap.  By  her  military  and  naval  power,  by 
her  vast  trained  army,  by  her  readiness  for  in- 
stantaneous action,  by  her  well  planned  strategic 
railroads,  and  by  her  alliances  with  the  middle- 
European  states  she  was  in  a  threatening  position. 
At  a  given  signal  she  could  seize  great  domains, 
fortify  herself,  and  defy  all  the  world  to  drive 
her  out  of  what  she  had  taken.  There  was  hardly 
an  intelligent  German  who  did  not  believe  that 
this  course  would  be  followed  in  the  near  future 
and  who  did  not  feel  confident  that  it  would  make 
Germany  the  dominating  nation  of  the  world. 
Against  this  system  the  Triple  Entente  was 
formed,  as  a  means  of  balance.  It  was  larger 
than  the  Triple  Alliance  but  not  so  effectively 
led. 

And  here  I  must  observe  that  these  two  groups 


102     THE  i:OST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

had  come  into  existence  in  the  most  natural  way. 
Bismarck  had  founded  the  Triple  Alliance  as  a 
means  of  preserving  peace,  not  as  a  means  of 
aggression;  but  it  had  become  something  more 
than  he  intended  it  to  be.  It  had  enabled  Ger- 
many to  play  such  a  part  in  European  politics 
that  the  creation  of  another  great  group  as  a 
balance  was  apparently  demanded.  Imme- 
diately that  her  position  was  lowered  Germany 
felt  aggrieved  that  the  combination  had  been 
made  against  her.  So  powerful  were  her  con- 
victions about  her  wrongs  that  she  threw  away 
all  thought  of  a  concert  of  the  Great  Powers  for 
the  settlement  of  the  difficulty.  She  had  trusted 
to  the  Balance  to  protect  her;  but  she  now  con- 
sidered it  something  more  than  a  state  of  equi- 
librium and  she  appealed  to  arms.  Before  this 
narrative  recounts  the  actual  events  by  which 
she  felt  that  she  was  justified  in  taking  this  step, 
it  is  necessary  to  consider  the  Balkan  question,  a 
series  of  causes  and  events  which  for  nearly  a 
century  has  been  an  open  menace  to  European 
peace  and  stability. 


CHAPTER  VI 

THE   BALKAN   STATES 

Viscount  Grey  has  been  criticized  for  not 
understanding  the  Balkan  problem.  If  his 
critics  understood  how  complex  is  the  story  of  the 
last  century  in  this  part  of  Europe  they  would 
withold  their  strictures.  I,  at  least,  do  not 
blame  any  man  for  failing  to  carry  in  his  mind 
an  appreciation  of  all  that  the  mixed  mass  of 
races  and  religions  in  the  Balkan  country  have 
striven  and  hoped  for  during  the  recent  past.  In 
this  chapter  the  best  that  can  be  promised  is  an 
account  of  the  main  facts  of  Balkan  history.  A 
more  detailed  narrative  would  be  confusing  to 
the  reader.  A  failure  to  mention  the  subject 
would  leave  much  unexplained  that  is  essential  to 
an  understanding  of  the  origin  of  the  present 
war.  And  we  shall  hardly  know  how  to  decide 
what  kind  of  a  peace  the  future  security  of 
Europe  demands,  if  we  leave  out  of  consideration 
the  proper  disposition  to  be  made  of  the  small 
states  of  the  Southeast. 

103 


104*     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

In  1453  Turkey  took  Constantinople  and  be- 
gan a  series  of  conquests  that  carried  her  to  the 
very  gates  of  the  city  of  Vienna.  That  impor- 
tant stronghold  seemed  about  to  fall  into  her 
hands  in  1683,  when  an  army  of  Polish  and  Ger- 
man soldiers  came  to  its  rescue  in  the  name  of 
Christianity,  drove  off  the  infidels,  and  wrenched 
Hungary  out  of  their  hands  for  the  benefit  of 
the  Austrian  power.  This  struggle  proved  the 
highwater  mark  of  Turkish  conquest  in  Europe. 
From  that  time  to  this,  wars  of  reconquest  have 
followed  one  another,  the  pagans  always  playing 
a  losing  game.  But  for  a  long  time  all  that  part 
of  Southeastern  Europe  that  could  be  reached 
from  the  Black  Sea  was  held  by  the  Turks,  the 
part  that  was  easily  reached  from  Germany 
was  held  by  the  Christians,  and  the  part  that  lay 
between,  a  broad  belt  of  hilly  country,  was  con- 
tinually in  dispute.  Across  it  armies  fought 
back  and  forth,  each  side  winning  and  losing  in 
turn,  but  with  the  general  result  in  favor  of  the 
Christians,  who  slowly  pushed  back  the  frontier 
of  their  enemies. 

The  region  held  by  the  Turks  was  tenacious  of 
its  Christian  faith  and  recognized  the  religious 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  105 

authority  of  the  Patriarch  of  Constantinople, 
who,  Christian  though  he  was,  stood  under  the 
control  of  the  sultan.  The  inhabitants  suffered 
many  hardships  and  were  reduced  to  the  condi- 
tion of  serfs  under  Mohammedan  masters.  The 
long  bondage  to  their  overlords  had  a  peculiar 
effect  on  their  characters.  They  came  to  think  it 
right  to  use  fraud,  violence,  and  subterfuge 
against  their  oppressors,  and  so  they  employed 
religion  and  patriotism  to  defend  the  commission 
of  acts  which  in  ordinary  situations  are  consid- 
ered without  the  pale  of  civilized  conduct.  To 
this  day  the  Balkan  states  are  not  rid  of  their 
heritage  from  these  years  of  moral  darkness. 

The  Balkan  people,  ruled  long  as  Turkish 
subjects,  have  gradually  formed  themselves  into 
five  principal  groups  as  follows:  the  Serbians, 
dwelling  in  the  interior  of  the  country  northwest 
of  Turkey  proper  and  occupying  much  of  the 
hinterland  lying  east  of  the  Adriatic;  the  Bul- 
gars,  settled  east  of  the  Serbs  and  extending  as 
far  as  the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea;  the  Wallach- 
ians  and  Moldavians,  who  were  of  kindred  stock 
and  became  known  as  Rumanians  because  they 
believed  themselves  the  descendants  of  the  inhabi- 


106     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

tants  of  the  ancient  Roman  colony  of  Dacia; 
the  Albanians  living  along  the  lower  eastern 
shores  of  the  Adriatic;  and  the  Montenegrins,  of 
the  same  race  as  the  Serbians,  who  defended 
themselves  so  well  in  their  mountain  strongholds 
that  they  could  say  they  had  never  been  con- 
quered by  the  Turks.  Many  race  elements 
entered  into  these  groups,  but  the  Serbs  and 
Montenegrins  were  largely  Slavic,  while  the 
iBulgars  were  generally  of  a  distinct  race  of 
Asiatic  origin,  and  the  Rumanians  were  gen- 
erally Vlachs,  a  name  given  to  the  Latin  speak- 
ing population  of  the  Eastern  Roman  Empire. 
The  Albanians  seem  to  be  of  mixed  stock,  but 
they  have  a  strong  sense  of  nationality.  These 
five  groups  correspond  respectively  to  the  five 
civil  divisions  that  have  emerged  from  the  Turk- 
ish provinces,  each  playing  its  part  in  the  modern 
Balkan  problem. 

Montenegro  aside,  the  first  group  to  become  a 
state  was  Serbia,  whose  hardy  mountain  in- 
habitants rose  in  revolt  in  1804.  A  number  of 
brave  leaders  appeared  and  valley  by  valley  the 
Turks  were  forced  out  of  the  country.  The 
Serbs  were  practically  independent  for  a  time. 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  107 

but  the  sultan  did  not  acquiesce  in  their  freedom, 
and  the  constant  preparedness  that  was  necessary 
to  repel  any  attack  he  might  launch  was  a  source 
of  much  expense  and  anxiety  to  the  people. 

In  1821  the  Greeks,  also  under  the  domination 
of  Turkey,  rose  in  revolt.  Great  sympathy  was 
aroused  in  the  rest  of  Europe  and  in  spite  of 
the  disposition  of  the  Great  Powers  to  allow 
Turkey  a  free  hand  to  preserve  her  territory  in- 
tact, lest  one  of  them  gain  over-balancing  terri- 
tory, public  opinion  forced  them  to  intervene. 
The  first  to  show  sympathy  was  Russia,  who  had 
an  interest  in  making  herself  the  protector  of  the 
Christians  in  Turkey.  The  other  powers  re- 
sented her  assistance  to  the  Greeks,  and  finally 
Great  Britain  and  France  united  in  a  project  of 
intervention,  sending  a  joint  fleet  to  the  Medi- 
terranean which  destroyed  the  Turkish  fleet  at 
Navarino  in  1827.  The  stubborn  sultan  re- 
mained unyielding,  and  in  1828  Russia  entered 
the  war  openly,  having  come  to  an  agreement 
with  the  other  Powers.  She  sent  an  army  across 
the  border  which  carried  all  before  it,  and  the 
sultan  was  forced  to  make  the  treaty  of  Adria- 
nople,  in  which  Turkey  recognized  the  independ- 


108      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ence  of  Greece  and  acknowledged  Serbia  as  an 
autonomous  state  under  Turkish  suzerainty. 
At  the  same  time  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  where 
Rumans  lived,  were  recognized  as  independent 
under  a  Russian  protectorate.  Thus  one  sov- 
ereign and  three  dependent  but  locally  autono- 
mous states  stood  forth  out  of  the  confused 
and  misgoverned  Christian  area  of  Turkey  in 
Europe. 

The  rest  of  the  region,  occupied  by  Bulgars 
and  Albanians,  with  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
claimed  by  the  Serbs  as  legitimate  parts  of  their 
national  habitat,  remained  in  an  unredeemed  con- 
dition and  were  governed  by  agents  appointed 
by  the  sultan.  Montenegro  retained  her  posi- 
tion of  practical  independence,  which  Turkey 
had  been  forced  to  acknowledge  in  1799.  These 
arrangements  were  confirmed  in  a  more  formal 
treaty  in  1832. 

The  successes  of  this  period  quickened  the 
spirit  of  nationality  in  the  Balkans.  Just  as  the 
Greeks  were  swept  by  a  wave  of  enthusiasm  for 
their  classical  culture  and  sought  to  revive  the 
language  and  ideals  of  the  remote  past,  so  the 
Balkan  peoples  set  out  to  revive  their  ancient 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  109 

culture,  long  obscured  by  the  shadow  of  Turkish 
masters.  Serbs,  Rumans,  and  Bulgars  made 
grammars  of  their  own  languages,  gathered  up 
what  was  preserved  of  their  ancient  literatures 
and  traditions,  taught  their  children  to  revere 
the  national  heroes,  and  sought  in  many  other 
ways  to  stimulate  the  spirit  of  nationality.  The 
Slavic  portion  turned  to  Russia  for  support, 
whom  they  called  their  "big  brother,"  while  the 
Rumans  cultivated  an  appreciation  of  Italy  and 
France,  whom  they  considered  kindred  descend- 
ants of  the  ancient  Romans.  To  their  national 
hopes  in  these  things  was  added  the  desire  for 
religious  independence.  They  disliked  being  un- 
der the  ecclesiastical  authority  of  the  Patriarch 
of  Constantinople,  who  was  appointed  by  the  sul- 
tan, and  looked  forward  to  a  time  when  they 
might  have  exarchs  of  their  own,  with  jurisdiction 
not  limited  by  the  Patriarch. 

In  1854  Russia  was  ready  for  another  advance 
in  the  region  of  the  Balkans,  hoping  to  gain  at 
last  what  Peter  the  Great  had  declared  was  es- 
sential to  her  progress,  a  window  looking  out  on 
the  Mediterranean.  Great  Britain  and  France 
came  to  the  help  of  the  sultan  and  the  Crimean 


110      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

War  followed.  After  a  hard  struggle  it  ended 
in  Russia's  defeat,  and  at  the  Conference  of 
Paris,  1856,  the  affairs  of  the  Balkans  were  again 
up  for  settlement,  but  this  time  the  victory  leaned 
to  the  side  of  the  Turk,  although  it  was  modified 
by  the  restraining  hand  of  his  two  allies.  The 
purport  of  the  treaty  was  to  reduce  the  power 
of  Russia,  and  in  doing  so  the  aspirations  of  the 
Balkans  states  were  checked.  The  protectorate 
the  tsar  had  established  over  Wallachia  and  Mol- 
davia was  destroyed,  and  Bulgars,  who  had 
expected  independence,  remained  under  the  rule 
of  the  sultan,  while  Greece,  who  had  desired  a 
large  portion  of  Macedonia,  was  forced  to  con- 
tinue in  her  old  boundaries.  This  crisis  was  not 
the  last  in  which  the  vexed  Balkan  question, 
seemingly  near  solution,  was  made  to  give  way 
before  the  complicated  problems  of  the  general 
European  situation.  Looking  backward  we  may 
well  say  that  if  Russia  had  secured  her  wish,  ex- 
pelled the  Turk  from  Constantinople  and  liber- 
ated the  Balkan  states,  the  fortunes  of  France 
would  not  have  been  lessened,  and  Great  Britain, 
safe  through  her  supremacy  at  sea,  would  not 
have  lost  any  of  the  strength  she  had  in  India, 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  111 

At  the  same  time  the  sore  spot  of  European 
relations  would  have  been  healed,  and  we  should 
probably  have  had  no  war  in  1914. 

Wallachia  and  Moldavia  were  of  the  same 
stock  and  wished  to  unite  as  one  kingdom.  They 
made  their  desires  known  in  the  negotiations 
that  resulted  in  the  Treaty  of  Paris,  but  the 
Powers  did  not  mean  to  create  a  large  state  on 
the  borders  of  Russia  which  might  prove  a  bul- 
wark of  influence  for  the  tsar,  and  accordingly 
they  denied  the  request.  The  two  states  found 
a  way  to  accomplish  their  desire,  soon  after  the 
conference  at  Paris  adjourned.  Meeting  to 
select  rulers  each  chose  Alexander  John  Cuza 
simultaneously,  and  after  hesitating  two  years 
the  Powers  acknowledged  him  as  king.  Thus 
was  formed  the  united  kingdom  of  Rumania; 
and  its  formation  illustrated  a  weak  point  in  the 
Concert  of  Europe.  However  much  the  Powers 
might  interfere  to  prevent  the  consummation  of 
an  act  they  considered  dangerous,  they  would 
think  twice  before  trying  to  punish  a  Balkan 
state,  since  in  doing  so  they  might  set  off  an 
explosion  in  the  very  system  they  were  working 
to    keep    peaceful.     Rumania    understood    this 


lis      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

phase  of  the  matter  and  took  her  chances.  Her 
firm  course  had  its  reward. 

The  influence  of  Great  Britain  was  now  para- 
mount at  Constantinople.  The  sultan  was  satis- 
fied with  his  ally,  since  he  knew  that  of  all  the 
Powers  he  had  least  to  fear  from  this  state,  which 
had  no  territories  in  that  part  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean and  was  committed  to  the  preservation  of 
his  rule  as  a  means  of  keeping  Russia  away  from 
the  Bosphorus.  To  justify  herself  for  defending 
the  Turk,  Great  Britain  gave  the  world  assur- 
ances that  the  sultan  was  about  to  become  good. 
Under  her  insistance  a  series  of  reforms  was  an- 
nounced, but  they  did  not  go  far  in  the  realiza- 
tion. Some  of  the  promises  referred  to  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Balkans,  but  they  were  as  fruit- 
less as  the  others.  Meanwhile  French  and 
British  merchants  found  large  profits  in  Turkish 
trade. 

The  tsar  was  humiliated  by  his  loss  of  influence 
in  the  Southeast,  and  in  1877  he  began  another 
war  against  Turkey.  He  thought  the  time 
favorable  for  such  action.  Impeded  for  a  while 
at  Plevna,  in  Bulgaria,  he  at  last  swept  the  enemy 
before  him  and  took  Adrianople  on  January  16, 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  113 

1878.  His  successes  created  great  enthusiasm 
among  the  Serbs,  Bulgars,  and  Rumans,  who 
flocked  to  his  victorious  standard.  The  panic- 
stricken  sultan  sued  for  peace  and  at  San  Stefano 
signed  a  treaty  which  granted  all  that  was  de- 
manded of  him.  Serbia,  Montenegro,  and 
Rumania  were  recognized  as  completely  inde- 
pendent, Bulgaria  as  an  autonomous  tributary 
province,  and  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  were  as- 
sured of  important  administrative  reforms. 
Russia  was  awarded  some  territory  not  strictly  in 
the  Balkans,  but  her  greatest  gain  was  the  pres- 
tige she  now  had  as  liberator  of  Christian  states. 
The  treaty  of  San  Stefano  alarmed  Great 
Britain  and  Austria,  both  of  whom  felt  that  they 
had  major  interests  at  stake.  They  got  a  con- 
gress of  the  Great  Powers  to  meet  at  Berlin, 
1878,  which  revised  the  treaty  in  what  they  were 
pleased  to  call  the  interest  of  European  peace. 
Complete  independence  was  announced  for 
Serbia,  Rumania,  and  Montenegro,  and  the  sul- 
tan accepted  the  fact  of  their  perfect  sovereignty. 
By  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano  Bulgaria  was  to 
include  Macedon  and  eastern  Rumelia,  making 
one  great  buffer  province  between  the  Turkish 


114      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

and  the  Christian  states.  The  three  parts  were 
now  left  distinct,  Bulgaria  proper  being  autono- 
mous but  under  Turkish  suzerainty,  and  the 
other  two  less  independent. 

To  create  a  "Big  Bulgaria"  as  a  bulwark 
against  Turkey  had  been  Russia's  chief  hope  in 
the  war.  Her  initial  success  awakened  enthus- 
iasm in  all  the  Balkan  people,  and  the  results 
were  expressed  in  the  way  in  which  they  rallied 
to  her  aid.  At  last,  said  the  onlookers,  an  op- 
portunity had  come  to  found  a  strong  Balkan 
confederacy  which  would  play  an  important 
part  in  the  development  of  the  Near  East.  The 
hand  of  Russia  seemed  strong  enough  to  hold 
these  nascent  states  to  one  policy,  allay  their  in- 
cipient jealousies,  and  bring  them  to  a  great  com- 
mon ideal.  If  such  a  course  could  have  been 
adopted  the  future  of  Europe  would  have  been 
profoundly  altered.  It  was  defeated  by  that 
Concert  of  Europe  which  was  supposed  to  exist 
in  order  that  the  world  might  be  spared  the  bur- 
den of  war.  It  was  really  prevented  through  the 
operation  of  the  forces  of  national  selfishness, 
safely  esconced  in  the  system  which  we  have 
called  the  Concert  of  Europe. 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  115 

The  ambition  of  Austria-Hungary  played  a 
large  part  at  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  This  na- 
tion had  long  looked  upon  the  region  that  sepa- 
rated her  from  the  Adriatic  as  a  sphere  through 
which  she  was  justified  in  extending  her  power  at 
the  expense  of  Turkey,  and  she  now  felt  that 
the  time  had  come  to  realize  her  plans.  If  she 
waited,  Russia  would  acquire  such  an  influence 
as  to  forestall  Austrian  advancement.  Her  eyes 
were  fixed  on  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  for  some 
time  in  revolt  against  Turkish  misgovernment. 
Her  influence  was  such  that  the  congress  gave 
her  the  right  to  occupy  and  administer  the  two 
provinces  under  the  reservation  of  sovereignty  to 
the  sultan.  The  inhabitants,  who  were  largely 
Slavic,  were  forced  to  accept  the  decision,  al- 
though they  did  not  relax  their  cherished  hopes 
of  independence.  They  were  pawns  thrown  to 
Austria  as  a  balance  for  the  gains  of  Russia. 
The  transaction  only  whetted  the  Austrian  appe- 
tite for  more  and  deepened  the  Serbian  resent- 
ment for  Austria. 

Great  Britain  had  her  advantage  out  of  the 
bargain  also.  She  retained  her  position  of  para- 
mount friend  at  Constantinople,  justifying  her- 


116     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

self  with  the  assurance  that  the  sultan  would 
carry  out  reforms  in  his  empire.  She  seemed 
to  think  that  the  "Sick  Man  of  Europe"  would 
cure  himself  under  her  guidance  and  then  defend 
himself  against  states  that  tried  to  oust  him  from 
his  seat  of  power.  To  enable  her  to  watch  the 
bedside  of  her  patient  from  a  convenient  posi- 
tion, as  well  as  to  safeguard  the  Suez  Canal, 
Great  Britain  was  given  the  right  to  occupy  and 
administer  the  island  of  Cyprus  under  nominal 
authority  of  Turkey.  To  be  perfectly  fair  we 
must  admit  that  there  is  little  moral  difference 
between  her  acquisition  of  Cyprus  and  Austria's 
gain  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina;  and  it  is  clear 
that  in  this  ease  the  Concert  of  Europe  was  a 
concert  for  the  gain  of  selfish  ends.  It  is  also 
worth  while  to  note  that  two  of  the  Great  Powers 
took  no  benefit  from  the  agreement.  France 
was  slowly  recovering  from  the  war  of  1870- 
1871  and  was  in  no  condition  to  fight,  although 
in  1881  she  established  a  protectorate  over  Tunis. 
The  German  Empire,  newly  founded  and  not  yet 
fully  adapted  to  the  imperial  system,  was  also  in 
no  condition  to  undertake  a  stiff  encounter. 
There  were  many  Germans  who  wished  that  their 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  117 

government  should  not  allow  the  other  states  to 
get  large  gains  of  territory  while  Germany  got 
nothing;  but  they  yielded  to  Bismarck's  wise 
policy  which  held  that  it  was  not  yet  time 
for  Germany  to  assume  an  aggressive  position 
in  the  world.  The  impatience  of  the  Ger- 
man patriots  lost  nothing  through  having  to 
wait. 

No  treaty  ends  the  march  of  time,  and  the  ^ 
Balkan  situation  continued  to  develop  along  the 
old  lines.  In  1881  Greece  acquired  Thessaly  in 
accordance  with  a  promise  made  to  her  at  the 
Congress  of  Berlin.  In  1885  East  Rumelia  de- 
clared herself  united  to  Bulgaria,  acting  in  de- 
fiance of  the  will  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  The 
Powers  did  not  interfere  for  the  same  reason 
that  they  did  not  act  when  Wallachia  and  Mol- 
davia united  in  1862.  To  attempt  to  undo  the 
union  would  have  precipitated  a  general  war. 
The  Concert  was  stronger  to  prevent  a  given 
action  than  to  correct  it  after  it  was  done. 
Serbia,  however,  took  the  action  of  the  two 
provinces  as  a  menace  and  declared  war  against 
the  new  state  of  Bulgaria.  She  seemed  about 
to  throw  herself  on  her  adversary  when  she  sud- 


118      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

denly  made  peace,  evidently  feeling  she  was  not 
strong  enough  to  carry  on  the  war  alone. 

Thenceforth  the  Powers  showed  that  they  did 
not  mean  to  allow  the  Balkan  states  to  profit 
by  seizing  parts  of  the  decaying  Turkish  Em- 
pire. But  for  their  restraint  it  seems  that  the 
Turk  would  have  been  expelled  from  Europe 
before  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century. 

Their  intention  was  clearly  manifested  in  re- 
gard to  the  island  of  Crete,  whose  population 
long  suffered  from  Turkish  oppression.  In  1896 
the  island  was  in  revolt  and  the  sultan  was  forced 
to  promise  reforms.  The  assurance  proved 
empty  and  in  1897  Greece  interfered  in  behalf 
of  Crete.  In  the  war  that  followed  the  Greeks 
fought  heroically  but  alone  and  were  no  match 
for  Turkey  in  operations  on  land.  They  made 
peace  without  success,  but  through  the  instru- 
mentality of  the  Great  Powers  the  sultan  agreed 
to  allow  Crete  self-government  under  an  elected 
assembly.  The  powers  let  it  be  known  that 
they  would  not  have  the  island  annexed  to  Greece, 
which  they  did  not  mean  to  make  a  preponderat- 
ing influence  in  the  Balkans.  Now  appeared  a 
great    Cretan    leader,    Eleutherios    Venezelos, 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  119 

whom  his  admirers  call  the  Cavour  of  Greece. 
'Under  his  influence  the  Cretan  assembly  voted  the 
union  of  the  island  with  Greece  in  1905,  but  again 
the  Powers  interposed,  insisting  that  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  sultan  should  not  be  abrogated. 
However,  they  permitted  the  Greek  king  to  ap- 
point a  representative  to  rule  the  island  as  a 
Turkish  fief,  and  Greek  officers  were  allowed  to 
train  the  Cretan  soldiers  and  police.  At  last 
the  Balkan  war  (1912-1913)  brought  the  com- 
pletion of  union,  the  Great  Powers  yielding  their 
assent. 

The  explanation  of  the  conduct  of  the  Powers 
in  this  incident  is  to  be  found  in  the  delicate 
nature  of  the  whole  Balkan  question.  With 
Austria  and  Russia  keenly  aroused  and  each  of 
the  Balkan  states  anxiously  looking  for  the 
moment  when  the  rest  of  the  sultan's  territory  in 
Europe  was  to  be  divided  between  them,  it  was 
evident  that  a  little  thing  could  precipitate  a 
serious  conflict.  It  was  in  view  of  this  phase  of 
the  situation  that  the  Balkans  were  called  "the 
tinder-box  of  Europe." 

It  will  be  observed  that  while  these  things 
happened   the   Balkan   states   were   developing 


120      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

steadily  in  national  resources  and  spirit.  Greece, 
Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Rumania  became  vitally- 
organized  powers,  it  became  more  and  more  evi- 
dent that  they  were  no  longer  mere  pawns  in 
the  diplomatic  game,  and  the  time  was  fast  ap- 
proaching when  they  would  wish  to  take  parts 
on  their  own  initiative.  So  assertive  were  they 
becoming  that  it  was  certain  that  the  time  would 
soon  come  when  the  Great  Powers  would  tire  of 
the  process  of  holding  conferences  to  keep  these 
states  out  of  trouble.  It  is  not  an  easy  task  to 
serve  as  custodian  for  a  "tinder-box." 

A  fair  warning  of  this  kind  of  danger  oc- 
curred in  1908.  For  twenty- three  years  Bul- 
garia had  remained  undisturbed,  giving  herself 
to  a  rapid  process  of  educational  and  industrial 
development,  in  both  of  which  lines  she  had 
come  under  the  influence  of  German  methods. 
Suddenly  she  threw  off  her  nominal  Turkish 
sovereignty  and  declared  herself  an  entirely  in- 
dependent state.  At  the  same  time,  and 
evidently  by  agreement  with  the  German  Em- 
pire, Austria-Hungary  announced  that  she  would 
hold  Bosnia-Herzegovina  as  an  integral  part  of 
her  empire,  thus  superseding  the  "occupation" 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  121 

that  was  authorized  by  the  congress  of  Berlin,  in 
1878.  Serbia  took  the  matter  as  a  great  injury, 
but  she  could  do  nothing  alone.  Her  natural 
ally  was  Russia,  then  recovering  from  the  severe 
losses  of  the  war  against  Japan.  Had  the  tsar 
been  ready  for  war  it  is  doubtful  if  he  would 
have  drawn  the  sword  in  this  instance;  for  a 
world  war  would  have  resulted,  and  the  nations 
were  not  yet  ready  to  think  of  such  an  under- 
taking. But  Serbia  nursed  her  wrongs  and  to 
Russia  the  sense  of  her  shame  grew  as  she  thought 
how  her  weakness  had  been  flaunted  in  the  face 
of  the  world.  The  day  came  when  the  fire  could 
no  longer  be  smothered. 

To  understand  Serbia's  feelings  we  must  re- 
call the  national  ideal  by  which  her  hopes  had 
been  formed  for  many  years.  Most  of  the 
people  of  Montenegro,  Bosnia,  Herzegovina, 
Novi-Bazar,  and  the  northwestern  corner  of 
Macedonia  were  Serbs  by  blood.  To  unite  them 
into  a  great  Serbia  had  long  been  spoken  of  in 
Serbia  as  the  "Great  Idea."  When,  therefore, 
Austria  took  definite  possession  of  Bosnia- 
Herzegovina  the  "Great  Idea"  seemed  defeated 
forever.     Rage  and  despair  possessed  the  Serbs 


ISa     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

wherever  they  lived,  patriotic  societies  voiced  the 
f  eeHng  of  the  people,  and  vengeance  was  plotted. 
Probably  it  was  the  feeling  that  this  wide-spread 
hatred  should  be  uprooted  in  the  most  thorough 
manner  that  prompted  Austria  to  make  the  heavy 
conditions  that  were  demanded  as  atonement  for 
the  crime  of  Sarajevo. 

After  Austria  took  the  fateful  step  of  1908 
Turkey  still  held  the  territory  just  north  of  the 
Bosphorus,  organized  as  the  province  of 
Adrianople.  She  also  had  in  Europe  the  prov- 
inces of  Macedonia,  Albania,  and  the  sanjak 
of  Novi-Bazar.  To  drive  her  out  of  these  pos- 
sessions was  the  object  of  the  Balkan  states.  In 
1911  Italy  began  a  war  against  the  sultan  to 
gain  Tripoli.  The  Balkan  States  seeing  their 
enemy  embarrassed,  concluded  that  the  hour  of 
fate  had  come.  They  formed  the  Balkan 
League,  made  up  of  Greece,  Bulgaria,  Serbia, 
and  Montenegro,  and  made  ready  for  war. 
Their  action  alarmed  the  Great  Powers,  who 
brought  the  Concert  of  Europe  to  bear  against 
the  League.  They  gave  the  allies  fair  notice 
that  they  would  not  permit  them  to  take  any  of 
the  sultan's  territory  in  Europe,  even  though 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  123 

a  war  was  won  against  him.  The  reply  to  this 
threat  shows  how  weak  the  Concert  had  become. 
It  was  voiced  by  Montenegro,  the  smallest  of 
the  states,  whose  king  immediately  declared  war 
and  called  on  his  allies  to  aid  him  in  driving  the 
pagan  out  of  Europe.  The  call  was  accepted 
gladly  and  an  ultimatum  was  sent  to  the  sultan, 
who,  relying  on  the  promise  of  the  Powers,  defied 
his  opponents. 

In  the  war  that  followed  Tm-key  was  con- 
fronted by  a  united  army  of  nearly  a  million 
men.  It  was  impossible  to  withstand  them  and 
in  two  months  most  of  Macedonia  was  lost,  Con- 
stantinople was  threatened,  and  Turkey  asked 
for  an  armistice.  Negotiations  began  in  Lon- 
don, the  Powers  seemingly  forgetting  their  empty 
threat  that  they  "would  not  permit  at  the  end  of 
the  conflict  any  modification  of  the  territorial 
status  quo  in  European  Turkey."  The  allies  de- 
manded hard  terms  which  seemed  about  to  be 
accepted  by  Turkey  when  by  a  coup  d'etat  the 
"Young  Turks,"  a  patriotic  party  of  reformers, 
got  possession  of  the  government  at  Constanti- 
nople and  resumed  the  fighting.  Although  they 
fought  well,  they  could  not  withstand  the  large 


124*     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

numbers  that  were  against  them.  Janina  fell  to 
the  Greeks,  Adrianople  was  taken  by  a  Serbo- 
Bulgarian  force,  and  Scutari  was  taken  by  the 
Montenegrins.  The  TuAs  now  yielded  defi- 
nitely and  negotiations  for  peace  were  resumed. 
Behind  the  diplomatic  proceedings  was  the  fol- 
lowing interesting  situation:  Austria-Hungary 
was  dismayed  at  the  prospect  of  having  a  strong 
and  permanent  league  organized  in  the  Balkans ; 
for  it  would  probably  make  it  impossible  for  her 
to  realize  her  desire  to  extend  her  territory  in 
that  direction.  She  was  especially  unwilling  to 
allow  Serbia  and  Montenegro  to  hold  the  con- 
quered shore  of  the  Adriatic,  since  it  was  here 
that  she  designed  to  gain  additional  outlets  to 
the  seas.  Italy  at  the  same  time  was  alarmed  at 
the  extension  of  Serbian  power,  since  she,  also, 
did  not  relish  the  prospect  of  having  a  strong 
state  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  sea.  It  was  with 
unexpected  short-sightedness,  however,  that  she 
was  willing  to  block  Serbia  in  order  to  promote 
the  schemes  of  Austria,  a  far  more  formidable 
rival  in  that  quarter,  if  she  were  ever  firmly  es- 
tablished there.  Both  states,  therefore,  appeared 
at  London  to  limit  the  expansion  of  Serbia,  and 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  125 

Germany  supported  them,  seemingly  on  the 
principle  that  she  was  merely  standing  by  the 
members  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  It  has  been 
supposed  that  she  expected  that  Ferdinand,  heir- 
apparent  of  Austria,  when  he  came  to  rule,  would 
promote  a  vital  union  of  the  two  great  Mid- Con- 
tinental empires.  If  we  accept  this  theory,  we 
must  conclude  that  she  had  a  still  more  vital  rea- 
son for  wishing  Austria  to  have  a  large  Adriatic 
coast-line,  with  important  commercial  harbors. 

These  considerations  ran  exactly  counter  to 
Serbia's  hopes  in  Albania.  She  had  already  oc- 
cupied the  Albanian  port  of  Durazzo  and  ex- 
pected to  make  it  the  center  of  a  fair  commercial 
life.  When  ordered  to  withdraw  she  did  not  dare 
refuse;  but  it  was  a  great  humiliation  to  her  to 
cut  off  the  possibility  of  her  future  growth.  For 
a  second  time  Austria  had  given  her  a  vital  blow, 
and  there  was  another  wrong  to  be  remembered 
by  those  Serbians  who  were  inclined  to  remember. 
By  the  decree  of  the  Powers  Albania  was  made 
an  autonomous  state  under  Turkish  suzerainty, 
and  later  on  a  German  prince  was  appointed  to 
rule  it. 

While    these    affairs    were    being    discussed 


126     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Montenegro  besieged  Scutari,  in  northern  Al- 
bania and  continued  operation  until  the  place 
was  taken,  notwithstanding  the  purpose  of  the 
Powers  was  well  known.  Her  courageous  con- 
duct won  the  admiration  of  lovers  of  brave  men 
everywhere.  Eight  days  after  the  capture  of 
Scutari,  Austria  announced  that  she  would  enter 
the  war  if  the  place  was  not  evacuated,  and  Italy 
and  Germany  declared  they  would  support  her. 
Throughout  all  slavic  countries  arose  a  cry  of 
indignation.  In  Russia  especially  it  was  loud 
and  bitter;  and  it  seemed  that  a  great  war  was 
about  to  begin  when  King  Nicholas,  of  Monte- 
negro, gave  the  world  the  assurance  of  peace  by 
withdrawing  his  army  from  Scutari. 

Then  came  that  unhappy  turn  of  affairs  by 
which  the  Balkan  League  was  dissolved  and  the 
hope  disappeared  that  a  strong  power  would 
arise  which  would  take  the  Near  East  out  of  the 
position  of  pawn  for  the  greed  of  the  Great 
Powers.  Serbia,  Greece,  and  Bulgaria  had  made 
an  ante-bellum  agreement  for  the  disposal  of  the 
territory  they  would  take  from  Turkey,  and  the 
first  was  to  have  a  large  part  of  Albania.  Denied 
this  region  she  asked  her  allies  to  make  a  new 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  127 

allotment.  Bulgaria  raised  strong  objection, 
since  the  new  demand,  if  granted,  would  mean 
that  her  gains  would  be  smaller  than  was  first 
agreed.  Angry  speeches  led  to  war,  and  after 
a  sharp  struggle  Bulgaria  was  beaten  and  forced 
to  make  peace  without  honor.  While  they  were 
locked  in  the  conflict  Turkey  seized  the  oppor- 
tunity to  recover  Adrianople,  and  eventually  held 
it.  It  illustrates  the  sordid  nature  of  some  of 
the  Balkan  states  that  Rumania  entered  this  war 
for  purely  predatory  purposes.  She  had  re- 
mained neutral  during  the  common  effort  to  drive 
the  Turk  out ;  but  now  that  Bulgaria  was  march- 
ing to  sure  defeat  she  came  into  the  battle  against 
her,  and  at  the  end  of  the  war  she  demanded  and 
was  given  a  large  part  of  Bulgarian  territory. 
The  '*July  War,"  as  this  stage  of  the  Balkan  con- 
flict is  called,  left  the  allies  filled  with  bitter 
hatred  for  one  another,  and  Bulgaria,  weakened 
as  she  was,  felt  little  inclined  to  lean  on  any  of 
her  immediate  neighbors.  She  was  ripe  for  the 
reception  of  Teutonic  offers  of  friendship,  and 
the  result  was  soon  seen  of  all  men. 

I  have  thus  followed  the  complex  story  of  the 
Balkan  States  to  the  year  1913.     Through  a 


128      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

century  of  war  and  intrigue  Serbia,  Bulgaria, 
Rumania,  Greece,  and  the  small  state  of  Monte- 
negro had  emerged  from  the  Christian  lands  over 
which  the  Turks  had  ruled.  Russia  and  Austria 
had  taken  small  portions  of  those  lands  and  had 
definite  plans  to  secure  influence  over  larger  por- 
tions. In  the  Balkans  Russian  prestige  was 
great,  but  if  a  state  feared  it  she  was  apt  to  look 
to  Austria,  or  to  Germany — which  was  the  same 
thing — as  a  means  of  balancing  against  Russia. 
At  the  same  time  it  was  known  that  Russia  was 
planning  to  construct  strategic  lines  of  railroad 
leading  to  the  Black  Sea  along  the  western  bor- 
der of  her  empire,  and  this  was  considered  an 
ominous  sign  for  the  future.  Altogether,  the 
"tinder  box"  was  ready  for  ignition. 

As  to  Turkey,  her  fortunes  shrank  steadily. 
At  the  end  of  the  Balkan  War  she  retained  only 
1,900,000  subjects  in  Europe,  inhabitants  of  the 
district  around  Adrianople.  She  was  becoming 
a  distinctly  Asiatic  power,  and  the  sultan  must 
have  felt  that  his  hold  on  Constantinople  was 
precarious.  At  the  same  time,  as  we  shall  see 
later  on.  Great  Britain  had  secured  a  foothold 
on  the  shores  of  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  Russia 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  1^9 

was  extending  her  influence  in  Persia,  two  threats 
from  the  eastward.  Any  far  sighted  Turk  could 
see  that  his  country  was  in  danger  of  being 
crushed  in  a  vise  of  foreign  aggression.  To 
which  of  the  great  states  should  Turkey  turn  for 
that  protection  which  had  long  been  her  safety? 
Not  to  Russia,  whose  ambition  was  for  Con- 
stantinople itself,  nor  to  Great  Britain,  who 
seemed  to  desire  the  Euphrates  Valley,  and  who 
was  safely  established  in  Egypt.  In  her  ex- 
tremity she  listened  to  the  suggestions  of  Ger- 
man wooers,  who  promised  industrial  develop- 
ment, railroads,  and  financial  aid.  Here  was 
laid  the  foundation  of  Turko-German  sympathy 
which  was  to  be  very  important  in  the  Great 
War. 

After  a  calamity  has  occurred  it  is  easy  to 
point  out  the  course  by  which  it  might  have  been 
avoided.  It  seems  certain  that  if  we  stood  again 
where  the  world  stood  in  1914  we  should  not  do 
what  we  did  in  1914.  So  we  can  see  in  what 
respects  the  events  of  the  Balkan  history  went 
wrong.  But  the  men  who  settled  the  crises  of 
the  past  were  not  able  to  see  what  we  see.  They 
had  the  same  blindness  for  the  future  that  we 


130      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

have  for  that  which  lies  before  us  now.  They 
fumbled  their  problems  as  most  men  fumble 
problems,  as  we  shall,  perhaps,  go  on  fumbling 
until  the  end  of  time.  It  is  asking  much  to  ex- 
pect that  statesmen  shall  be  as  wise  as  we  who 
review  their  deeds. 

But  there  are  great  facts  in  history  which  it  is 
possible  to  know  and  use  with  profit.  One  of 
them  is  the  incompetency  of  the  principle  of  the 
Concert  of  Europe  to  deal  with  a  situation  like 
that  we  have  reviewed  in  the  Balkans.  Concert 
predicates  a  group  of  satisfied  great  states,  with- 
out over-reaching  ambitions,  who  are  willing  to 
unite  their  efforts  to  restrain  small  states,  or  even 
one  large  state,  from  a  course  which  shall  force 
the  rest  of  the  world  into  conflict.  When  a 
group  of  great  states  have  united  to  carry  out  a 
certain  policy,  and  another  tries  to  restrain  the 
first  group,  concert  is  in  great  danger  of  break- 
ing down.  That  was  the  situation  in  the  Bal- 
kans. These  states  were  drawn  into  the  whirl 
of  general  European  politics,  and  they  intensi- 
fied its  velocity  at  one  particular  corner,  so  that 
what  may  be  contemplated  as  a  harmonious  ro- 
tary movement  broke  into  a  twisting  tornado. 


THE  BALKAN  STATES  ISl 

If,  when  the  present  war  is  over,  the  nations  of 
the  world  undertake  to  go  on  under  the  old  sys- 
tem, trusting  to  concert  as  the  means  of  avoiding 
war,  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  the  future 
will  be  less  turbulent  than  the  past. 


CHAPTER  VII 

GERMAN    IDEALS   AND   ORGANIZATION 

When  wars  begin  between  nations  we  usually 
see  the  leaders  of  thought  on  each  side  busy  de- 
veloping distrust  among  their  own  citizens  for 
the  people  against  whom  they  are  fighting.  In 
accordance  with  this  fact,  the  people  of  the 
United  States  have  read  a  great  deal  since  Au- 
gust, 1914,  to  make  them  think  very  unkindly  of 
Germany. 

This  chapter  is  not  a  plea  for  the  Germans, 
and  I  agree  that  they  did  unnecessarily  cruel  and 
impossible  things  in  Belgium.  It  is  not  to  be 
denied  that  they  played  a  most  unwise  part  in 
the  war  game,  when  they  tried  to  steal  a  march 
on  France  by  invading  through  Belgium,  a  thing 
they  were  pledged  not  to  do.  It  pays  to  keep 
faith;  and  when  a  nation  does  not  keep  faith 
other  nations  have  no  recourse  but  to  treat  it  as 
if  it  were  a  pirate.  If  they  do  otherwise,  the 
whole  game  will  become  a  pirate's  game,  and 
good  faith  will  disappear  from  international  re- 

132 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     133 

lations.  If  Germany  may  violate  Belgium  at 
will,  why  may  she  not  violate  Switzerland,  Hol- 
land, or  any  other  state  that  stands  in  her  way; 
and  who  would  not  expect  her  to  do  it,  if  no 
powers  faced  her  that  were  willing  and  able  to 
dispute  her  will? 

It  is  not  improbable  that  German  leaders  un- 
derstood this  as  well  as  we  who  now  pass  it  under 
review.  They  must  have  made  their  calculations 
on  arousing  the  opposition  of  the  world  and  pro- 
ceeded with  the  expectation  that  they  would  gain 
so  much  by  their  sweep  through  forbidden  Bel- 
gium that  they  could  defy  the  world.  And  if 
things  had  gone  well  for  them,  the  calculation 
would  have  been  well  made.  For  if  Germany 
had  carried  France  off  her  feet  and  placed  her 
in  a  position  to  offer  no  further  menace  during 
the  next  ten  years,  and  if  she  had  dealt  a  similar 
blow  to  Russia,  what  power  could  have  checked 
her  in  the  future  decade?  By  glancing  at  the 
situation  in  Europe  today  we  may  see  how  an 
intrenched  Germany  defies  the  united  and  un- 
whipped  world.  How  much  more  might  she  not 
have  had  her  way,  if  the  thrust  through  Belgium 
had  succeeded! 


134     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Let  us  suppose  that  the  game  of  bad  faith  had 
proved  successful  as  planned,  what  would  have 
been  the  result?  Probably  Great  Britain  would 
have  wakened  slowly  to  her  peril,  but  her  posi- 
tion was  such  that  she  could  have  done  nothing. 
Her  fleet  would  have  been  useless  against  an 
enemy  that  rules  on  land.  Her  army  could  not 
have  met  the  combined  Teutonic  armies,  and  she 
would  have  had  no  allies.  Meanwhile,  Germany 
and  Austria  at  their  leisure  could  have  digested 
the  Balkans  and  drawing  Turkey  into  their  net 
could  have  established  a  "Mittel-Europa"  that 
would  have  left  the  rest  of  the  world  at  their 
mercy.  These  were  alluring  stakes  to  play  for, 
and  it  is  not  hard  to  see  how  a  nation  whose  lead- 
ers have  thrown  aside  the  homely  motto  that 
"Righteousness  exalteth  a  nation"  would  be  will- 
ing to  take  a  chance  in  order  to  obtain  them. 

When  we  think  of  such  things  as  these  we  are 
in  danger  of  concluding  that  they  represent  the 
real  Germany.  We  look  back  to  that  Germany 
of  the  past  which  we  saw  in  our  youth,  whose 
music  we  have  heard  all  our  lives,  whose  Goethe 
we  have  read,  whose  scholarship  we  have  built 
upon,  and  whose  toys  have  amused  us  and  our 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     135 

children  through  many  decades  and  ask  our- 
selves whether  or  not  we  were  mistaken  in  our 
ideas  of  Germany.  Are  there  two  Germanics, 
and  if  so,  which  is  the  true  Germany?  Probably 
the  answer  is  that  each  is  the  real  Germany  mani- 
festing herself  in  different  moods.  Fundamen- 
tally we  have  an  intense  and  emotional  people, 
swayed  in  one  instance  by  artistic  emotions,  in 
another  by  the  love  of  exact  research  for  facts, 
in  another  by  the  feeling  of  domesticity,  and  in 
still  another  by  the  powerful  impulse  of  a  great 
national  egoism.  They  are  a  people  who  can 
love  much,  hate  much,  play  much,  sacrifice  much, 
and  serve  well  when  called  into  service.  In  their 
war-maddened  mood  they  have  stained  a  fair 
reputation,  and  they  are  now  trying  to  think  that 
the  stain  will  not  matter  if  they  can  only  fight 
through  to  victory.  But  nations  are  like  men  in 
this  that  however  successful  one  may  become 
personally  he  never  gets  to  be  so  great  that  he 
can  afford  to  carry  a  tarnished  reputation. 

Let  us  turn  to  the  Germany  of  old  and  see 
if  we  cannot  observe  the  process  by  which  she 
came  to  her  present  state  of  mind.  While  I 
realize  that  it  is  absolutely  necessary  for  the 


1S6      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

world  to  crush  her  attempt  to  rule  Europe,  I 
cannot  find  it  in  my  heart  to  hate  her.  She  has 
risen  to  such  a  state  of  efficiency  in  social  organ- 
ization and  in  the  capacity  to  spread  the  light  of 
civilization  that  she  commands  respect  from 
thinking  foes.  It  is  the  duty  of  the  world  to 
chasten  the  spirit  of  arrogance  out  of  her,  but  to 
leave  her  sound  and  able  to  deal  with  the  future 
in  that  way  in  which  she  is  so  well  fitted  to  play 
a  strong  and  beneficial  part.  If  ever  a  great 
people  needed  the  discipline  of  disaster  to  teach 
them  that  nations,  like  men,  should  do  to  others 
as  they  wish  others  to  do  to  them,  that  nation  is 
the  Germany  of  today.  To  understand  in  what 
way  this  splendid  state  has  run  away  from  its 
past  we  shall  have  to  glance  at  its  history  in  the 
recent  past. 

For  a  point  of  departure  let  us  take  the  Seven 
Years'  War.  This  struggle  was  the  result  of  the 
ambition  of  young  Frederick,  a  strong  and  un- 
ethical king  of  Prussia.  When  he  came  to  the 
throne  he  found  that  a  parsimonious  father  had 
left  him  a  full  treasury,  an  excellent  army,  and 
a  united  kingdom,  while  fate  had  sent  the  neigh- 
boring state  Austria,  a  young  woman  for  ruler 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     137 

and  an  army  that  was  not  formidable.  It  was 
a  favorable  opportunity  to  seize  Silesia,  which 
Prussia  considered  necessary  to  her  welfare,  and 
to  which  she  had  the  flimsiest  pretense  of  right. 
The  rapacity  of  Frederick,  her  king,  cannot  be 
justified  on  moral  grounds,  and  it  threw  Europe 
into  commotions  for  which  nearly  a  quarter  of 
a  century  was  needed  for  settlement.  The  last 
phase  of  this  quarter-of-a-century  was  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  1756-1763.  By  the  time  it  began 
Frederick  of  Prussia  was  looked  upon  by  his 
neighbors  as  a  menace  to  Europe;  and  Austria, 
France,  and  Russia  united  to  crush  him.  He 
had  a  friend  in  Great  Britain,  who  was  gen- 
erally found  among  the  foes  of  France.  In  the 
great  war  he  waged  through  seven  years  he 
fought  off  foes  first  on  one  side  and  then  on  the 
other  until  the  war  ended  at  last  with  Prussia 
still  unconquered. 

If  hard  and  valiant  fighting  and  solicitude  for 
the  welfare  of  his  country  could  redeem  the  error 
of  the  invasion  of  Silesia  the  Seven  Years'  War 
would  relieve  Frederick,  whom  posterity  calls 
"Frederick  the  Great,"  of  all  odium  on  account 
of  the  thoughtless  way  in  which  he  began  his 


138     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

wars.  Unlike  the  present  kaiser,  he  began  a 
long  reign  rashly  and  ended  it  wisely.  Admin- 
istrative reforms  and  a  policy  of  peace  with  his 
neighbors  made  his  last  years  a  period  of  happi- 
ness for  Prussia. 

But  Silesia  fixed  a  firm  hold  on  the  Prussian 
imagination.  Long  justified  as  an  act  necessary 
to  the  safety  of  the  Fatherland,  and  therefore 
permissible,  it  has  given  sanction  for  the  idea 
that  wrong  may  be  done  that  good  shall  result, 
if  only  the  state  is  to  be  benefitted.  It  is  a  false 
doctrine,  and  it  can  do  nothing  but  lead  to  wars. 
Nations  are  under  the  same  obligations  to  do 
right  as  individuals. 

The  next  phase  of  German  history  which  has 
interest  for  us  in  connection  with  this  study  is 
that  which  lies  between  the  years  1806  and  1813. 
It  was  a  period  of  deep  humiliation  at  the  hands 
of  Napoleon.  The  small  states  were  huddled  to- 
gether in  a  Confederation  which  was,  in  fact,  a 
tool  of  the  Emperor  of  France,  and  Prussia  lay 
like  a  trembling  and  crushed  thing  in  his  hand. 
No  living  man  who  hates  Germany  for  the  deeds 
of  the  present  war  could  wish  her  a  worse  fate 
than  Napoleon  inflicted  on  her  after  the  battle 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     139 

of  Jena  in  1806.  He  insulted  the  king,  burdened 
the  people  with  requisitions,  and  limited  their 
armies.  It  was  the  acme  of  national  shame  for 
the  nation  that  is  now  so  strong. 

The  cause  of  these  woes  was  the  lack  of  organ- 
ization, and  perhaps  Napoleon  did  the  nation  a 
service  when  he  beat  the  Prussians  into  a  realiza- 
tion of  it.  No  nation  is  so  poor  that  it  has  not 
reformers  who  see  in  what  way  its  evils  may  be 
corrected.  In  the  days  that  preceded  the  calami- 
ties of  which  I  speak  Prussia  had  her  prophets 
crying  to  deaf  men.  Misfortune  opened  the  ears 
of  the  rulers  so  that  the  prophets  might  be  heard. 
Reforms  were  adopted  out  of  which  has  grown 
the  Germany  of  today.  They  all  looked  toward 
the  unification  of  national  energy,  whatever  its 
form;  but  they  are  expressed  in  three  notable 
ways:  universal  military  service,  the  correction 
of  waste  energy  in  civil  life,  and  the  inculcation 
of  the  spirit  of  obedience  to  authority.  On  these 
principles  chiefly  a  new  Germany  was  built. 

We  have  said  a  great  deal  recently  about 
crushing  the  German  military  system.  Prob- 
ably we  do  not  know  just  what  we  mean  in  say- 
ing this.     At  least,  it  was  not  always  our  habit 


140     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

to  decry  the  system.  Many  a  time  we  have 
spoken  with  admiration  of  the  reforms  of 
Scharnhorst,  of  the  glory  of  Leipzig  and  of  the 
services  of  Bliicher  at  Waterloo.  If  we  stop  to 
think  we  shall  see  that  our  real  objection  is  the 
purpose  for  which  the  German  military  system 
has  been  used.  And  it  seems  that  if  it  is  to  be 
broken  into  pieces  it  must  be  opposed  with  a 
stronger  system  built  on  a  similar  plan. 

The  next  period  that  expresses  Germany's 
peculiar  spirit  is  the  era  of  Bismarck,  1862  to 
1890.  It  was  the  time  of  the  cult  of  iron.  Bis- 
marck was  the  "Iron  Chancellor,"  the  nation  of- 
fered its  enemies  "blood  and  iron."  Iron  can- 
non, iron  words,  and  iron  laws  became  the  ideals 
of  the  people.  Statesmen,  historians,  poets,  edi- 
tors, professors,  and  all  other  patriots  began  to 
worship  according  to  the  rite  of  the  new  cult. 
And  iron  entered  into  the  blood  of  the  Germans. 

To  carry  out  Bismarck's  policy  it  was  neces- 
sary to  break  down  a  promising  liberal  movement 
that  seemed  on  the  point  of  giving  Prussia  re- 
sponsible government.  It  was  his  faith  that  a 
united  Germany  must  hew  her  way  into  the  posi- 
tion of  great  power  in  Europe,  and  in  order  to 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     14?1 

have  a  state  that  could  do  this  there  must  be  a 
strong  central  authority,  able  to  direct  all  the 
resources  of  the  state  to  the  desired  end.  The 
large  number  of  small  nobles  had  long  ago 
formed  the  celebrated  Junker  autocracy,  a  body 
with  like  ideals.  He  gave  their  restless  energy 
a  more  definite  political  and  military  object,  and 
made  them  take  places  as  parts  of  his  great  state 
machine. 

He  had  his  reward.  In  1866  he  fought  a  de- 
cisive war  against  Prussia's  old  enemy,  Austria, 
and  won  it  so  quickly  that  even  the  Prussians 
were  astonished.  In  1870-1871  he  threw  the 
state  against  France  in  a  war  that  left  the  land 
of  Napoleon  as  completely  at  his  feet  as  Prussia 
had  been  at  the  feet  of  the  Corsican.  And  then 
in  the  moment  of  exultation  over  the  victory  he 
founded  the  German  empire  by  uniting  with 
Prussia  the  numerous  smaller  German  states. 
There  is  much  to  support  the  suggestion  that  a 
similar  stroke  is  held  in  reserve  to  create  a  Mittel- 
Europa  of  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  as  a 
final  glory  of  the  present  war,  if  Germany  shows 
herself  able  to  carry  off  the  victory. 

Bismarck's  ambition  for  Germany  was  to  hold 


142      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

a  position  of  arbiter  in  Continental  affairs.  He 
felt  that  this  was  the  best  way  to  make  his  coun- 
try safe  from  hostile  combinations,  and  it  met 
his  ideal  of  the  dignity  to  which  Germany  ought 
to  attain.  He  achieved  his  desire  in  the  Three 
Emperors'  League  and  the  Triple  Alliance. 
Predominance  in  influence  was  the  height  of  his 
ambition.  The  conquest  of  new  lands,  and  the 
support  of  industry  and  trade  by  a  policy  of  ter- 
ritorial expansion,  were  not  within  his  plans. 
He  was  a  man  of  an  older  generation  to  whom 
a  predominance  among  the  Great  Powers  was 
better  than  chasing  the  rainbow  of  world  empire. 
In  1888  died  Wilhelm  I,  the  king  whom  Bis- 
marck made  Emperor.  He  was  an  honest  man 
who  loved  the  simple  and  sound  Germany  in 
which  he  was  reared.  At  this  time  the  leading 
men  of  1871  were  passing  from  power  and  a 
group  was  coming  on  the  scene  who  were  young 
men  in  the  intoxicating  times  of  Sedan  and  Metz. 
A  new  emperor  came  to  the  throne,  possessing 
great  energy  and  the  capacity  of  forming  vast 
plans.  He  was  eleven  years  old  when  the  em- 
pire was  proclaimed  at  Versailles,  the  age  at 
which  ordinary  boys  begin  to  wake  from  the 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     143 

dreams  of  childhood.  From  such  dreams  Wil- 
hehn  II  passed  to  dreams  of  imperial  glory. 
The  idea  of  bigness  of  authority  that  he  thus 
formed  has  remained  with  him  to  this  day.  Add 
the  effects  of  an  impulsive  disposition  and  an  un- 
usual amount  of  confidence  in  himself  and  you 
will  account  for  the  peculiar  gloss  spread  over  a 
character  that  is  strong  and  otherwise  wholesome. 

Early  in  his  reign  he  gave  ground  for  alarm 
by  several  acts  that  are  hardly  to  be  described 
in  a  less  severe  word  than  "bumptious."  He 
dismissed  Bismarck  from  the  Chancellorship, 
seemingly  for  no  other  reason  than  that  he  wished 
a  chancellor  who  would  be  more  obedient  to  the 
imperial  will,  and  he  uttered  many  sentiments 
which  caused  sober  men  to  wonder  what  kind  of 
emperor  he  was  going  to  be.  But  as  the  years 
passed  it  was  noticed  that  all  his  aberrations  fell 
short  of  disaster,  and  as  he  was  very  energetic 
and  devoted  to  efficiency  in  civil  and  military 
matters  the  world  came  at  last  to  regard  him 
with  real  esteem. 

When  the  present  war  began  the  kaiser  became 
its  leader,  as  was  his  duty  and  privilege.  Opin- 
ion  in   hostile    countries   pronounced   him   the 


lU     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

agent  responsible  for  its  outbreak.  Around  his 
striking  personality  have  collected  many  sto- 
ries of  dark  complexion.  At  this  time  it  is  not 
possible  to  test  their  accuracy,  but  it  is  safe  to 
say  that  many  of  them  are  chiefly  assumption. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  is  undoubted  that  he  is  now 
a  firm  friend  of  the  military  party,  and  that  he 
supports  the  autocracy  in  its  purpose  to  carry 
the  war  to  the  bitter  end.  He  has  been  a  dili- 
gent war  lord  and  he  has  shown  a  willingness  to 
share  the  sacrifices  of  the  people.  Stories  of  ap- 
parent reliability  that  have  come  out  of  Germany 
in  recent  months  imply  that  he  has  steadily 
gained  in  popularity  during  the  conflict,  while 
most  of  the  other  members  of  his  family  have 
lost. 

If  it  is  important  to  clear  thinking  to  see  the 
kaiser  in  an  impartial  light,  it  is  equally  neces- 
sary to  understand  the  German  Kultur,  This 
term  is  used  in  Germany  to  indicate  the  mass  of 
ideas  and  habits  of  thought  of  a  people.  It  ap- 
plies to  art  and  industry,  to  religion  and  war,  to 
whatever  the  human  mind  directs.  From  the 
German's  standpoint  we  have  a  Kultur  of  our 
own.     We  have  no  corresponding  term,  nor  con- 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     146 

cept,  and  we  cannot  realize  all  he  means  in  using 
the  term  if  we  do  not  put  ourselves  in  his  place. 
Now  it  is  true  that  the  German  has  won  great 
success  in  intellectual  ways.  Scholarship,  scien- 
tific invention,  the  application  of  art  to  industry, 
and  well  planned  efficiency  in  social  organization 
are  his  in  a  large  degree.  He  is  proud  of  his 
achievements;  and  when  the  war  began  he  felt 
that  it  was  the  German  mission  to  give  this  Kul- 
tur  to  other  peoples.  From  his  standpoint,  a 
Germanized  world  would  be  a  world  made 
happy.  It  was  an  honest  opinion,  and  it  went 
far  to  support  his  desire  for  expansion. 

The  Germans  are  a  docile  people  with  respect 
to  their  superiors,  and  this  trait  is  a  condition  of 
their  Kultur,  It  is  traditional  in  Germany  for 
the  peasant  to  obey  his  lord,  the  lord  to  obey  his 
over-lord,  and  the  over-lord  to  obey  his  ruler. 
To  the  kaiser  look  all  the  people  in  a  sense  which 
no  citizen  of  the  United  States  can  understand 
without  using  a  fair  amount  of  imagination. 
The  lords  and  over-lords  constitute  the  Junkers, 
who  in  the  modern  military  system  make  up  the 
officer  class.  A  high  sense  of  authority  runs 
through  the  whole  population,  the  upper  classes 


146      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

knowing  how  to  give  orders  and  the  lower  classes 
knowing  how  to  take  them. 

Before  the  battle  of  Jena,  1806,  the  Prussian 
army  was  made  up  of  peasants  forced  to  serve 
under  the  nobles,  who  took  the  offices.  Towns- 
men were  excluded  from  the  army.  The  peas- 
ant's forced  service  lasted  twenty  years.  The 
system  was  as  inefficient  as  it  was  unequal,  and 
a  commission  was  appointed  to  reform  it.  The 
result  was  the  modern  system  of  universal  serv- 
ice, put  into  complete  operation  in  1813.  After 
a  hundred  years  it  is  possible  to  see  some  of  the 
effects  of  the  system  on  the  ideals  of  the  peopls. 
It  has  taught  them  to  work  together  in  their 
places,  formed  habits  of  promptness  and  clean- 
liness, and  lessened  the  provincialism  of  the  lower 
classes.  It  has  been  a  great  training  school  in 
nationalism,  preserving  the  love  of  country  and 
instilling  in  the  minds  of  the  masses  a  warm  de- 
votion to  the  military  traditions  of  the  nation. 

It  has  also  produced  results  of  a  questionable 
value.  By  fostering  the  military  spirit  it  has  de- 
veloped a  desire  for  war,  on  the  same  principle 
that  a  boy  in  possession  of  a  sharp  hatchet  has  a 
strong  impulse  to  hack  away  at  his  neighbor's 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     147 

shrubbery.  It  is  probable  that  the  temptation 
to  use  a  great  and  superior  army  was  a  vital  fact 
in  bringing  on  the  present  war.  Furthermore, 
the  wide-spread  habit  of  docility  leaves  a  people 
without  self-assertion  and  enables  their  rulers  to 
impose  upon  them.  As  to  the  influence  of  uni- 
versal service  in  promoting  militarism,  that  has 
been  frequently  mentioned. 

On  the  other  hand,  it  should  be  borne  in  mind 
that  not  all  states  that  have  had  universal  mili- 
tary training  have  been  saddled  with  these  evils. 
France,  for  example,  has  had  universal  training 
without  becoming  obsessed  with  the  passion  for 
war  and  without  the  loss  of  popular  individual- 
ism. It  seems  well  to  say  that  universal  training 
itself  does  not  produce  the  evils  sometimes  at- 
tributed to  it.  In  Germany,  at  least,  it  seems 
that  it  was  the  purpose  for  which  the  army  ex- 
isted, and  not  the  army  itself,  that  developed 
militarism  and  brought  other  unhappy  effects. 

Probably  the  German  army  before  the  war  was 
the  most  efficient  great  human  machine  then  in 
existence.  There  was  less  waste  in  it  and  less 
graft  than  in  any  other  army.  Since  the  army 
included  all  the  men  of  the  empire  at  some  stage 


14*8      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

or  other  of  their  existence,  it  was  a  great  train- 
ing school  in  organization.  Its  effects  on  Ger- 
man history  are  hardly  to  be  exaggerated. 

I  have  said  that  military  organization  alone 
was  not  sufficient  to  make  the  modern  Germany. 
It  was  also  necessary  to  give  the  nation  a  definite 
national  purpose,  and  this  was  the  task  of  its 
intellectual  leaders.  The  purpose  itself  was  ex- 
pressed in  the  idea  of  German  nationality.  By 
a  bold  stretch  of  fancy  every  part  of  Europe 
that  had  once  been  ruled  by  Germans,  that 
spoke  the  German  language,  or  that  could  be 
considered  as  a  part  that  ought  to  speak  that 
language  was  fixed  upon  as  territory  to  be 
brought  within  the  authority  of  the  Fatherland. 
It  was  in  accordance  with  this  principle  that 
Schleswig-Holstein  was  taken  from  Denmark 
in  1864  and  Alsace-Lorraine  in  1871.  Here  the 
march  of  annexation  paused.  Bismarck  was  too 
wise  to  carry  the  theory  to  an  extreme;  but  a 
growing  number  of  writers  and  speakers  in  the 
empire  took  up  the  idea  and  kept  it  before  the 
people  with  winning  persistence.  It  is  thus  that 
Pan-Germanism  has  come  to  be  one  of  the  great 
facts  in  German  public  opinion.     By  preaching 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     149 

race  unity  with  patriotic  zeal  the  intellectual  lead- 
ers have  established  a  powerful  propaganda  of 
expansion. 

Of  the  men  most  prominently  associated  with 
this  movement  especial  attention  must  be  given 
to  Heinrich  von  Treitschke,  for  years  profes- 
sor of  Modern  and  Contemporary  History  at  the 
University  of  Berlin,  whose  remarkable  influence 
reached  all  classes  of  people.  He  was  a  hand- 
some man  with  an  open  face  that  invited  admira- 
tion without  appearing  to  care  whether  it  was 
given  or  not.  When  he  spoke  the  auditor  heard 
"a  raucous,  half-strangled,  uneasy  voice''  and 
noticed  that  his  movements  were  mechanical  and 
his  utterances  were  without  regard  to  the  pauses 
that  usually  stand  for  commas  and  periods,  while 
his  pleasant  facial  expression  had  no  apparent 
relation  to  what  he  was  saying.  The  explana- 
tion was  that  he  was  so  deaf  that  he  did  not  hear 
himself  speak.  That  such  a  speaker  could  fire 
the  heart  of  a  nation  is  evidence  that  he  was  filled 
with  unusual  earnestness  and  sympathy. 

He  had  great  love  of  country,  and  if  he  exalted 
royalty  and  strong  government  it  was  because  he 
thought  that  Germany  would  reach  her  highest 


150      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

authority  through  them.  It  was  no  selfish  or  in- 
competent king  that  he  worshiped,  but  one  that 
lived  righteously  and  sought  diligently  to  pro- 
mote the  interest  of  the  people.  He  held  that  the 
nobihty  should  serve  as  thoroughly  as  the  com- 
mon men.  Strong  government  in  his  idea  did 
not  mean  privilege,  as  ordinarily  understood,  but 
vital  energy  in  all  the  organs  of  administration, 
efficiently  directed  by  a  will  that  was  not  ham- 
pered by  the  contrarywise  tugging  of  individual 
opinions. 

Treitschke's  penetrating  eloquence  was  heard 
throughout  the  land.  Editors,  preachers  of  re- 
ligion, schoolmasters,  authors,  members  of  the 
legislative  assemblies,  high  officials,  and  even  min- 
isters of  state  came  to  his  class-room  and  went 
away  to  carry  his  ideas  into  other  channels.  He 
inspired  the  men  who  did  the  actual  thinking  for 
the  nation.  All  his  efforts  were  expended  for 
what  he  considered  the  enhancement  of  Ger- 
many's position  among  nations. 

In  giving  him  his  due  we  must  not  overlook  his 
faults.  He  was  narrow  in  his  ideas  of  interna- 
tional relations.  His  exaltation  of  Germany 
would  have  left  other  nations  at  her  mercy.     He 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     151 

seems  to  have  had  small  respect  for  the  principle 
of  live-and-let-live  among  states.  As  much  as 
any  one  in  his  country  he  was  responsible  for  the 
idea  that  the  British  are  a  pack  of  hypocrites,  of- 
fering inferior  races  the  Bible  with  one  hand  and 
opium  with  the  other.  That  they  had  not  a  good 
record  with  respect  to  the  opium  trade  is  true, 
but  it  was  sheer  narrowness  to  make  it  the  chief 
characteristic  of  a  people  who  have  done  a  great 
work  in  behalf  of  the  backward  races. 

Although  Treitschke  wrote  many  pamphlets 
on  topics  of  current  interest,  all  bearing  upon 
what  he  considered  the  destiny  of  Germany,  he 
was  preeminently  a  historian.  It  was  by  telling 
the  story  of  Germany  since  the  revival  of  na- 
tional feeling  after  the  battle  of  Jena  that  he 
wished  to  serve  best  the  generation  in  which  he 
lived.  For  him  it  was  the  historian  to  whom  was 
committed  the  task  of  making  the  citizen  realize 
what  place  he  had  in  the  nation's  complex  of 
duties  and  hopes. 

He  came  upon  the  scene  when  history  had  be- 
come fixed  upon  the  basis  of  accuracy  and  de- 
tached research.  Men  like  Leopold  von  Ranke 
had  insisted  that  history  should  deal  with  the 


152     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

cold  exploitation  of  universal  laws.  For  them 
Treitschke  was  a  bad  historian,  and  they  used 
their  influence  to  prevent  his  appointment  at  the 
University  of  Berlin.  He  was  a  Chauvinist,  un- 
doubtedly, and  his  History  of  Germany  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century  is  a  highly  colored  pic- 
ture of  what  he  conceived  the  reader  should  know 
about  the  history  of  his  country.  It  is  a  work 
written  to  arouse  the  enthusiasm  of  the  people  for 
their  country,  rather  than  to  instruct  them  in  the 
universal  laws  of  human  development;  and  it 
would  be  a  sad  day  for  the  world  if  all  history 
were  written  as  he  wrote  this.  But  it  was  a 
powerful  appeal  to  national  pride  and  energy. 
It  played  a  great  part  in  the  formation  of  the 
Germany  with  which  we  are  concerned  in  this 
chapter,  the  striving,  self-confident,  and  aspiring 
empire  that  set  for  itself  the  task  of  dominating 
the  European  continent. 

This  chapter  is  not  written  to  reconcile  Amer- 
ican readers  to  the  German  side  of  the  contro- 
versy that  now  engages  the  attention  of  all  men. 
I  wish  to  enable  the  reader  to  have  a  clear  view 
of  the  people  with  whom  we  fight.  It  is  they 
with  whom  we  must  deal  in  building  up  the  sys- 


GERMAN  IDEALS  AND  ORGANIZATION     153 

tern  out  of  which  the  future  is  to  be  constructed 
again;  and  we  shall  not  know  how  to  deal  with 
them  if  we  do  not  see  their  point  of  view  and 
know  what  they  are  thinking  about. 

If  in  some  of  their  ideals  they  are  superior  to 
other  peoples,  and  if  their  organization  of  indi- 
viduals into  the  state  has  some  elements  of 
strength  not  found  in  other  systems,  it  is  not  for 
us  to  seek  to  destroy  the  advantage  they  have 
won.  It  would  be  better  for  us  to  adopt  their 
good  points,  in  order  that  we  might  the  more 
surely  defeat  them  on  the  field  of  battle.  Hav- 
ing won  the  victory  we  desire,  we  should  cer- 
tainly not  seek  to  destroy  that  which  we  cannot 
replace.  Live  and  let  live,  a  principle  which 
Germans  have  ignored  in  some  important  re- 
spects, must  be  recognized  after  the  military  am- 
bition of  Germany  is  broken,  if  we  are  to  have 
an  enduring  peace. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

THE  FAILURE   OF   THE   OLD   EUROPEAN   SYSTEM 

Much  has  been  written  to  prove  that  one  side 
or  the  other  was  responsible  for  the  present  war. 
Minute  facts,  as  the  words  in  a  dispatch,  or  the 
time  at  which  the  troops  were  mobihzed,  or 
whether  or  not  a  prehminary  summons  of  troops 
to  the  colors  was  in  itself  an  act  of  mobilization, 
have  become  the  subjects  of  bitter  debate.  Such 
questions  will  have  to  be  settled  by  the  historians 
of  the  future  years:  they  cannot  be  discussed 
here  with  any  profit,  since  this  book  is  an  appeal 
to  the  reason  of  men  on  each  side  of  the  con- 
troversy. 

Back  of  the  events  of  July,  1914,  is  a  more 
fundamental  cause  of  the  war.  It  is  the  break- 
down of  the  systems  of  concert  and  balance  to 
which  the  powers  had  trusted  themselves.  Cas- 
tlereagh  and  Metternich  allowed  themselves  to 
slip  into  these  theories,  when  they  set  aside  the 
suggestion  of  a  federated  Europe,  which  came 

154 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       155 

from  Alexander  I.  Granted  that  the  tsar's 
dream  was  too  ethereal  for  a  world  steeped  in  sel- 
fishness, it  does  not  follow  that  a  policy  entirely- 
devoted  to  the  balancing  of  selfishness  with  self- 
ishness would  have  preserved  peace. 

On  the  other  hand,  we  must  admit  that  nations 
are  not  idealists.  Selfishness  is  their  doctrine. 
So  long  as  the  project  of  a  federation  is  viewed 
idealistically  it  is  practically  impossible.  But  if 
it  ever  comes  to  be  admitted  by  the  people  who 
count  in  political  things  that  it  is  for  the  interests 
of  the  nations  to  adopt  it,  that  is,  if  it  is  brought 
within  what  we  may  call  the  sphere  of  selfishness, 
it  ceases  to  be  idealistic  and  comes  to  be  a  subject 
worthy  of  the  consideration  of  the  practical 
statesman. 

Furthermore,  the  political  philosopher  has 
ever  to  answer  the  question,  "What  about  the 
future?"  What  are  we  going  to  do  after  the 
present  debauch  of  waste  and  murder  is  over? 
Are  we  to  trust  the  world  to  the  same  old  forces 
that  brought  us  this  ruin?  One  says  that  human 
nature  is  the  same  forever,  that  it  learns  only  in 
the  hard  school  of  experience,  and  that  it  must 
fight  its  wars  as  the  price  it  pays  for  being  human 


156      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

nature.  To  such  a  man  the  Napoleonic  wars 
did  all  that  could  be  expected  of  them  when  they 
so  impressed  the  world  with  the  cost  of  war  that 
a  system  was  adopted  which  gave  the  world  a 
measure  of  peace  for  a  hundred  years.  "What 
more  can  you  ask?"  said  such  a  philosopher  to  me. 
In  humble  responsibility  to  the  throne  of  reason  I 
reply  that  we  can  try  as  intelligent  beings  to  re- 
move the  war  madness  permanently,  making  it 
our  duty  to  posterity  to  do  the  best  we  can. 
Some  generation  must  make  the  start,  or  we  shall 
wring  our  hands  forever. 

In  this  chapter  I  wish  to  show  in  what  way  the 
old  system  crumbled  before  the  desire  of  world 
power.  It  seems  a  vicious  system  by  virtue  of 
its  innate  qualities  of  selfishness,  and  it  is  all 
the  more  to  be  feared  because  its  subtle  spirit 
gets  control  of  our  own  hearts  as  well  as  the 
hearts  of  other  men.  While  our  opponents — 
Germany  and  Austria — were  following  the  sys- 
tem to  its  bitter  conclusion,  our  friends — Great 
Britain,  France,  and  Italy — were  doing  nearly 
the  same  things,  but  in  a  slightly  different  way. 
And  there  is  no  reason  to  expect  that  under  the 
continuation  of  the  balancing  of  great  and  am- 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       157 

bitious  world  powers  we  shall  have  more  respect 
for  the  rights  of  one  another  than  we  had  in  the 
past. 

The  system  of  Balance  of  Power  flourished  best 
in  Bismarck's  time.  It  was  his  strong  personal- 
ity that  held  together  the  Three  Emperors' 
League  for  a  brief  season  and  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance for  a  longer  period.  Each  of  these  groups 
had  certain  interests  in  common  which  gave  them 
coherence :  Bismarck  alone  knew  how  to  exploit 
these  mutual  advantages  and  lessen  the  jars  of 
clashing  feelings.  His  objects  were  made  easier 
by  the  fact  that  most  of  the  other  nations  of 
Europe  at  that  time  had  developed  quarrels  of 
their  own.  Great  Britain  and  Russia  were  at 
swords'  points  over  the  Far  Eastern  question,  and 
France  and  Great  Britain  had  not  forgotten  their 
century  old  antagonism,  which  only  a  minor  dis- 
pute was  sufficient  to  set  aflame. 

Moreover,  Great  Britain  was  engaged  in  a  vast 
task  of  empire  building.  Manufactures  in- 
creased rapidly  in  the  United  Kingdom,  an  ever 
growing  trade  threw  out  ever  expanding  tentacles 
to  the  remotest  parts  of  the  world,  and  the 
growth  of  the  colonies  produced  greater  pros- 


158      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

perity  at  home  and  abroad  than  the  most  hope- 
ful Briton  had  previously  thought  within  the 
bounds  of  probability.  She  was  too  busy  with 
this  splendid  process  of  internal  prosperity  to 
take  notice  of  what  was  happening  on  the  Conti- 
nent, so  long  as  her  own  interests  were  not  threat- 
ened. From  her  standpoint  Bismarck's  policy  of 
preserving  peace  through  the  means  of  a  Ger- 
man predominating  influence  was  a  welcome  re- 
lief from  other  burdens. 

This  state  of  affairs  was  prolonged  for  at  least 
fifteen  years  after  the  death  of  Bismarck. 
Kaiser  Wilhelm  II's  temperamental  impetuous- 
ness  did  not  break  up  the  balance  that  had  been 
established,  although  many  prophets  had  foretold 
such  a  thing'.  As  the  corner-stone  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  Germany  was  looked  upon  as  the  pro- 
tector of  European  peace,  and  the  kaiser,  it  is 
said,  was  pleased  to  regard  himself  as  the  man 
especially  responsible  for  that  policy. 

It  is  difficult  to  say  when  and  how  this  happy 
situation  began  to  be  undermined  and  whose  was 
the  responsibility.  One  cause  of  the  rupture  was 
the  rapid  growth  of  German  manufactures  and 
trade,  which  brought  about  stern  competition  be- 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM        159 

tween  the  business  interests  of  Germany  and 
Great  Britain.  The  newspapers  of  the  two  na- 
tions, like  all  other  newspapers  of  modern  times, 
were  closely  connected  with  the  capitalistic  in- 
terests of  the  respective  states,  and  voiced  the 
alarm  and  antipathy  of  the  industrial  classes. 
Thus  the  people  of  Germany  and  the  people  of 
Britain  were  stimulated  to  a  condition  of  mutual 
distrust.  They  believed  that  each  practiced  the 
most  disreputable  tricks  of  competition  against 
the  other,  and  each  talked  of  destroying  the  in- 
dustry of  the  other.  It  is  difficult  to  say  who  is 
responsible  for  the  beginning  of  commercial 
rivalry. 

Late  in  the  last  century  Germany  began  to  en- 
large her  navy  with  the  evident  purpose  of  mak- 
ing it  rival  the  navy  of  Great  Britain.  Her 
justification  was  found  in  the  idea  that  a  navy 
was  necessary  to  protect  the  great  commerce  that 
she  was  building  up.  At  the  same  time  German 
writers  began  to  make  many  criticisms  on  the 
British  claim  of  being  mistress  of  the  seas. 
"Freedom  of  the  seas"  became  a  phrase  of  com- 
fort in  their  mouths.  It  is  not  clear  that  it  meant 
what  it  seemed  to  say ;  for  the  seas  were  as  free  to 


160     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

the  Germans  in  times  of  peace  as  to  any  other 
people,  and  Germany's  plan  to  build  a  great 
fleet  that  would  defeat  the  British  fleet  would 
establish  that  same  kind  of  rule  at  sea  that  Great 
Britain  through  her  naval  superiority  then  held. 

Now  it  is  very  certain  that  Germany  had  a  per- 
fect right  to  enter  each  of  these  two  fields  of 
endeavor.  The  contests  of  industry  are  open 
to  all,  and  the  laws  of  peace  protect  them.  She 
had  the  right,  also,  to  build  up  her  navy,  al- 
though she  should  not  have  expected  to  overtop 
the  British  navy  specifically  without  arousing  the 
hostility  of  the  British  people.  The  insular  posi- 
tion of  the  United  Kingdom  and  its  relations  with 
its  colonies  are  such  that  a  navy  is  its  surest  pro- 
tection if  assailed  in  war ;  and  to  fall  into  a  second 
position  is  to  hold  its  life  at  the  permission  of 
another  state.  Germany  must  have  seen  this 
phase  of  the  situation.  Her  statesmen  were  poor 
leaders  of  men  if  they  did  not  realize  that  they 
were  entering  upon  a  rivalry  in  which  was  the  pos- 
sibility of  great  resistance. 

Another  phase  of  the  opposition  that  was 
steadily  rising  against  Germany  was  the  general 
alarm  at  the  growth  of  her  military  power.     Her 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       161 

army  and  navy  ever  increased  in  size  and  readi- 
ness for  that  initial  rush  to  victory  which  is  half 
the  struggle  in  modern  war.  At  the  same  time 
German  leaders  did  not  disguise  their  desire  for 
the  enlargement  of  German  territory  on  the  Con- 
tinent. The  Pan-German  party  made  a  great 
deal  of  noise,  and  other  nations  were  not  re- 
assured by  being  told  that  the  party  was  not  as 
strong  as  its  agitation  seemed  to  indicate. 

Now  and  again  one  read  in  some  German  paper 
an  assertion  to  the  effect  that  Germany  was 
bound  to  become  the  dominant  power  in  Europe 
and  that  she  would  next  turn  on  the  United 
States.  How  many  Americans  have  not  heard 
some  over-confident  German  friend  make  a 
prophecy  of  like  import?  It  was  evident  that 
many  Germans  regarded  the  great  republic  of  the 
West  as  an  over-fattened  commercial  nation  with- 
out the  power  of  resistance  and  destined  at  the 
proper  time  to  furnish  rich  nourishment  for  their 
conquering  arms.  That  we  considered  these 
thoughts  but  the  idle  boasts  of  a  nation  intoxi- 
cated by  success  did  not  lessen  the  conviction  of 
ourselves  and  others  that  Germany  was  running 
into  a  state  of  mind  that  required  cooperative 


162      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

measures  of  resistance  on  the  part  of  people  who 
might  become  victims  of  her  infatuation. 

While  these  two  processes  of  national  feeling 
ran  their  courses,  several  political  events,  which 
have  already  been  described  added  vigor  to  the 
antagonism  that  was  rising  against  Germany. 
Her  attitude  toward  the  Boers  when  they  were 
at  war  against  Great  Britain  was  one,  Delcasse's 
wise  adjustment  of  the  Fashoda  incident  was 
another,  his  clever  formation  of  the  Entente  Cor- 
diale  between  France  and  Britain  was  another, 
the  conclusion  of  the  Anglo-Japanese  alliance 
was  still  another,  the  defeat  of  Russia  by  Japan 
and  her  elimination  as  a  threat  against  British 
interests  in  India  was  another,  and  the  formation 
of  the  Triple  Entente  by  Great  Britain,  France, 
and  Russia,  announced  in  1907,  was  the  final  act 
of  the  series.  Great  Britain  was  not  only  again 
seriously  concerned  in  Continental  affairs,  but  a 
combination  had  been  formed  of  three  great 
European  nations,  with  the  strongest  power  of 
the  East  as  a  flying  buttress,  to  hold  back  the 
much  dreaded  aggressions  of  the  Triple  Alliance, 
consisting  of  Germany,  Austria,  and  Italy.  The 
Balance  of  Power  had  come  to  its  most  logical 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       163 

state  of  development;  for  instead  of  having  one 
great  state  balancing  between  the  other  states 
around  it,  we  now  had  the  great  state's  of  the 
world  ranged  in  two  camps,  each  side  checking 
the  other  in  the  belief  that  in  so  doing  it  was  pre- 
serving the  world  from  war. 

It  is  hard  to  establish  a  balance  when  two 
opposing  sides  are  strong  and  mutually  jealous 
of  one  another;  for  the  opposition  of  forces  is 
then  formed  to  secure  mutual  advantages,  and 
not  to  promote  the  common  interest  through  the 
preservation  of  equilibrium.  In  such  a  case  one 
side  or  the  other,  possibly  each  side,  is  apt  to 
fancy  itself  the  stronger,  and  if  it  acts  on  that 
assumption  it  arouses  the  apprehension  of  the 
other  which  finds  itself  tempted  to  make  a  coun- 
ter stroke.  Once  such  a  step  is  taken  equilibrium 
is  lost.  This  is  what  happened  in  1914.  The 
train  of  events  that  led  up  to  the  destruction  of 
the  international  balance  is  now  to  be  described. 

Here  we  must  go  back  to  the  days  when  Del- 
casse  was  foreign  secretary  in  Paris,  1898-1905. 
One  of  his  achievements  was  to  come  to  agree- 
ment with  Spain  and  Italy  in  reference  to  the 
northern  coast  of  Africa.     He  effected  a  treaty 


164*     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

with  the  former  nation  by  which  French  and 
Spanish  spheres  of  influence  in  Morocco  were 
defined,  and  another  with  Italy  by  which  the  right 
of  France  in  Tunis  was  accorded  in  exchange  for 
recognition  of  the  right  of  Italy  to  Tripoli  and 
Cyrenaica. 

Making  this  treaty  by  Italy  did  not  constitute 
treason  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  since  it  was  clearly 
advantageous  for  Italy  without  infringing  the 
rights  of  either  Germany  or  Austria;  but  it 
alarmed  Germany,  already  drawing  close  to  Tur- 
key, because  the  object  of  Italian  policy  was  to 
get  territory  over  which  Turkey  had  a  vital 
claim.  Nor  was  it  pleasant  for  the  kaiser  to  see 
one  of  the  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance  acting 
in  cooperation  with  the  members  of  the  Entente 
in  so  important  a  matter. 

Taking  these  achievements  in  connection  with 
the  formation  of  the  Dual  Alliance  and  the  mu- 
tual approach  of  France  and  Great  Britain,  Ger- 
many had  reason  to  feel  that  she  was  being  iso- 
lated. Her  whole  population  resented  this  turn 
of  events,  seeing  in  it  a  sort  of  challenge  hurled 
forth  by  France,  who  at  last  found  herself  strong 
enough  to  assume  a  position  of  self-assertion.     It 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       165 

is  true  that  Delcasse  only  placed  Germany  in 
a  position  of  isolation  like  that  which  Bismarck 
imposed  on  France  for  many  years ;  and  it  was,  in 
strict  logic,  as  fair  for  him  to  treat  Germany 
thus  as  for  Bismarck  to  isolate  France.  Let 
Germany  submit  to  her  fate,  as  France  sub- 
mitted, when  she  had  to  submit.  But  we  are  not 
dealing  with  logical  matters  here.  It  is  a  plain 
fact  that  confronts  us.  Germany,  who  had 
been  strong  through  three  decades  without  seek- 
ing to  expand  her  territory,  suddenly  realized  that 
her  opponents  were  forming  a  combination 
stronger  than  hers,  their  acquisition  of  territory 
that  followed  set  her  in  a  rage,  and  she  made 
plans  for  getting  her  share  in  the  world  that  was 
to  be  taken.  Under  the  system  of  balance  then 
recognized  as  the  proper  means  of  regulating 
international  relations  her  course  was  a  natural 
result  of  Delcasse's  policy. 

The  particular  portion  of  the  earth  to  which 
she  turned  her  eyes  was  Turkey.  While  she  sup- 
ported the  plans  of  Austria-Hungary  to  acquire 
territory  on  the  Adriatic,  she  herself  looked 
further  to  the  East.  She  encouraged  the  party 
at  Constantinople  known  as  the  "Young  Turks," 


166     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

she  furnished  improved  arms  to  the  Turkish 
army,  she  formed  plans  to  establish  her  influence 
in  Palestine,  and  she  projected  a  great  railroad  to 
Bagdad  in  the  center  of  the  Euphrates-Tigris 
Valley.  It  was  a  sphere  of  influence  that  might 
be  considered  more  than  a  fair  offset  for  the  lands 
her  rivals  were  about  to  gain. 

At  the  same  time  Germany  found  a  means  of 
restoring  her  prestige,  which  was  sorely  wilted  by 
the  progress  of  her  rivals.  The  occasion  arose  in 
connection  with  France's  occupation  of  Morocco, 
which  had  begun  without  the  aid  or  consent  of  the 
kaiser. 

Morocco  had  long  been  under  a  line  of  inde- 
pendent sultans.  Most  of  her  commerce  was 
with  Great  Britain  although  German  capitalists 
had  received  concessions  within  her  border.  As 
the  country  next  to  the  French  province  of  Al- 
geria, France  looked  upon  it  as  her  own  particu- 
lar sphere  of  influence.  We  have  already  seen 
that  Italy  conceded  this  claim,  1901,  while  France 
conceded  Italy's  claim  to  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica. 
In  1904  France  conceded  Great  Britain's  prac- 
tical supremacy  in  Egypt  and  in  return  was  as- 
sured the  protectorate  over  Morocco.     She  asked 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       167 

no  concession  from  Germany  but  came  to  an 
agreement  with  Spain,  who  had  a  small  strip  of 
territory  south  of  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar. 

In  1905  Delcasse  was  quietly  preparing  to 
carry  out  his  plan  for  the  development  of  Mo- 
rocco, when  the  kaiser  landed  in  Tangiers  without 
the  slightest  warning,  and  announced  in  a  public 
address  that  he  had  come  to  visit  his  friend,  the 
independent  sultan  of  Morocco,  in  whose  country 
all  foreign  nations  had  equal  rights.  The  speech 
was  received  by  the  world  as  a  challenge  to 
France  and  a  means  of  announcing  that  Ger- 
many was  no  longer  to  be  ignored.  The  moment 
of  the  landing  at  Tangiers  was  well  chosen  by  the 
kaiser;  for  only  three  weeks  earlier  Russia,  the 
ally  of  France,  had  been  defeated  by  the  Japan- 
ese at  Mukden  and  could  give  her  no  assist- 
ance. 

In  this  unfortunate  situation  it  was  necessary 
for  France  to  bend  before  the  storm.  She  agreed 
to  submit  the  whole  Moroccan  question  to  an  in- 
ternational congress,  thus  appealing  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  Concert  of  Europe,  and  when  she 
learned  that  the  kaiser  demanded  that  she  dis- 
miss the  minister  whose  hands  had  been  played 


168     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

so  skillfully  against  Germany,  she  agreed  to  that 
also. 

The  dismissal  of  Delcasse  recalls  an  incident  of 
1807.  In  that  year  Napoleon  forced  the  king  of 
Prussia  to  dismiss  Stein,  his  great  minister,  who 
was  bending  all  his  efforts  to  reestablish  Prussia 
on  a  war  footing.  It  marked  the  triumph  of 
Napoleon's  power  for  the  time  being,  but  it 
was  a  futile  action;  for  Stein  out  of  office  under 
such  circumstances  had  more  influence  than  ever, 
and  the  shameful  way  in  which  he  was  treated 
only  emphasized  Prussia's  humiliation  and  made 
the  Prussians  more  determined  than  ever  to  as- 
sert their  national  power.  Similar  results  in 
France  in  1905  followed  the  stab  given  to  that 
nation's  faithful  and  efficient  minister. 

The  international  congress  assembled  at  Al- 
geciras  in  1906.  It  adopted  a  compromise  de- 
cision, which  gave  something  to  each  side  and  sat- 
isfied neither.  Germany  was  supposed  to  have 
gained  when  the  congress  recognized  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  Morocco  under  the  sovereignty 
of  the  sultan  and  guaranteed  equal  rights  of  trade 
in  the  country  to  the  citizens  of  all  the  signa- 
tory powers.     On  the  other  hand,  France  and 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       169 

Spain  were  jointly  to  have  the  right  to  instruct 
and  furnish  officers  for  the  Moroccan  poHce  force. 
Winning  in  a  quarrel  rarely  makes  the  victor 
think  well  of  the  vanquished.  Certainly  Ger- 
many, who  had  now  blocked  the  plans  of  France, 
was  not  less  bitter  in  her  attitude  toward  that 
nation;  while  France,  feeling  that  she  had  been 
caught  at  a  disadvantage,  smothered  her  indigna- 
tion and  waited  for  the  opportunity  to  make 
things  even. 

In  1907  disturbances  occurred  in  Moroccan 
ports  and  French  marines  were  landed  to  pre- 
serve order.  When  they  were  not  withdrawn  in 
a  year  Germany  protested  and  an  irritating 
diplomatic  discussion  followed.  At  last  Ger- 
many was  persuaded  to  submit  the  point  actually 
at  issue  to  the  Hague  tribunal,  whose  decision 
was  not  conclusive  and  satisfied  neither  side. 
Then  a  Franco-German  convention  was  held  to 
pass  on  the  rights  of  each  nation  in  Morocco. 
Its  decision,  given  in  February,  1909,  announced 
that  the  interest  of  Germany  in  the  province  was 
only  economic;  and  as  France  agreed  to  give 
equal  protection  in  such  matters,  the  kaiser 
promised  he  would  not  interfere  in  the  country. 


170      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

In  each  of  these  incidents  war  seemed  about  to 
begin,  and  Europe  awaited  the  results  in  great 
anxiety.  When  the  clouds  lifted  the  nations 
breathed  freely  again. 

Still  there  was  no  way  under  the  existing  sys- 
tem to  solve  the  difficulty  that  presented  itself, 
had  Germany  only  decided  that  she  would  not 
trust  her  cause  to  peaceful  negotiation.  The 
fact  that  she  took  such  a  step  was  to  her  own 
people  but  a  mark  of  the  kaiser's  love  of  peace. 
This  and  similar  incidents,  in  which  the  militarists 
carried  their  country  to  the  verge  of  war  only 
to  be  held  back  by  the  hand  of  the  emperor  served 
to  lay  the  foundation  for  that  popular  belief 
in  Germany  that  a  peace  policy  had  been  steadily 
followed  under  provocations  and  that  Europe 
was  indebted  to  Wilhelm  II  for  immunity  from 
war.  In  reality  the  system  of  balance  of  power 
had  needlessly  brought  the  world  to  the  verge  of 
a  bitter  and  unnecessary  conflict. 

Almost  immediately  after  the  war  clouds  lifted 
Europe  had  evidence  of  the  small  amount  of 
tolerance  the  leading  classes  of  Germany  had  for 
the  slightest  manifestation  of  the  spirit  of  com- 
promise in  the  matter  under  discussion.     The 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       171 

chancellor  under  whom  the  recent  settlement  was 
made  was  von  Biilow,  who  thought  it  better  to 
adjust  so  small  a  quarrel  than  to  incur  the  re- 
sponsibility of  war.  His  action  received  the 
stern  denunciation  of  the  military  party.  So 
strong  was  the  criticism  that  he  was  forced  to 
retire  from  office,  his  place  going  to  Bethmann- 
Hollweg,  who  had  the  support  of  the  militarists. 
The  only  explanation  to  be  advanced  for  this 
turn  of  the  affair  is  that  the  German  national 
spirit  was  so  much  excited  by  the  long  agitation 
of  men  like  Treitschke  that  a  concession  which 
others  might  consider  only  trifling  seemed  to 
them  a  sacrifice  of  national  honor. 

In  1911  occurred  a  third  Moroccan  incident,  in 
which  Bethmann-Hollweg  took  occasion  to  re- 
cover some  of  the  attitude  of  assertiveness  that 
von  Biilow  had  given  up  in  1909.  In  pursuance 
of  their  plan  to  extend  their  protectorate  over 
Morocco  the  French  occupied  Fez  with  a  military 
force.  A  short  time  later  the  German  warship 
Panther  entered  the  Moroccan  port  of  Agadir, 
ostensibly  to  protect  German  property.  It  was 
soon  known  that  the  German  government  pro- 
posed to  hold  the  Panther  at  Agadir  until  the 


m     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

French  withdrew  from  Fez.  The  war  spirit 
again  flared  up.  Russia  still  suffered  from  the 
wounds  received  from  the  hands  of  the  Japanese, 
which  Germany  well  knew;  but  Great  Britain 
was  in  fighting  condition  and  announced  her  sup- 
port of  France.  After  a  short  discussion  Ger- 
many took  a  more  complaisant  attitude,  and  a 
settlement  was  made  whereby  the  French  were 
allowed  a  protectorate  over  Morocco  on  condi- 
tion that  they  guarantee  an  "open  door"  in  Mo- 
roccan trade  and  transfer  to  Germany  two  valu- 
able strips  of  territory  in  the  French  Congo  re- 
gion. 

Again  Europe  breathed  easily,  and  again  wise 
men  reflected  that  no  real  settlement  had  been 
made.  France  had  been  bluffed  out  of  a  valu- 
able portion  of  her  Congo  colony  and  was  not 
disposed  to  endure  the  affront  longer  than  was 
necessary.  Some  day  Russia  would  be  fully  re- 
stored to  her  strength  and  ready  to  help  her  ally 
in  the  face  of  German  aggression.  Until  then 
France  would  have  to  yield.  Meanwhile  she 
was  consoled  by  the  reflection  that  Great  Britain 
had  pronounced  for  her  openly.  That  was  some- 
thing to  take  to  heart.     The  great  sea  power, 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       173 

though  slow  to  anger,  was  at  last  conscious  of  her 
danger  if  Germany  overran  France  and  seized  a 
channel  port. 

On  the  other  hand,  Germany  was  not  fully 
pleased  at  the  outcome  of  the  affair.  The  ap- 
pearance of  Great  Britain  in  it  was  an  indication 
that  the  Entente  was  a  thing  of  vitality.  Ger- 
many had  been  forced  to  moderate  her  demands, 
taking  colonial  territory  while  her  whole  thought 
for  the  future  was  not  developing  African  colon- 
ies but  curbing  the  power  of  France.  Not  only 
was  France  not  checked,  but  she  was  much 
strengthened  in  a  vital  part  of  her  power.  She 
had  acquired  lands  in  just  the  region  that  she 
needed  them  to  carry  out  her  ambition  to  control 
the  western  end  of  the  Mediterranean.  If  some 
day  Spain  were  to  become  a  republic,  could  she 
fail  to  establish  cordial  relations  with  the  republic 
of  France,  and  thus  be  swept  into  the  anti-Ger- 
man group  ?  It  may  well  be  that  in  these  reflec- 
tions were  born  two  German  impulses:  first  to 
win  Great  Britain  to  some  kind  of  a  compromise 
with  Germany,  detaching  her,  at  least  for  a  time, 
from  the  Entente;  and  second,  to  strike  a  vital 
blow    before    Russia    was    entirely    recovered. 


174      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Within  the  next  three  years  she  acted  on  each 
of  these  impulses. 

At  the  same  time  it  became  evident  that  the 
Triple  Alliance  was  crumbling,  and  this  was  an- 
other source  of  anxiety  to  Germany.  It  meant 
that  she  should  hasten  her  steps  if  she  was  to  carry 
forward  her  great  purpose.  It  was  in  Septem- 
ber, 1911,  while  the  Agadir  incident  was  still 
unsettled,  that  Italy  began  the  war  with  Turkey 
to  establish  control  of  Tripoli  and  Cyrenaica.  In 
view  of  Germany's  well-known  friendliness  with 
Turkey,  this  step  was  most  unexpected.  It 
could  only  mean  that  Italy  was  not  disposed  to 
subordinate  her  own  interests  to  those  of  Ger- 
many at  Constantinople.  If  she  had  not  felt  cer- 
tain of  support  by  the  Entente  powers,  in  case 
Germany  turned  on  her,  she  would  hardly  have 
ventured  to  begin  the  war. 

Another  advance  made  by  Entente  powers 
within  the  period  under  consideration  was  in 
Persia.  This  ancient  state  was  in  sad  disorder. 
Weak  and  unpatriotic  shahs,  bold  bands  of 
brigands,  and  foreign  intrigues  plunged  it  into 
such  a  condition  that  it  invited  the  domination  of 
foreign  nations.     Russia  approached  from  the 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       175 

north,  and  Great  Britain  appeared  in  the  south, 
where  rich  oil  fields  had  caught  her  eye. 

After  some  initial  gains  the  two  powers 
came  to  an  agreement  in  1907  by  which  they 
established  their  respective  spheres  of  influence, 
so  that  Persia  was  occupied  at  the  two  ends, 
north  and  south,  by  strong  powers,  and  the  mid- 
dle portion  was  in  such  a  chaotic  state  that  its 
future  seemed  very  doubtful.  By  making  loans 
to  the  shah  and  furnishing  capital  for  public  im- 
provements British  and  Russian  capitalists  en- 
abled their  respective  countries  to  tighten  their 
grips  on  Persia.  Soon  that  country  was  in  the 
throes  of  revolution,  a  so-called  Nationalist  party 
came  into  power  which  was  not  able  to  rule  with- 
out the  aid  of  Russia  and  Great  Britain.  So  far 
did  the  foreign  influence  go  that  Morgan  W. 
Shuster,  an  American  financial  adviser  of  the 
shah  who  had  tried  hard  to  place  the  government 
on  a  satisfactory  basis,  was  fain  to  withdraw  from 
Persia  in  despair.  To  the  rest  of  the  world  it 
seemed  that  the  independence  of  the  country  was 
near  its  end. 

A  mere  glance  will  show  us  what  these  de- 
velopments meant  for  Germany  and  Austria- 


176      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Hungary.  Remembering  that  Italy  was  acting 
with  the  Entente  in  her  African  pohcy,  we 
see  that  the  entire  southern  shore  of  the  Medi- 
terranean was  passing  into  hands  adverse  to  the 
central  powers,  and  that  the  new  combination 
stretched  out  a  long  arm  to  the  Persian  Gulf  and 
the  region  south  of  the  Caspian.  In  view  of 
Germany's  hope  that  she  would  some  day  gain 
through  Syria  a  railway  route  to  the  Far  East, 
the  trend  of  things  in  Persia  threatened  to  close 
the  narrow  gap  that  was  left  her  for  such  a  route 
by  completing  the  absorption  of  the  kingdom  of 
the  shah.  Should  she  allow  the  gap  to  be 
stopped,  or  should  she  strike  while  there  was  still 
time?  And  if  she  did  not  strike,  what  was  there 
in  the  system  of  the  Balance  of  Power  that  could 
be  counted  on  as  a  guarantee  that  she  was  not  a 
passive  victim  to  the  play  of  politics  in  the  system 
then  in  use? 

Furthermore,  it  was  evident  that  Germany's 
prestige  was  being  undermined  by  the  progres- 
sive steps  of  her  rivals.  Three  times  had  she 
rattled  the  saber  over  the  Moroccan  incidents, 
and  each  time  with  decreasing  terror  in  the  minds 
of  her  opponents.     Perhaps  its  rattling  had  been 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       177 

one  of  the  main  facts  in  promoting  the  union  of 
those  opponents,  since  it  always  brought  before 
them  the  picture  of  Germany  embattled  against 
the  rest  of  Europe.  To  strike  a  blow  that  would 
teach  France  and  Russia  a  lesson  would  restore 
German  prestige  and  bring  the  balance  back  to 
the  German  side  of  the  rivalry,  if  it  did  not  do 
more. 

There  is  good  ground  for  the  guess  that  it  was 
expected  in  high  quarters  in  Berlin  that  the  blow 
would  do  far  more  than  restore  prestige.  It  is 
true  that  the  plan  to  which  I  am  about  to  refer 
has  not  been  openly  accepted  by  responsible 
agents  of  state,  but  it  was  widely  advocated  by 
a  portion  of  the  people,  the  Pan-Germans.  It 
involved  the  union  of  Austria-Hungary  and  Ger- 
many in  a  great  state,  Mittel-Europa,  with  strong 
influence  in  the  Near  East.  Treitschke  and 
many  others  had  written  and  spoken  for  such  a 
thing,  and  to  a  large  number  of  Germans  it  had 
become  a  sacred  ideal.  When  some  one  spoke  to 
the  deaf  Colussus  about  the  acquisition  of  ter- 
ritory in  Africa  he  exclaimed:  "  Cameroons? 
What  are  we  to  do  with  this  sand-box?  Let  us 
take  Holland;  then  we  shall  have  colonies."     It 


178      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

was  a  part  of  the  dream  of  the  Pan- Germans 
that  the  proposed  Mittel-Europa  should  extend 
from  the  Baltic  to  the  Black  Sea.  If  such  a  thing 
could  be  carried  through,  how  excellent  a  trump 
card  to  play  against  the  Entente  plotters ! 

Francis  Joseph,  of  Austria-Hungary,  was  too 
stout  a  patriot  to  hand  his  country  over  to  the 
schemes  of  the  Pan-Germans,  but  he  was  ap- 
proaching an  already  long  deferred  demise. 
The  heir-apparent,  Ferdinand,  was  supposed  to 
be  a  great  admirer  of  the  kaiser,  and  the  advo- 
cates of  union  had  high  hopes  that  he  would  pro- 
mote their  desires.  Suddenly  came  the  crime  of 
Sarajevo.  In  a  peculiar  manner  it  dashed  the 
hopes  of  the  dreamers ;  for  not  only  was  their  chief 
reliance  taken  away,  but  the  new  heir-apparent 
was  supposed  to  be  a  pacific  man  who  would 
favor  constitutional  government.  Such  a  ruler 
would  hardly  support  the  formation  of  a  great 
empire  built  after  the  fashion  of  Prussian  autoc- 
racy. It  was  the  inspiration  of  the  moment  to 
have  the  war  come,  and  demonstrate  the  glory  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  while  the  old 
emperor  still  lived.  And  if  it  was  precipitated 
in  the  interest  of  Austria-Hungary,  that  was  all 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       179 

the  greater  reason  that  the  people  of  the  dual 
empire  should  feel  under  obligation  to  the  mili- 
tary power  that  carried  it  through.  Possibly 
they  would  be  so  much  impressed  that  they  would 
sweep  a  youthful  emperor  on  with  them  in  the 
realization  of  a  great  united  empire. 

It  is  not  certain  how  far  the  Pan-German  party 
controlled  the  policy  of  government  in  July, 
1914;  but  it  does  not  seem  too  much  to  attribute 
such  plans  to  men  who  did  not  hesitate  to  dream 
of  the  annexation  of  Holland  and  who  had  defi- 
nitely planned  for  the  acquisition  of  Constanti- 
nople. The  imagination  of  a  German  patriot  is 
no  mean  thing  in  ordinary  situations ;  but  a  great 
sweep  would  be  vouchsafed  to  it  when  its  pos- 
sessor realized  that  his  country  was  being  out- 
played by  the  diplomats  and  the  grim  Captain  of 
Death.  It  was  an  extraordinary  situation  that 
the  Germans  confronted  in  July,  1914,  and  there 
was  not  much  time  for  deliberation. 

This  chapter  is  not  written  to  show  that  Ger- 
many was,  or  was  not,  responsible  for  the  war. 
If  it  explains  how  it  was  that  the  German  people 
believed  that  the  war  was  forced  on  them,  it  will 
accomplish  more  than  it  was  designed  to  accom- 


180      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

plish.  But  it  is  intended  to  enable  persons  to 
keep  calm  heads  in  these  times  of  perplexity  in 
order  to  understand  how  each  side  approached 
the  great  conflict.  It  is  evident  that  the  Entente 
powers  thought  that  Germany  wished  to  change 
Europe  into  a  great  empire  with  herself  at  the 
head,  while  the  central  powers  felt  that  the  chains 
were  being  riveted  around  about  them. 

In  view  of  this  long  train  of  events  the  last 
week  in  that  fateful  July  assumes  small  propor- 
tions. If  Ferdinand  had  not  been  killed  war 
would  still  have  hung  over  the  horizon.  If  Ser- 
bia had  accepted  the  Austrian  ultimatum  war 
would  still  have  threatened;  for  though  it  may 
have  been  averted  for  the  moment,  the  Triple 
Entente  would  still  have  existed,  nor  would  it 
have  brooked  the  increase  of  German  prestige 
that  the  backdown  of  Serbia  would  have  implied. 
If  Russia  had  not  mobilized  her  army,  Germany 
may  not  have  mobilized,  but  the  ancient  fear  of 
Russia  as  an  overwhelming  opponent  when 
she  was  once  organized  in  the  modern  way 
would  have  remained  as  a  threat  of  dire  conse- 
quences. 

The  theory  of  the  Balance  of  Power  is  built 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM       181 

upon  the  idea  that  states  act  for  their  own  in- 
terests in  the  restraint  of  one  another  from  over- 
weening ambition.  At  bottom  it  is  selfish.  It 
assmnes  a  state  of  rivalry;  and  it  is  necessary  to 
the  theory  that  as  fast  as  one  side  gains  in 
strength  the  other  shall  gain  also.  If  the  En- 
tente nations  acquire  Morocco,  Tripoli,  Cyre- 
naica,  and  parts  of  Persia,  the  central  powers 
must  gain  also  or  they  are  over-balanced.  And 
who  is  to  determine  how  much  they  shall  gain? 
Manifestly  each  will  strive  to  get  all  it  can.  The 
very  process  of  gaining  stimulates  antipathy  and 
makes  war  a  probability. 

Another  observation  that  is  worthy  of  consider- 
ation is  that  balance  is  logically  possible  only 
when  more  than  two  sides  are  opposed  to  one 
another.  When  Great  Britain,  France  and 
Russia  had  varying  purposes  it  was  not  difficult 
for  Bismarck  to  play  one  against  the  other  and 
so  keep  the  equilibrium.  But  when  it  happened 
that  the  central  powers  became  so  strong  that 
they  constituted  a  threat  against  every  other  na- 
tion in  the  world,  it  was  natural  for  the  other 
nations  to  unite  to  check  them.  In  such  a  con- 
dition no  true  balance  of  power  could  exist,  and 


182      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

it  was  folly  to  expect  that  theory  to  serve  as  it 
served  in  former  days. 

One  of  the  things  the  world  ought  to  learn 
from  the  war  that  now  afflicts  it  is  that  no  nation 
can  conquer  the  world  by  stealth.  It  is  one  of 
the  happy  shortcomings  of  political  selfishness 
that  its  agents  usually  fancy  they  can  cover  their 
tracks.  How  often  do  we  see  a  bad  politician 
doing  something  wrong  in  the  false  confidence 
that  while  he  knows  what  he  is  doing  the  people 
cannot  see  it!  So  with  Germany  in  the  years 
before  the  war.  Making  her  plans  for  large 
accretions  of  power,  she  thought  she  could  steal 
a  march  on  other  nations  and  gain  in  a  spurt  a 
position  from  which  at  a  later  time  she  could  ex- 
tend her  power  by  other  and  still  larger  sweeps 
of  conquest.  She  did  not  think  that  the  other 
nations  would  take  part  until  it  was  too  late. 

But  the  rest  of  the  world  was  as  wide  awake 
as  she.  No  man  in  England  accustomed  to  view 
political  things  in  the  large  failed  to  see  the  in- 
stant the  war  began  that  the  hour  of  crisis  for 
his  country  was  at  hand.  If  Great  Britain  had 
not  fought  in  August,  1914,  she  would  have  been 
the  stupidest  nation  in  the  world.     To  have  al- 


FAILURE  OF  THE  OLD  SYSTEM        183 

lowed  her  greatest  rival  to  sit  down  in  the  French 
channel  ports  would  have  been  suicidal  for  her. 
The  only  probable  explanation  of  Germany's  fail- 
ure to  realize  this  is  that  she  had  become  so  con- 
fident of  the  superiority  of  her  own  mind  that 
she  thought  all  other  minds  were  sodden. 

In  a  similar  way,  when  she  had  carried  on  the 
war  for  two  years  and  a  half  and  resorted  to 
the  submarine  in  ruthless  attacks  on  American 
ships  of  commerce,  she  should  have  known  that 
she  was  giving  the  United  States  a  reason  for 
participating  in  the  war  at  a  time  when  it  was 
clear  to  most  Americans  that  their  national  safety 
demanded  that  they  should  take  part.  If  by  this 
kind  of  battle  the  Germans  forced  Europe  to 
bend  to  her,  what  could  we  expect  in  the  future? 
The  very  imminence  of  German  success  de- 
manded that  the  United  States  should  throw  her- 
self into  the  struggle.  And  after  the  war  is 
over  this  truth  will  be  written  indelibly  in  the 
pages  of  history:  No  great  nation  can  be  al- 
lowed to  conquer  the  world  piecemeal. 


CHAPTER  IX 

IF   THE   SUBMARINES   FAIL 

The  German  people  say  the  submarines  will 
not  fail.  They  seem  to  think  that  what  they  call 
the  highest  achievement  of  the  scientific  mind  of 
Germany  cannot  fail.  There  is  little  doubt 
that  they  pin  on  this  arm  of  the  service  their 
last  hope  of  securing  a  decision  in  actual  war- 
fare. If  it  fails  them  they  can  look  forward 
only  to  a  long  course  of  sheer  dogged  resistance, 
hoping  they  can  last  longer  than  their  adver- 
saries. Let  us  consider  the  probable  results  re- 
spectively of  the  success  and  the  failure  of  the 
submarine  campaign. 

If  the  under-sea  boats  do  all  the  Germans 
expect  of  them  the  result  is  soon  told.  Great 
Britain  will  be  forced  to  make  lame  and  in- 
efficient war,  France  will  be  unable  to  do  more 
than  hold  on  to  the  line  that  she  occupies,  and 
the  United  States,  unable  to  send  her  vast  army 
across  the  seas  in  large  numbers,  will  not  be  able 
to  repair  the  loss  of  strength  that  her  allies  sus- 

184 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  186 

tain.  Under  such  circumstances  Russia,  even  if 
she  should  recover  from  her  present  state  of 
weakness,  could  hardly  deliver  the  blows  that 
would  bring  Germany  to  reason. 

Under  such  conditions  the  war  would  end  with- 
out the  defeat  of  the  Teutons,  and  Mittel-Europa 
would  still  be  impending.  If  the  enthusiasm 
of  victory  would  stimulate  such  a  union,  the  re- 
alization that  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
were  pressed  back  to  the  wall  and  must  fight  for 
their  future  existence  might  equally  bring  them 
to  unite  their  fortunes.  In  fact,  if  these  two 
states  wish  to  unite  it  is  hard  to  see  how  they  are 
to  be  prevented,  unless  at  the  end  of  the  war  they 
are  so  much  weaker  than  their  opponents  that 
they  can  be  forbidden  to  take  such  a  step,  with 
assurance  that  the  prohibition  will  be  respected. 

To  form  such  a  union  would  be,  in  fact,  to 
snatch  victory  out  of  sore  distress ;  for  the  united 
empires,  even  though  Serbia,  Bulgaria,  and  Tur- 
key were  left  out  of  account,  would  have  a  popu- 
lation of  116,000,000,  which  is  more  than  the 
population  of  the  United  States  and  smaller  only 
than  that  of  Russia  and  China.  Ten  years' 
breathing  space  in  which  to  reorganize  the  indus- 


186      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

trial  and  social  life  of  so  large  a  body  of  men 
would  work  wonders  with  them;  and  when  re- 
organized and  fired  by  a  conmion  ambition  they 
would  be  able  to  dictate  terms  to  any  two  of  the 
nations  of  Western  Europe.  It  is  the  probable 
union  of  these  states  rather  than  the  power  of 
either  when  acting  alone,  that  makes  it  necessary 
for  the  rest  of  the  world  to  procure  their  defeat. 
In  two  ways  the  union  can  be  prevented.  One 
is  to  inflict  such  a  defeat  on  the  central  allies 
that  they  will  not  dare  run  the  risk  of  another 
war  through  endeavoring  to  combine.  Possibly 
such  a  defeat  could  be  inflicted  by  fighting  long 
and  winning  great  victories.  It  would  have  to 
be  a  greater  victory  than  was  won  by  Prussia 
over  France  in  1871;  for  after  that  victory 
France,  fired  with  hatred  for  all  that  was  Ger- 
man, was  so  much  feared  by  her  conquerors  that 
it  became  a  chief  object  of  their  diplomacy  to 
keep  her  isolated  by  drawing  possible  allies  over 
to  the  German  interest.  The  great  military 
strength  of  Germany  at  present  hardly  warrants 
the  hope  that  she  can  be  brought  to  a  lower 
state  than  France  at  the  end  of  the  siege  of 
Paris. 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  187 

The  other  method  is  to  bring  about  such  a 
situation  that  union  shall  not  be  desired  in  the 
Teutonic  states.  For  it  is  not  to  be  disputed 
that  if  ever  a  strong  and  competent  group  of 
states  wish  to  become  an  empire,  nothing  short  of 
a  great  war  by  other  states  can  stop  them. 
It  behooves  us,  therefore,  to  make  our  appeal  to 
the  reasons  of  the  Germans,  Austrians  and  Hun- 
garians. It  is  not  necessary  to  limit  our  argu- 
ments to  words  merely;  it  is,  however,  essential 
that  the  Teutonic  mind  shall  understand  what 
to  threaten  the  equilibrium  of  nations  means. 
To  show  that  such  a  preponderance  cannot  be 
established  practically  would  be  an  effective 
warning  to  those  leaders  who  set  up  to  preach 
Germanic  militarism  in  the  future. 

As  this  chapter  is  being  printed,  it  seems  that 
the  submarines  are  not  a  success.  They  have 
taken  a  great  toll  but  not  all  the  grist.  Enough 
ships  are  left  on  the  sea  to  carry  the  minimum  of 
food  and  war  material  that  our  allies  must 
have  to  maintain  their  grip  on  Germany.  The 
war  of  the  central  powers  does  not  force  their 
enemies  to  their  knees,  and  it  seems  that  the  best 
the  kaiser  can  hope  for  is  to  hold  out  for  a  time 


188      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

with  the  expectation  that  victory  will  be  snatched 
by  accident  out  of  the  gloom  that  hangs  over  his 
cause. 

When  the  war  began  it  was  essentially  a  con- 
test between  two  groups  of  powers,  each  of  which 
had  been  pursuing  policies  of  aggrandizement. 
One  group  had  progressively  acquired  territory 
in  Africa  and  Asia,  and  the  other  had  a  plan 
equally  definite  for  acquiring  territory  in  South- 
eastern Europe  and  the  Near  East.  If  the  war 
had  been  fought  out  as  begun  it  would  probably 
have  led  to  the  realization  of  one  or  the  other  of 
these  desires.  Either  the  Entente  powers  would 
have  fixed  their  hold  on  their  respective  spheres 
of  influence  and  broken  the  schemes  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  or  Germany  would  have 
made  a  great  sweep  forward  and  established  her- 
self in  the  keystone  position  of  Europe,  with  im- 
mense consequences  for  the  future. 

As  the  war  progressed  it  became  evident  that 
it  was  becoming  a  supreme  test  of  the  ability  of 
one  combination  of  nations  to  create  a  new  empire 
that  would  dominate  Europe.  It  is  no  stretch 
of  imagination  to  say  that  the  Germans  dreamed 
of  reestablishing  a  modern  Roman  Empire  of 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  189 

the  Germans.  If  the  scheme  had  materialized — 
and  the  future  historian  will  probably  conclude 
that  it  was  near  success  at  one  time — the  fate 
of  the  rest  of  the  world  would  have  been  far 
different  from  what  we  wish  it  to  be.  A  gigantic 
struggle  would  have  been  thrust  upon  the  United 
States  to  save  the  Western  World  from  con- 
quest. It  was  the  conviction  that  such  a  crisis 
actually  menaced  us  that  brought  us  to  join  in  the 
attempt  to  block  the  German  plans. 

Assuming,  therefore,  that  the  anti-German  al- 
lies are  victorious,  it  is  unthinkable  that  the  war 
shall  be  allowed  to  end  as  a  mere  check  on  the 
plans  of  the  central  powers.  To  do  so  would 
be  to  grant  that  the  Entente  powers  should  be 
left  to  carry  on  their  plans  for  national  aggran- 
dizement with  carte  blanche  approval  by  the 
United  States.  It  would  mean  that  we  are  fight- 
ing at  a  great  sacrifice  in  order  to  enable  Great 
Britain  to  maintain  her  position  as  mistress  of 
the  sea  and  ruler  of  a  far  distant  empire.  Now 
we  do  not  object  to  British  rule  in  the  distant 
parts  of  the  earth:  we  have  found  it  a  tolerable 
thing  that  she  should  be  entrusted  with  the  task 
of  developing  the  backward  races  over  whom  she 


190      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

has  established  her  authority.  But  we  have 
never  meant  to  save  her  topphng  empire  for  her 
own  comfort,  as  an  act  of  grace  merely. 

If  we  are  to  contribute  a  material  part  to  the 
suppression  of  aggression  in  the  world,  we  have 
a  right  to  say  in  what  way  and  to  what  end  our 
sacrifice  will  have  been  made.  As  the  greatest 
of  the  anti-German  allies  we  shall  have  the  larg- 
est burden  to  bear  in  proportion  to  the  time  in 
which  we  are  to  fight.  That  we  should  guar- 
antee to  Great  Britain  and  our  other  allies  the 
full  existence  of  their  rights  is  but  fair.  It  is 
equally  reasonable  that  we  shall  demand  that 
the  future  does  not  inure  to  the  special  advan- 
tage of  any  one  of  the  group;  but  in  fixing 
upon  the  terms  under  which  it  shall  be  arranged 
the  main  end  in  view  should  be  the  good  of  all 
the  nations  in  the  world. 

This  is  a  view  which  is  likely  to  have  the  sup- 
port of  all  the  anti-German  allies,  with  the  pos- 
sible exception  of  Britain.  France  and  Russia, 
to  say  nothing  of  the  smaller  states,  have  the 
same  interest  as  we  in  making  the  common  wel- 
fare the  chief  aim  in  peace  negotiations.  If 
we  were  not  in  the  group  and  if  victory  came  to 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  191 

it,  these  nations  would  perforce  have  to  yield  the 
lead  to  Great  Britain,  since  she  would  outclass 
them  in  strength  by  reason  of  her  sea  power. 
She  might  well  say  that  as  the  nation  on  which 
would  fall  the  largest  burden  in  keeping  Ger- 
many in  a  state  of  restraint,  she  should  have 
the  largest  influence  in  deciding  what  was  to  be 
done.  She  cannot  make  such  a  claim  under  ex- 
isting conditions. 

Of  course,  there  is  the  difficulty  that  the  United 
States  may  not  be  guided  by  statesmen  who  real- 
ize the  importance  of  following  a  thoroughly 
American  policy.  It  has  long  been  a  practice 
with  a  great  many  Americans  to  follow  the  lead 
of  Great  Britain.  Unaccustomed  to  take  a  nor- 
mal share  of  responsibility  in  world  problems,  we 
may  now  be  inclined  to  hold  back,  leaving  the 
game  to  hands  that  have  acquired  greater  skill 
in  playing  it.  Such  a  course  would  be  a  misfor- 
tune. It  would  mean  that  statesmen  would  be 
given  charge  of  the  situation  who  derived  all 
their  ideas  under  the  old  system  of  Balance  of 
Power,  and  it  would  be  strange  if  they  did  not  try 
to  carry  on  the  world  in  the  future  with  a  strong 
squint  at  the  only  principles   of  international 


19^      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

policy  they  know  anything  about.  To  break  into 
this  well  crystallized  realm  of  so-called  practical 
ideas,  demands  an  unusually  strong  man,  a  man 
well  founded  in  principles  and  able  to  convince 
others  of  the  wisdom  of  his  views. 

It  is  true  that  the  President  of  the  United 
States  now  in  office  has  many  of  the  traits  that 
seem  necessary  to  a  correct  conduct  of  the  situa- 
tion. A  man  who  had  the  training  of  a  mere 
politician  might  well  be  less  than  able  to  deal 
with  the  situation  that  faces  us.  President  Wil- 
son's knowledge  of  history  enables  him  to  think 
in  terms  of  large  national  movements.  That  is 
the  chief  value  of  historical  training  to  a  states- 
man. If  he  knows  the  history  of  the  attempts  to 
settle  the  affairs  of  the  nations  after  the  great 
world  struggles  of  the  past,  he  is  better  able  to 
understand  how  the  various  suggested  plans  will 
work  in  the  crisis  that  is  to  be  passed  through. 

President  Wilson  has,  also,  the  unusual  faculty 
of  doing  what  he  wishes  to  do.  When  he  has 
formed  a  purpose  it  is  not  generally  a  com- 
promise with  a  number  of  men  whose  chief  con- 
cern is  how  the  result  of  action  will  affect  their 
party  support.     At  least  this  is  true  in  mat- 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  193 

ters  not  clearly  within  the  bounds  of  party  activ- 
ity. Moreover,  he  has  spoken  and  written  words 
which  seem  to  show  that  he  understands  the  need 
of  providing  for  such  a  course  of  conduct  between 
the  nations  as  will  assure  us  of  cooperation  fot 
the  elimination  of  future  wars.  In  his  long  de- 
lay in  urging  war  and  in  his  early  pronounce- 
ment for  a  league  of  peace,  he  gave  us  the  assur- 
ance, if  nothing  else,  that  he  understands  the  sit- 
uation and  is  capable  of  holding  a  firm  course  in 
accordance  with  his  principles. 

If  the  submarines  fail,  therefore,  and  if  we 
come  to  a  settlement  of  the  largely  new  world 
problems  that  will  confront  us,  and  if  our  policy 
is  in  the  hands  of  wise  men,  what  principles  will 
guide  our  actions  and  the  actions  of  the  rest 
of  the  world?  This  is  a  question  that  all  intelli- 
gent citizens  should  consider,  since  it  cannot  be 
answered  well  unless  there  is  a  restrained  and 
broad-minded  public  opinion  to  support  the  lead- 
ers of  the  people.  It  is  a  matter  for  the  consider- 
ation of  Germans  as  well  as  their  opponents ;  for 
their  attitude  toward  any  policy  adopted  will 
have  a  strong  effect  upon  the  continuation  of  the 
policy. 


194      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

The  first  question  we  should  ask  ourselves  is: 
What  are  we  to  do  to  the  Germans  ?  How  shall 
we  punish  them  for  what  they  have  done  to  make 
the  world  miserable?  My  answer  to  that  is: 
Let  God  punish  them.  For  us  it  is  not  a  ques- 
tion of  giving  the  Germans  their  deserts  but  a 
question  of  coming  out  of  this  cataclysm  with 
a  clear  gain  for  the  cause  of  human  happiness. 
Let  us  look  upon  the  Germans  as  suffering  from 
a  kind  of  disease  of  the  mind  which  produces 
bad  results  on  those  with  whom  they  are  in  con- 
tact. It  is  ours  to  prescribe  a  cure,  both  for 
their  sake  and  for  ours.  I  suggest  that  we  first 
put  them  on  a  liquid  diet  to  reduce  their  exuber- 
ant vitality  and  then  give  them  the  rest  cure. 
At  any  rate,  that  is  better  than  cropping  their 
ears  or  putting  them  into  strait- jackets.  To 
treat  an  impassioned  man  you  do  not  kick  and 
beat  him  but  try  to  bring  him  to  his  senses.  To 
bring  the  Germans  into  a  realization  that  this 
world  is  run  on  the  principle  of  hve-and-let-live, 
we  ourselves  must  show  a  willingness  to  let  live. 

We  had  a  large  amount  of  the  opposite  spirit 
in  the  United  States  from  1865  to  1875.  The 
South,  passionately  convinced  that  slavery  was 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  1»6 

no  evil,  had  made  as  good  a  fight  to  preserve  her 
cause  as  Germany  has  made  or  can  make.  She 
held  out  to  the  last  with  what  her  own  people 
called  a  stout  heart,  but  her  foes  said  with  a 
stiff  neck.  For  a  year  and  a  half  after  the  out- 
side world  concluded  that  she  could  never  win, 
she  held  on  in  the  hope  that  her  adversaries  would 
tire  of  war  and  make  peace  without  victory. 
Now  all  this  was  exasperating,  and  the  mass  of 
the  Northern  people  felt  in  1865  that  some  pun- 
ishment should  be  inflicted  on  the  perverse  people 
who  had  inflicted  so  much  unnecessary  misery  on 
the  country.  But  Lincoln  did  not  feel  that  way. 
There  is  no  reason  to  think  that  he  gave  a  mo- 
ment's thought  to  making  the  South  suffer  for 
her  course.  For  him  all  thought  was  how  to 
smooth  the  wrinkles  out  of  the  present,  and  how 
to  make  the  Southern  people  cast  out  their  hatred 
of  the  union  and  come  back  to  their  former  loy- 
alty. The  Lincoln  spirit  should  guide  the  world 
at  the  end  of  the  present  struggle. 

War  lives  on  hatred.  To  make  your  people 
put  all  their  energy  into  the  fight  make  them 
hate  the  other  people;  and  you  may  rest  in  the 
assurance  that  the  leaders  of  the  others  are  striv- 


196      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ing  to  make  their  followers  hate  the  men  on  your 
side.  The  mill  of  hate  grinds  steadily  and  at  a 
high  speed  while  war  lasts.  In  Germany  in  these 
days  is  a  vast  amount  of  industrious  abusing  of 
England.  That  makes  the  German  people  sup- 
port the  war.  In  Great  Britain  is  a  great  ac- 
tivity in  describing  atrocities  in  Belgium  and 
Armenia,  and  it  exists  in  order  to  make  the  Brit- 
ish people  mad  for  war.  When  you  see  a  new 
crop  of  the  testimony  concerning  the  torturing 
horrors  of  the  first  month  of  war  in  Belgium, 
you  may  know  that  the  war  spirit  is  running  low 
in  Britain.  Unhappily,  such  propaganda  is  a 
necessary  feature  of  war.  We  are  naturally 
good-hearted,  and  we  do  not  go  out  to  kill  men 
until  we  are  made  to  hate  them. 

The  moment  war  ends  all  this  kind  of  thing 
should  cease.  The  time  will  then  have  come  for 
the  propaganda  of  peace.  Unfortunately  there 
are  few  men  whose  mission  it  is  to  spread  such 
ideas.  Merchants  and  tourists  may  do  what  is 
their  nature  to  do,  but  they  are  not  sufficient ;  and 
it  generally  takes  years  for  the  fires  to  cool  off. 

The  aftermath  of  our  civil  war  was  as  un- 
happy a  series  of  events  as  we  have  encountered 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  197 

within  our  national  history.  Undertaken  as  a 
means  of  making  sure  of  the  gains  of  the  civil 
war,  it  became  a  procession  of  passion  in  which 
stalked  all  the  worst  feelings  that  divided  the 
people  in  actual  warfare.  There  are  still  men  in 
the  North  who  have  Andersonville  in  mind  when 
they  vote,  and  men  in  the  South  who  can  never 
respect  the  republican  party  because  it  was  re- 
sponsible for  the  reconstruction  acts  of  1867.  It 
will  be  extremely  unfortunate  if  we  take  up  the 
problems  that  are  soon  to  be  upon  us  in  the  spirit 
with  which  we  assumed  the  duties  of  reconstruct- 
ing the  South. 

During  the  civil  war  the  South  was  possessed 
of  a  fixed  idea:  the  same  thing  is  true  of  Ger- 
many today.  The  South  was  committed  to  a 
position  that  the  rest  of  the  world  had  abandoned : 
Germany  is  committed  to  a  type  of  bureaucratic 
government  which  is  as  much  out  of  date  in  a 
modern  world  as  slavery.  No  ordinary  system 
of  reasoning  could  show  fair  and  honest  Southern 
men  in  what  respect  they  had  the  sentiment  of 
civilization  against  them:  the  German  is  thor- 
oughly convinced  that  he  is  fighting  for  the  pre- 
servation of  the  most  efficient  type  of  government 


198      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

the  world  has  seen.  The  South  went  to  her  de- 
feat after  a  long  and  astonishingly  effective  re- 
sistance :  Germany  seems  to  be  destined  to  a  simi- 
larly long  and  steady  process  of  reduction  into 
complete  prostration.  The  South  was  ruled  by 
a  small  but  able  class  of  landed  proprietors  who 
refused  to  see  the  plain  truth  of  the  situation 
before  them  and  prolonged  the  struggle  until 
they  were  exhausted,  although  by  making  a  fav- 
orable adjustment  in  accordance  with  the  logic 
of  the  conditions  before  them  they  might  have 
ended  the  war  in  1864  and  saved  their  people 
from  the  uttermost  bitterness  of  defeat :  the  Ger- 
mans, ruled  by  their  Junkers,  are  equally  deaf 
to  argument,  equally  determined  to  die  at  their 
posts,  and  equally  opposed  to  a  compromise  by 
which  they  will  have  to  give  up  their  antiquated 
"institution,"  relinquish  their  special  privileges, 
and  make  their  country  like  the  rest  of  the  world. 
There  are  so  many  parallels  between  the  two 
countries  that  we  wonder  if  there  will  not  also  be 
a  disposition  of  the  victorious  opposing  allies  to 
degrade  Germany  in  her  defeat. 

Probably  her  best  adjusted  punishment  will  be 
the    reflection   that   her    "peculiar   institution" 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  199 

proved  a  failure  in  time  of  need.  For  a  century- 
she  has  been  training  an  army,  but  it  is  not  the 
army  that  has  failed  her.  It  has  done  all  that 
could  have  been  expected  of  it.  Nor  did  the 
Southern  army  fail  the  South.  It  is  not  the 
sense  of  loyalty,  nor  the  scientific  efficiency,  nor 
the  unity  of  purpose  within  the  empire,  that  have 
failed  her.  They  are  all  splendid  and  have  done 
what  could  be  demanded  of  them.  The  thing 
that  has  failed  is  the  peculiar  way  in  which  the 
German  ruling  classes  have  made  use  of  these 
forces.  They  have  used  army,  scientific  effici- 
ency, loyalty,  and  unity  of  purpose  to  promote 
the  ends  of  an  aggressive  ruling  class.  Now  the 
best  treatment  is  to  defeat  them  in  the  war  and 
allow  them  plenty  of  time,  with  no  unnecessary 
antagonisms,  to  learn  that  their  system  does  not 
pay,  and  that  any  attempt  to  revive  it  in  the 
future  will  be  followed  by  another  punishment  as 
severe  as  that  which  this  war  brought.  The  sup- 
port of  a  military  caste  and  the  training  of  all  the 
men  in  a  great  army  are  heavy  burdens  on  the 
economic  life  of  the  state.  Will  any  nation  con- 
tinue to  bear  them  if  they  come  to  nothing  in  the 
day  of  trial?     Armies  for  defense  do  not  demand 


200      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

the  great  expenditures  that  Germany  has  made 
in  the  last  decades. 

No  penalty  that  the  victors  could  lay  on  Ger- 
many would  be  permanently  effective  in  reduc- 
ing her.  So  great  are  her  economic  energies  that 
they  would  restore  her  to  prosperity  within  a  short 
time,  and  she  would  be  ready  to  take  advantage  of 
any  favorable  combination  to  strike  in  revenge. 
Disarmament  would  not  be  a  guaranty  that  she 
would  cease  to  be  troublesome  to  her  neighbors; 
for  she  would  still  have  her  excellently  trained 
soldiers  who  could  be  reassembled  in  a  great  army 
at  short  notice.  She  might  well  be  required  to 
dismantle  her  great  armament  factories ;  and  since 
they  are  essential  to  the  re-arming  of  a  great 
army  some  check  on  her  restoration  would  come 
from  such  dismantling.  But  it  would  be  a  tem- 
porary check.  It  is  only  necessary  to  remember 
that  the  beginning  of  the  present  German  army 
was  the  attempt  of  one  conqueror,  Napoleon,  to 
limit  the  Prussian  army  to  42,000  men. 

Moreover,  what  nations  could  be  expected  to 
agree  among  themselves  while  standing  guard 
over  Germany?  Under  the  Balance  of  Power 
we  might  expect  a  fair  amount  of  mobility  of 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  201 

alliances.  We  have  just  seen  that  not  even  the 
Triple  Alhance  was  proof  against  the  skillful 
hands  of  Delcasse.  If  Italy  could  be  withdrawn 
by  France  from  that  powerful  combination,  how 
can  we  doubt  that  a  humiliated  Germany  would 
find  means  of  weakening  the  combination  against 
her?  She  would  have  the  greatest  inducement 
to  do  so ;  and  it  is  not  probable  that  complete  har- 
mony would  prevail  long  between  the  victors,  if 
they  were  held  together  only  by  the  bonds  of 
mutual  friendship.  The  history  of  diplomacy  is 
the  record  of  broken  friendships. 

To  see  what  readjustment  might  occur  with 
respect  to  a  humiliated  Germany,  it  is  only  neces- 
sary to  recall  the  position  of  France  after  the 
Napoleonic  wars.  Beaten  beyond  resistance, 
suspected  of  carrying  the  germs  of  bad  govern- 
ment from  which  all  other  nations  felt  that  they 
must  be  protected  as  from  deadly  disease,  and 
held  down  by  great  armies  of  occupation,  her  sit- 
uation would  seem  to  have  been  most  deplorable. 
But  her  isolation  lasted  for  only  a  moment.  She 
was  admitted  to  the  Congress  of  Vienna, — called 
to  pass  on  the  future  arrangements  of  Europe, — 
because  there  was  division  among  her  conquer- 


aoa      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ors.  From  that  time  she  was  suspected  less  and 
less,  and  at  the  Conference  of  Aix-la-Chapelle, 
1818,  she  was  admitted  to  the  Concert  of  Europe, 
but  not  with  full  fellowship ;  for  the  other  powers 
made  a  secret  agreement  to  watch  her  for  a  while 
longer.  She  progressed  so  rapidly  in  eliminat- 
ing the  republican  virus  in  her  system  that  in 
1823  she  was  entrusted  with  the  task  of  suppress- 
ing the  constitution  of  Spain.  Thus  in  eight 
years  after  the  battle  of  Waterloo  France  was 
again  in  full  accord  with  the  other  powers. 
Probably  few  people  would  have  said  in  1815  that 
her  restoration  would  come  about  so  rapidly.  It 
would  be  no  more  singular  if  within  ten  years 
after  the  end  of  the  present  struggle  a  conquered 
Germany  were  to  forget  her  antipathies  of  1918 
and  be  ready  to  give  and  be  given  in  diplomatic 
alliances  with  as  little  regard  for  the  past. 

If,  for  example,  a  restored  and  highly  nation- 
alized Russia  becomes  a  threat  against  Western 
Europe  some  years  hence,  the  antagonisms  of 
today  would  be  forgotten  and  Germany,  France, 
and  Great  Britain  would  probably  be  found 
fighting  side  by  side  to  restrain  the  Muscovite 
giant.     The  old  system  is  intensely  selfish  and  it 


IF  THE  SUBMARINES  FAIL  203 

lends  itself  to  rapid  changes  in  policies.  But  it 
is  an  expensive  thing  to  keep  up  the  system. 
Large  armies  are  necessary,  great  debts  are 
created,  and  a  vast  amount  of  nervous  strength  is 
diverted  from  the  normal  activities  of  humanity. 
It  is  small  hope  for  him  who  longs  to  see  war  put 
down  permanently  that  only  by  fighting  a  war 
like  that  now  raging  may  we  expect  the  nations 
to  defeat  any  future  aspirant  for  universal 
power. 

Finally,  if  the  submarines  fail  and  the  anti- 
German  allies  break  down  the  defenses  of  their 
enemies  and  thus  are  able  to  determine  the  kind 
of  peace  that  is  to  be  made,  the  treaty  of  peace 
should  not  have  for  its  end  the  prolongation  of 
the  power  of  the  Entente  group.  The  history  of 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century  shows  how 
easy  it  is  for  such  a  group  to  be  re-arranged 
with  the  result  that  new  wars  threaten.  We 
must  trust  the  fair  mindedness  of  human  nature 
and  the  logic  of  the  situation  to  do  much  for  the 
Germans.  It  is  on  their  acceptance  of  the  issue 
that  we  must  rest  our  hopes  for  a  peaceful  future. 

These  truths  are  especially  pertinent  to  the  in- 
terests of  the  United  States.     We  are  not  fight- 


a04      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ing  Europe's  war,  but  the  world's.  We  are  the 
only  nation  in  the  struggle  that  has  not  a  special 
interest  at  stake.  We  are  the  only  member  of 
our  group  of  allies  that  has  a  right  to  take  the 
side  of  the  weakest  member  of  that  group  against 
the  desire  of  the  strongest.  If  any  one  member 
should  in  a  moment  of  more  or  less  pardonable 
forgetfulness  of  the  common  good  advance 
claims  that  would  be  based  on  a  desire  to  recoup 
herself  for  her  sufferings,  we  best  of  all  could 
demand  equal  treatment  and  see  that  the  seed  of 
future  discord  are  not  sown.  These  are  prin- 
ciples that  every  American  citizen  should  under- 
stand. 


CHAPTER  X 

OBSTACLES  TO  AN   ENDURING   PEACE 

By  an  enduring  peace  I  mean  a  peace  that 
shall  last  as  long  as  we  can  see  into  the  future. 
It  is  such  a  peace  as  has  in  it,  so  far  as  we  can  see, 
no  fact  that  would  seem  to  make  for  its  ruin.  If 
we  adopt  a  peace  that  has  the  seed  of  destruction 
in  its  very  nature,  we  cannot  hope  for  relief  from 
the  evils  of  war.  We  must,  under  such  a  condi- 
tion, take  account  of  war  as  one  of  the  permanent 
burdens  of  civilization,  with  the  full  consciousness 
that  it  will  become  increasingly  expensive  in 
life  and  property,  and  with  the  result  that  at  re- 
curring periods  an  intelligent  world  will  drop  its 
peaceful  tasks  to  try  to  reduce  its  population  to 
a  nullity.  From  the  possibility  of  such  a  strife 
we  turn  to  ask  the  question:  "Can  nothing  be 
done  to  save  humanity  from  such  madness?" 

The  answer  is  very  simple:  All  people  are 
unreasonable  to  some  extent.  In  connection 
with  the  question  now  under  consideration,  each 
of  the  great  states  of  the  world,  our  own  in- 

205 


we      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

eluded,  has  its  own  speeial  form  of  unreasonable- 
ness, which  acts  as  an  obstacle  to  the  formation 
of  a  regime  of  peace.  If  the  immense  disaster 
by  which  we  are  depressed  could  serve  as  a  means 
of  bringing  us  to  a  state  of  entire  reasonableness, 
the  present  war  would  be  worth  all  it  costs. 
Whether  or  not  it  can  lead  to  such  a  result  the 
reader  must  determine  for  himself. 

An  important  obstacle  to  such  a  result  is  the 
economic  competition  of  nations.  Economic 
competition  by  individuals  has  ugly  sides,  but  it 
is  not  dangerous  in  the  sense  in  which  national 
competition  is  dangerous.  When  two  merchants 
undersell  until  one  breaks  down  the  business  of 
the  other,  the  victim  passes  out  of  sight  in  the 
business  world,  and  the  current  of  trade  soon  goes 
on  as  before.  When  two  corporations,  however 
great,  engage  in  a  business  "war"  and  one  is 
crushed  or  absorbed  by  its  competitor,  the  ripple 
that  was  made  is  soon  obliterated,  and  the  victor 
serves  the  human  wants  with  which  it  has  to  do 
without  serious  damage  to  humanity. 

But  when  one  nation  finds  itself  in  strong  com- 
petition with  another  in  the  hope  of  controlling  a 
sphere  of  trade,  it  is  apt  to  seek  territorial  annex- 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     207 

ation  to  gain  the  desired  field  of  exploitation. 
The  competitor  can  only  follow  the  same  course. 
It  is  the  only  thing  it  can  do,  if  it  is  not  willing  to 
give  up  the  contest.  If  it  is  strong  enough  to  dis- 
pute the  will  of  the  rival,  its  very  sense  of  individ- 
uality demands  that  it  shall  not  tamely  yield  be- 
fore the  aggression  of  a  rival.  When  France 
acquired  Morocco,  Italy  acquired  Tripoli,  and 
Great  Britain  acquired  the  southern  part  of 
Persia,  economic  advantage  was  a  strong  motive, 
but  not  the  only  motive.  When  Germany  laid 
out  the  field  of  her  future  expansion  in  Turkish 
lands  and  when  she  expected  to  establish  a  per- 
manent influence  over  the  Balkans,  the  extension 
of  her  sphere  of  conmierce  was  a  chief  motive. 

Probably  the  fundamental  wrong  here  was 
the  idea,  widely  held  by  the  present  generation, 
that  a  nation  has  a  right  to  establish  bars  around 
her  national  territory  to  keep  the  trade  of  other 
nations  out,  so  that  her  own  citizens  shall  have 
preferential  advantages  in  the  exploitation  of  the 
territory.  That  idea  is  so  firmly  held  today 
that  one  must  be  a  rash  man  who  attempts  to  get 
the  nations  to  give  it  up.  But  it  is  a  fundamental 
obstacle  to  permanent  peace  in  the  world.     Prob- 


208      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ably  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  as  long  as  the 
business  men  of  the  world  insist  on  dividing 
themselves  into  national  groups  with  these 
national  preferences,  so  long  may  they  expect 
business  at  recurring  intervals  to  be  burdened 
with  the  waste  and  ruin  of  war. 

Against  the  existing  practice  we  may  place  the 
"open  door"  policy,  which  we  have  known  chiefly 
in  connection  with  the  trade  of  the  undeveloped 
nations.  It  means  the  free  opening  of  the  trade 
of  a  given  state  to  all  the  nations  that  may  care 
to  have  it.  We  heard  much  of  the  "open  door" 
in  China  a  few  years  ago,  and  most  of  the  benev- 
olent governments  approved  of  the  suggestion. 
To  have  been  perfectly  logical  they  should  have 
applied  the  same  idea  to  their  own  commerce; 
and  if  the  world  ever  comes  to  a  perfect  state  of 
international  comity,  it  is  likely  that  national 
tariff  barriers  will  be  broken  down. 

It  is  true,  however,  that  we  can  have  enduring 
peace  and  have  national  protective  tariffs,  also. 
If  nations  agree  that  tariffs  are  one  of  the  un- 
happy excrescences  of  an  unreasonable  world, 
they  may  find  it  in  their  hearts  to  tolerate  such 
growths.     To  tolerate  them  would  be,  no  doubt, 


* 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     ^09 

better  than  going  to  war.  But  when  a  state  sets 
its  eyes  on  a  certain  part  of  the  earth  which  it 
feels  it  must  acquire  in  order  to  enlarge  the  terri- 
tory in  which  it  can  trade  without  fair  competi- 
tion, the  peace  of  the  world  is  imperiled. 

It  is  probable  that  this  kind  of  motive  played 
a  large  part  in  Germany's  decision  to  begin  the 
present  war.  For  a  long  time  her  industries 
had  been  developing  at  a  rapid  rate.  Protected 
at  home  by  tariffs  they  were  able  to  sell  goods 
to  the  German  people  at  high  prices,  while  they 
sold  at  cheap  prices  in  foreign  markets  in  order 
to  drive  their  competitors  away.  The  volume  of 
German  trade  increased  inmiensely,  factories 
were  multiplied,  and  large  credits  were  extended 
by  the  banks  in  order  to  support  this  great 
structure.  At  last  the  situation  became  un- 
steady. The  expansion  of  the  foreign  part  of  the 
national  trade  at  small  profits  was  a  clog  on  the 
home  trade,  which  could  not  be  made  to  yield 
enough  profit  to  keep  the  business  of  the  country 
in  a  healthy  condition.  Then  the  manufacturers 
and  capitalists  came  to  the  conclusion  that  it  was 
to  their  interest  for  the  country  to  go  into  a  war 
of  conquest  in  which  new  national  territory  should 


210      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

be  laid  at  their  feet  for  profitable  exploitation. 
Thus,  the  large  business  interests,  usually  sup- 
porters of  peace,  swung  to  the  support  of  the  mil- 
itarists. It  is  significant  that  the  liberals,  that 
party  in  the  Reichstag  which  speaks  especially  for 
the  traders,  capitahsts,  and  manufacturers,  have 
been  among  the  most  outspoken  advocates  of  an- 
nexation. 

In  a  powerful,  if  indirect,  way  the  laborers 
are  reached  by  this  argument.  They  see  that  if 
the  manufacturers  and  transportation  companies 
expand  their  business  wages  are  better  and  em- 
ployment more  abundant,  and  this  leads  them 
to  favor  a  policy  of  expansion.  To  what  extent 
the  remote  organs  of  the  business  world  are  thus 
reached  it  is  difficult  to  say.  But  it  is  evident 
that  in  a  phase  of  human  activity  which  has  been 
organized  most  intricately  the  influence  of  the  in- 
itial idea  that  a  war  of  annexation  helps  business 
is  far  reaching. 

We  frequently  encounter  the  assertion  that 
economic  laws  are  unchangeable;  but  the  state- 
ment is  not  true,  as  it  is  made.  Many  economic 
processes  that  appeared  fundamental  in  their 
time  have  changed  as  the  minds  of  men  have  taken 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     ^11 

new  grips  on  human  life.  The  world  has  out- 
grown the  mercantile  school  of  economic  ideas. 
The  attitude  toward  private  property  and 
monopolies,  and  the  view  of  the  right  of  individ- 
ual bargaining  have  been  greatly  modified  in  the 
process  of  time.  If  a  so-called  economic  law 
stands  in  the  way  of  a  reasonable  adjustment  of 
human  relations,  it  can  be  altered,  if  enough  time 
and  effort  be  given  to  the  attempt  to  change  it. 
Although  it  may  seem  to  be  fundamentally  fixed 
in  the  minds  of  business  men  and  laborers  that 
a  war  for  annexation  is  in  their  interests,  if  rea- 
son shows  that  they  are  mistaken,  there  should 
be  a  way  of  bringing  reason  to  their  minds,  even 
as  it  has  come  to  ours. 

Another  obstacle  to  enduring  peace  is  a  false 
sense  of  patriotism.  If  a  man  extols  his  own  vir- 
tues we  say  he  is  a  boaster:  if  he  extols  the  good 
qualities  of  his  town,  state,  or  nation,  we  say  he 
is  a  patriot.  I  am  inclined  to  say  that  it  is  not 
permitted  to  a  man  to  praise  his  country — I  do 
not  say  love  his  country — in  any  sense  but  that  in 
which  he  may  praise  himself,  modestly  and  with 
reservations.  At  any  rate,  he  should  praise  and 
magnify   his    country   in   the    most    restrained 


ai2      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

spirit  possible.  Patriotism  does  not  demand 
national  egotism  in  the  good  citizen.  Those 
writers  and  teachers  who  try  to  create  a  national 
spirit  should  be  careful  lest  they  make  men  mere 
chauvinists. 

Especially  perilous  is  the  doctrine  that  "self- 
preservation  is  the  first  law  of  nature"  as  applied 
to  nations.  Times  come  when  a  man  is  not  justi- 
fied in  preserving  his  life.  So  to  nations  come 
crises  in  which  they  are  not  permitted  by  the  rules 
of  morality  to  save  themselves  by  what  appear  to 
be  the  only  means  left.  In  the  present  war  Ger- 
many asserted  that  she  was  justified  by  this  prin- 
ciple in  adopting  the  ruthless  war  of  the  sub- 
marine, since  it  was  the  only  thing  that  would 
save  her  from  destruction.  It  is  better  for  a 
state  to  go  to  destruction,  just  as  it  is  better  for 
a  man  to  go  to  his  death,  with  clean  hands  than 
to  live  foully. 

It  is  but  an  extension  of  this  doctrine  for  men 
of  normal  morality  to  say  they  may  do  things 
for  the  benefit  of  the  state  which  they 'may  not 
do  for  their  own  benefit.  A  statesman  has  no 
more  right  to  make  his  state  steal  another  state's 
lands  than  he  has  to  take  his  neighbor's  watch. 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     ai3 

It  is  not  a  virtue  if  he  lies  for  his  state.  The 
state  cannot  speak  of  itself:  it  speaks  through  its 
agents.  It  is  sullied,  even  as  a  man  is  sullied  in 
his  character,  when  its  only  voice,  the  words  and 
acts  of  its  servants,  is  not  true.  Judged  by  the 
standards  here  set  up,  the  world's  diplomacy 
needs  amendment,  and  if  amended  one  of  the 
obstacles  to  peace  will  be  removed. 

A  false  sense  of  patriotism  may  lead  to  acts 
that  imperil  peace.  When  France  acquired  Mo- 
rocco her  object  was  not  wholly  to  extend  her 
economic  interests.  To  increase  the  national 
strength  was  also  a  motive.  Likewise,  Ger- 
many's desire  to  establish  control  over  the  terri- 
tory southeast  of  her  was  not  entirely  economic 
in  its  origin.  She  also  wished  to  increase  the 
glory  and  strength  of  the  Fatherland.  How 
much  we  are  to  condemn  this  desire  of  a  citizen 
for  the  glory  of  his  country  it  is  hard  to  say ;  but 
it  seems  to  be  clear  that  such  a  desire  may  mani- 
fest itself  in  such  a  way  as  to  become  a  serious 
obstacle  to  peace. 

At  the  end  of  the  present  war  the  victorious 
nations  will  be  in  a  position  to  abate  national 
glory  in  the  interest  of  enduring  peace.     Our 


214      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

own  citizens  are  supposed  to  be  particularly 
proud  of  the  achievements  of  the  United  States. 
If  our  efforts  should  contribute  as  much  as  we 
wish  to  the  triumph  of  our  own  side,  we  should 
be  careful  lest  we  forget  that  we  entered  the 
war  with  the  modest  purpose  of  making  the  world 
a  fit  place  of  habitation  for  all  people.  Likewise 
we  should  be  justified  in  using  our  influence 
among  our  allies  to  see  that  the  desire  of  no 
statesman  to  enhance  the  glory  of  his  nation  leads 
to  action  which  may  imperil  peace  in  the  future. 
When  we  shall  have  fought  long  and  suffered 
greatly  our  hearts  are  likely  to  become  harder 
than  now,  in  the  beginning  of  the  war;  and  there 
is  danger  that  we  shall  forget  early  resolutions 
if  we  are  not  firmly  committed  to  them  at  the 
outset. 

Another  obstacle  to  enduring  peace  is  the  sense 
of  nationality.  The  older  men  of  this  generation 
who  were  students  in  Germany  in  their  youth 
acquired  much  respect  for  the  passionate  desire 
of  Germans  to  build  up  unity  among  all  German 
speaking  people.  It  was  a  sacred  idea  to  young 
men  and  imaginative  writers.  Long  had  North 
Germany  been  disunited,  stumbling  forward  un- 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     215 

der  the  lead  of  the  Hapsburgs.  To  be  able  to 
form  a  dominating  group  among  all  the  Germans 
in  the  world  seemed  no  more  than  was  their  just 
due.  We  did  not  realize  in  those  days  to  what 
an  end  these  people  who  lost  so  many  opportuni- 
ties through  internal  weakness  would  put  their 
strength  when  they  had  at  last  developed  it. 
And  yet,  it  was  the  right  of  the  Germans  to  unite 
themselves  into  as  strong  a  nation  as  they  might 
form.  The  wrong  came  in  the  improper  exten- 
sion of  the  idea.  When  men  like  Treitschke  talk 
about  including  Holland  in  the  German  Father- 
land we  may  well  ask  where  nationality's  pre- 
tensions are  taking  us? 

It  was  natural,  also,  that  the  sense  of  national- 
ity should  be  manifested  in  many  other  European 
countries.  Each  of  the  Balkan  states  had  its 
own  phase  of  it.  Russia  had  a  large  hope  of 
uniting  in  her  control  all  the  peoples  of  Slavic 
blood.  Italy  demanded  Trieste  as  a  part  of  the 
Italian-speaking  world.  Greece  lived  for  the 
acquisition  of  Macedonia  and  the  Greek  Islands, 
and  France  never  diminished  her  pathetic  long- 
ing for  Alsace-Lorraine,  where  lived  French- 
speaking  peoples. 


gl6      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Often  the  desire  for  nationality  runs  directly- 
counter  to  economic  laws.  For  example,  what 
are  we  to  do  when  we  have  Austria  holding  on 
to  her  only  great  Adriatic  seaport  as  the  essential 
outlet  of  her  trade  to  the  sea,  and  nationality 
proclaiming  that  this  port  shall  he  handed 
over  to  Italy?  Moreover,  different  peoples  are 
so  intermixed  in  some  parts  of  Europe  that  it  is 
impossible  for  any  but  a  scientific  specialist  to 
say  which  states,  or  sections  of  states,  are  oc- 
cupied by  a  majority  of  one  race  and  which  by 
a  majority  of  another.  If  we  are  to  set  out  to 
divide  Europe  according  to  nationality  we  shall 
have  a  large  task  on  our  hands.  In  the  United 
States  the  principle  of  nationality  is  not  to  be 
pleaded,  since  we  are  so  intimately  intermixed 
that  it  would  be  hopeless  to  try  to  range  us  into 
racial  groups.  Moreover,  we  get  along  very  well 
as  it  is,  having  once  agreed  that  we  shall  have  to 
get  along  together.  Perhaps  if  the  nationaliz- 
ing propaganda  ceased  in  Europe  race  antagon- 
ism would  subside. 

Autocratic  classes  in  society  constitute  still  an- 
other obstacle  to  peace.  We  have  heard  much  on 
this  subject  of  late,  and  some  of  the  things  that 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     ai7 

have  been  said  have  been  so  ill-estabhshed  in  truth 
that  they  must  make  the  real  autocrats  smile.  It 
will  probably  help  us  to  understand  the  situation 
if  we  undertake  to  enumerate  the  good  things  an 
autocracy  can  do.  For  truth  never  profits  by 
falsehood,  and  the  most  autocratic  people  in  the 
world  have  sense  enough  to  know  when  they  are 
misrepresented. 

Let  us  remember  that  under  favorable  condi- 
tions an  autocracy  is  composed  of  the  more  ca- 
pable people  in  the  community  in  which  it  exists. 
They  are  more  capable  because  they  have  been 
brought  up  most  carefully,  that  is,  because  they 
have  the  best  trained  minds.  There  is  no  law  of 
nature  by  which  more  fools  are  born  in  an  aris- 
tocracy than  in  a  proletariat.  In  fact,  the  tend- 
ency is  the  other  way;  for  since  the  aristocrats 
are  in  a  position  to  cultivate  themselves  in  a  given 
generation,  it  is  natural  that  a  comparatively 
large  portion  of  their  children  shall  be  well  en- 
dowed mentally.  To  this  gift  of  nature  add  the 
influence  of  better  educational  training,  and  you 
see  how  natural  it  is  to  expect  an  autocracy  to  be 
stronger  mentally  than  those  who  would  have  to 
replace  it  if  it  were  overthrown. 


ai8      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Again,  an  autocracy  is  not  necessarily  un- 
patriotic. Of  course,  it  has  its  own  idea  of  what 
patriotism  is,  but  so  have  the  classes  below  the 
autocracy.  Its  patriotism  usually  embraces  an 
honestly  held  opinion  that  the  autocratic  state  is 
the  best  form  of  society.  On  this  basis  it  is  will- 
ing to  sacrifice  much  for  the  state.  We  see  it 
putting  "lives,  fortunes,  and  sacred  honor"  lit- 
erally at  the  entire  command  of  the  state.  No 
man  can  do  more  than  give  his  all  for  that  which 
he  holds  right. 

An  autocracy  may  be  composed  of  men  of  the 
best  private  manners  and  principles.  They  fre- 
quently include  the  best  poets,  historians,  novel- 
ists, philosophers,  and  teachers  of  the  nation.  It 
is  they  who  encourage  art,  and  set  standards  of 
taste  in  architecture,  landscape  gardening,  and 
general  culture.  Compared  with  the  leisure  class 
of  a  prosperous  industrial  country  they  may  be 
more  courteous,  more  unassuming,  and  less  given 
to  offensive  use  of  their  wealth.  They  are  the 
kind  of  men  whom  any  of  us  could  love  if  we 
knew  them  personally.  These  words  do  not,  of 
course,  apply  to  all  members  of  the  class,  but  to 
the  group  as  a  whole  in  ordinary  conditions. 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     219 

Of  the  German  autocracy  most  of  these  things 
can  be  said,  and  more.  It  is  a  hard  working 
group  and  generally  speaking  it  is  honest.  In 
the  service  of  the  state  it  has  a  record  of  efficient 
government  that  few  democratic  countries  can 
show.  The  officials  of  German  towns  and  cities, 
provinces  and  states,  taken  from  the  hereditary 
upper  classes,  are  well  trained,  faithful,  and  free 
from  the  suggestion  of  corruption.  It  will  take 
New  York  or  Chicago  many  years  to  develop 
the  state  of  good  government  that  exists  in  Ber- 
lin. Moreover,  the  German  autocracy  has  the 
respect  of  the  German  people. 

Up  to  last  winter  the  Russian  autocracy  was 
an  obstacle  to  peace.  Many  who  looked  forward 
to  a  reign  of  reason  wondered  how  they  were  go- 
ing to  make  the  theory  work  while  the  largest 
Entente  nation  was  in  the  hands  of  an  autocracy 
that  was  less  tolerable  than  the  German  autoc- 
racy. Fortunately,  fate  has  settled  the  question, 
for  the  time  at  least.  So  uncertain  is  the  condi- 
tion of  affairs  in  Russia,  that  no  one  can  say  what 
will  be  the  outcome.  It  is  by  no  means  certain 
that  the  peasants,  workers,  and  soldiers,  will  not 
make  actual  war  against  the  former  autocrats. 


220      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

leading  to  a  state  of  chaos  like  the  worst  phases 
of  the  French  Revolution.  If  such  a  thing  hap- 
pens, a  reaction  in  favor  of  the  former  ruling 
class  may  well  follow.  If  the  war  ends  before 
the  newly  established  government  is  firmly 
seated  in  power  some  such  upheaval  may  be 
expected.  Certainly  the  time  of  danger  is  not 
yet  passed. 

The  German  autocracy  is  better  than  that 
which  ruled  Russia.  In  fact,  it  would  be  less 
dangerous  if  it  were  less  serviceable.  Its  sins  are 
not  the  patent  sins  of  pecculation,  cruelty,  lazi- 
ness, or  despotism.  It  offends  in  that  it  takes 
away  the  confidence  of  nation  in  nation.  It  of- 
fends because  it  is  filled  with  unfortunate  pur- 
poses. It  is  possible  to  think  of  an  autocracy 
that  would  be  no  menace  for  the  peace  of  the 
world,  an  autocracy  filled  with  no  ambition  for 
world  conquest.  It  is  true  that  most  autocratic 
governments  have  not  been  of  this  kind,  and  they 
seem  militarists  by  nature,  whence  arise  the  ideals 
with  which  they  trouble  the  world. 

When  Hegel  preached  the  philosophy  of  war 
that  underlies  the  German's  devotion  to 
war,  he  was  largely  right  from  the  Prussian 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     221 

standpoint.  He  held  that  the  mind  becomes 
sluggish  through  inactivity  and  that  war  burns 
up  its  waste  matter  and  leads  to  energy  of  char- 
acter. This  doctrine  would  not  be  essentially 
true  in  any  normally  organized  society;  for  there 
are  as  many  opportunities  for  self-expression  in 
commerce,  finance,  manufactures,  art,  and  other 
peaceful  occupations  as  in  war.  But  a  century 
ago  Prussia  was  filled,  even  more  than  today,  with 
a  mass  of  small  nobles,  unaccustomed  to  any  or- 
dinary form  of  labor,  and  with  slender  incomes. 
They  were  just  the  class  that  would  fall  into  the 
effete  vices  of  an  aristocracy.  To  them  the  mili- 
tary life  was  an  avenue  of  steady  and  moral  em- 
ployment. They  took  places  in  the  great  ma- 
chine, and  by  1870  they  had  been  bred  into  its 
very  spirit.  The  process  saved  the  German 
nobles  from  vapidity.  At  the  same  time,  as 
a  class,  they  preserved  their  political  privileges, 
and  it  has  happened  that  they,  with  their  official 
heads,  the  kaiser,  kings,  and  princes,  have  been 
able  to  unite  political  power  and  military  pur- 
poses until  they  have  made  of  their  country  the 
most  military  state  of  modern  times.  If  Ger- 
many has  fought  the  present  war  with  great  abil- 


222      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

ity,  it  is  the  organized  autocracy  that  deserves  the 
credit. 

It  is,  therefore,  the  union  of  the  political  and 
military  power  in  the  hands  of  a  privileged  class 
in  Germany  that  now  constitutes  the  greatest 
obstacle  to  peace.  It  enables  a  small  and  efficient 
portion  of  the  German  population  to  wield  the 
rest  of  the  people  for  the  ends  they  have  decided 
are  best.  If  this  union  of  functions  could  be 
broken  up,  and  if  political  power  could  be  dis- 
tributed as  in  the  countries  governed  by  the  peo- 
ple, the  obstacle  would  be  reduced  in  size.  It  is 
not  necessary  to  suppose  that  it  would  be  re- 
moved altogether ;  for  even  if  equal  suffrage  were 
established  in  Germany,  and  if  autocracy  were 
shorn  of  its  preponderating  electoral  power, 
the  nobles  would  still  be  the  most  capable  class  in 
the  empire.  Their  personality  would  go  a  long 
way  in  perpetuating  their  influence.  If  they 
played  the  game  of  trying  to  lead  the  people 
they  might  remain  rulers  of  Germany  for  a  long 
time  after  losing  their  present  electoral  ad- 
vantages. 

It  is  fair  to  assume  that  a  democracy  will  be 
less  likely  to  go  to  war  than  an  autocracy.     It  is 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     22S 

the  middle  and  lower  classes  that  bear  the  chief 
burdens  of  war.  They  fight  for  no  promotions. 
Generally  the  happiest  thing  that  can  come  to  one 
of  them  is  a  disabling  wound  to  send  him  home 
with  his  head  safely  on  his  shoulders.  Kings  and 
their  sons  are  rarely  killed  in  battle.  When  this 
war  began  the  kaiser  was  one  of  the  proud  Ger- 
mans who  had  five  tall  sons  of  military  age. 
After  nearly  four  years  of  fighting  none  of  them 
have  been  seriously  injured.  It  would  be  inter- 
esting to  know  if  there  is  another  German  father 
of  five  sons  who  has  been  so  gently  treated  by  for- 
tune. Report  says  that  fifty  thousand  school- 
masters were  killed  in  Germany  during  the  first 
two  years  of  the  war.  It  would  be  interesting  to 
learn  whether  or  not  the  titled  class  has  given  up 
so  large  a  proportion  of  its  members  for  the  cause 
of  the  Fatherland. 

And  yet,  it  must  not  be  thought  that  wars  can- 
not exist  in  democratic  countries.  When  Rome 
was  a  republic  war  was  a  constant  thing.  Athens 
in  her  republican  days  had  many  wars.  In  the 
region  that  is  now  the  United  States  of  America 
have  been  several  wars.  The  war  for  independ- 
ence was  essentially  popular.     It  was  organized 


2M      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

by  that  part  of  the  population  which  resented 
British  aristocratic  institutions,  the  class  we 
should  today  call  "the  plain  people."  In  the  civil 
war  the  demand  that  slavery  be  destroyed  did  not 
come  from  the  wealthy  men  of  the  North,  the 
class  that  stood  for  the  American  aristocracy,  but 
from  the  middle  classes,  men  who  filled  the 
churches  and  who  followed  the  common  impulses 
of  the  heart.  It  was  resisted  by  the  South,  as 
democratically  organized  as  Germany  would  be 
with  the  Junkers  turned  out  of  power,  and  the 
struggle  was  as  bitter  as  any  the  world  had 
seen  up  to  the  fatal  year  1914.  Democratic 
states  can  fight,  and  they  do  fight,  but  they  are 
less  likely  to  go  to  war  than  autocratic  states. 

If  it  seems  to  any  of  us  a  necessary  thing  that 
autocracy  must  be  removed  from  the  earth,  it  is 
well  to  remember  that  autocracy  can  be  removed 
only  through  the  operation  of  a  long  and  slow 
process.  It  can  be  reduced  by  some  great  catas- 
trophe, but  it  cannot  be  smitten  out  in  a  day. 
Take  away  its  political  power,  and  perhaps  its 
financial  power  will  be  left.  Undermine  that  by 
raising  up  a  rich  bourgeoisie,  and  its  social  influ- 
ence will  perhaps  still  exist.     You  do  not  abolish 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     225 

it  by  decree;  you  banish  it  only  when  you  have 
substituted  a  better  thing. 

What  force  exists  in  Germany  with  which  the 
autocracy  can  be  supplanted?  Next  to  the  rad- 
icals, a  small  faction  at  best,  we  have  the  social- 
ists, numerous  enough  to  have  great  influence, 
but  committed  to  a  theory  of  society  which  can- 
not be  established  until  humanity  has  gone 
through  centuries  of  development  in  the  princi- 
ples of  equality.  Then  we  find  the  national  lib- 
erals, whose  name  is  likely  to  mislead  liberals  in 
other  parts  of  the  world.  They  would  be  called 
the  stand-pat,  capitalistic  portion  of  society  in 
the  United  States,  men  who  believe  first  of  all  in 
the  protection  of  their  large  interests.  In  the 
present  struggle  they  are  committed  to  the  Pan- 
Germany  policy  since  it  means  the  expansion  of 
markets  for  German  wares.  Next  come  the  cen- 
trists. Catholics  in  their  primary  interests,  and 
fundamentally  opposed  to  the  doctrines  for  which 
the  socialists  stand.  Finally  we  come  to  the  con- 
servatives, who  believe  in  the  autocracy.  What 
magician  can  fuse  these  parties  into  a  solid  move- 
ment for  the  establishment  of  really  parliamen- 
tary government? 


2S6      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Last  obstacle  of  all  that  I  shall  mention  here 
is  the  accumulated  machinery  of  war  that  has 
been  built  up  in  modern  states.  I  do  not  refer 
to  ideas  but  to  materials  and  men.  Much  has 
been  written  to  show  that  munition  makers  have 
deliberately  fostered  a  belief  in  war,  so  as  to  make 
a  market  for  their  products.  Probably  some  ex- 
aggeration exists  in  most  of  these  arguments 
and  statements.  The  Krupps  and  their  brethren 
have  plausible  grounds  for  saying  that  war  is 
inevitable,  and  that  they  serve  it  but  do  not  pro- 
mote it.  But  giving  them  as  much  benefit  of  the 
doubt  as  they  can  expect,  it  must  be  true  that 
their  very  existence,  and  their  fine  application  of 
science  to  their  business,  have  led  states  to  count 
on  war  as  a  matter  of  course.  These  great  ag- 
gregations of  capital  have  vast  influence  in  politi- 
cal circles.  They  have  so  many  stockholders  that 
they  affect  a  large  number  of  influential  men. 
So  much  are  they  committed  to  the  cause  in  which 
their  fortunes  and  hearts  are  enlisted  that  they 
ought  not  to  have  the  opportunity  to  wield  their 
peculiar  influence.  When  this  war  is  over,  it 
would  be  a  real  service  if  every  munitions  factory 
as  such  were  taken  into  government  hands  and  its 


OBSTACLES  TO  AN  ENDURING  PEACE     %n 

capital  stock  closed  out  as  a  business  enterprise. 
It  is  only  the  state,  and  the  state  in  the  hands  of 
the  people,  that  can  safely  be  trusted  with  this 
powerful  weapon  for  the  creation  of  war  senti- 
ment. 

The  professional  soldiers  are  also  a  part  of  the 
war  machinery  which  stands  in  the  way  of  an 
enduring  peace.  They  can  hardly  be  expected  to 
become  pacifists.  They  are  trained  to  regard 
war  as  a  necessity.  All  their  ideas  of  virtue  are 
wrapped  up  in  the  fine  qualities  of  a  brave  soldier. 
Any  other  standard  is  strange  to  them.  They 
may  be  expected  to  throw  all  their  weight  of  in- 
fluence in  favor  of  recurring  wars.  Not  that 
they  wish  wars  to  recur,  but  that  they  consider 
it  improper  to  contemplate  anything  else  in  the 
natural  order  of  events.  This  is  a  hard  problem 
to  deal  with.  A  few  professional  soldiers  may  be 
brought  to  set  their  faces  against  war;  but  as  to 
the  great  majority,  I  fear  that  those  who  try  to 
abolish  war  will  have  to  count  on  the  opposition 
of  the  professional  warriors  until  the  end  of  the 
chapter. 

This  array  of  obstacles  to  enduring  peace,  is  it 
not  formidable?     Economic  competition,  the  ac- 


228      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

tual  if  false  sense  of  patriotism,  the  desire  for 
nationality — which  is  liable  to  run  into  extreme 
assertions  and  sometimes  to  run  counter  to  the 
strongest  economic  interests — the  existence  of 
autocratic  government,  and  the  powerful  influ- 
ence of  munition  makers  and  professional  war- 
riors— these  are  some  of  the  obstacles  against 
which  those  must  contend  who  try  to  convince 
the  world  that  peace  is  the  better  way.  They 
may  well  appal  the  stoutest  hearted  friend  of  en- 
during peace. 


CHAPTER  XI 

ARGUMENTS   FOE  A  FEDERATION   OF   STATES 

The  arguments  against  attempting  to  estab- 
lish an  enduring  peace  are  undoubtedly  formid- 
able, but  they  do  not  leave  the  idealist  entirely 
vanquished.  On  his  side  fight  humanity  and 
reason,  and  it  is  his  function  to  stand  by  humanity 
and  reason.  He  has  long  ago  formed  the  habit 
of  attacking  obstacles.  In  this  case  the  objec- 
tions he  meets  are  all  rooted  in  the  opinions  of 
men,  and  he  loves  to  change  opinions,  or,  if  he 
does  not  change  them,  to  hammer  away  at  them 
as  long  as  life  lasts.  For  his  fine  optimism  we 
can  but  have  great  respect,  and  in  this  chapter  I 
intend  to  summarize  his  arguments  and  give  them 
to  the  public  in  as  strong  a  light  of  plausibility 
as  possible.  If  the  stolid  opposition  of  the 
"practical"  world  is  not  to  be  broken  down,  let  it 
be  shaken  as  much  as  may  be.  The  time  of  its 
defeat  is  written  in  the  book  of  fate.  It  may  be 
that  the  time  is  near  at  hand. 

229 


S30      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

In  the  first  place,  let  me  recall  a  statement 
made  in  the  preceding  chapter.  To  get  any 
desired  reform  adopted  and  earried  out,  it  is 
first  necessary  to  get  the  people  to  imagine  the 
reform  in  operation.  I  mean  that  they  must 
have  a  clear  mental  picture  of  themselves  living 
contentedly  under  the  proposed  plan.  Let  the 
proposition  be  made  in  such  a  way  that  the  effec- 
tive people  who  direct  the  government  can  not,  or 
will  not,  in  the  mind's  eye  see  it  in  operation,  and 
it  will  surely  fail.  Let  them  imagine  its  success- 
ful use  and  they  will  most  likely  find  it  unobjec- 
tionable. Likewise,  if  the  people  of  the  world 
could  imagine  a  great  cooperative  union  to  pro- 
mote peace,  with  enough  force  behind  it  to  enforce 
the  will  of  the  union,  if  in  their  minds  they  could 
see  themselves  adjusted  into  such  a  system,  with 
all  its  economy  in  taxes,  human  suffering,  and 
ordinary  governmental  effort,  it  would  not  be 
very  difficult  to  make  such  a  scheme  work  in 
actual  experience. 

The  "practical"  man  has  but  little  imagina- 
tion. He  has  to  be  deceived  into  the  acceptance 
of  reforms.  Make  him  believe  that  a  given  plan 
has  been  made  to  work  and  his  objections  are 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION        231 

diminished,  if  not  overcome  altogether.  This  is 
not  said  for  scolding  but  as  a  sober  fact  confront- 
ing the  man  who  reasons  his  way  through  matters 
that  perplex  him.  The  "practical"  man  is  not 
responsible  for  his  weakness,  and  he  is  in  the  ma- 
jority among  men.  On  the  other  hand,  the  man 
with  imagination  is  not  to  be  faint-hearted.  If 
he  can  see  and  talk,  he  may,  by  reiteration  finally 
make  his  brothers  see  also. 

Fundamentally  his  position  rests  upon  the  rea- 
sonableness of  his  proposition:  war  is  madness, 
brutality,  useless  waste  of  wealth  and  life,  and  the 
negation  of  civilization.  It  proceeds  from  the 
unnecessarily  irritated  state  of  the  public  mind. 
Reason  demands  that  she  be  allowed  to  have  an 
opportunity  to  exert  her  influence  in  a  reasonable 
world  over  reasonable  beings.  Since  law  is  the 
expression  of  the  will  of  reasonable  beings,  let  law 
be  given  the  supervision  of  all  the  disputes  which 
may  possibly  lead  to  war.  How  true  all  this 
sounds!  And  the  preacher  of  peace  says  boldly 
that  it  is  more  worth  while  to  plan,  spend  money, 
and  take  a  chance  in  a  great  world  effort  to  bring 
such  a  reasonable  situation  to  pass  than  to  go  on 
planning,  spending,  and  risking  things  in  the 


SS2      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

efforts  to  make  a  system  work  that  has  ever  led 
us  around  in  a  circle  to  the  same  old  end,  war  and 
misery. 

The  advocate  of  peace  points  to  the  duel. 
There  was  a  time  when  every  man  felt  it  his  right 
and  duty  to  settle  his  own  quarrels.  He  was  his 
own  judge  and  his  own  sheriff.  The  result  was 
so  bad  that  law  was  created  to  enforce  peace  be- 
tween individuals.  The  old  condition  survived 
in  the  duel,  but  in  most  countries  this  at  last  was 
brought  under  the  authority  of  law.  Private 
combat  in  its  nature  does  not  differ  from  public 
combat,  and  if  one  was  eliminated  by  the  creation 
of  a  law  that  was  strong  enough  to  forbid  it,  the 
other  can  be  abolished  by  creating  a  still  stronger 
law,  powerful  enough  to  restrain  states  as  crim- 
inal law  restrains  individuals. 

Kant's  argument  for  perpetual  peace  ran  like 
this,  but  he,  in  sympathy  with  Rousseau's  social 
contract  theory,  argued  that  the  law  that  re- 
strained individuals  was  the  result  of  agreement 
between  individuals;  and  he  went  further  and 
*  argued  that  all  that  was  necessary  to  secure  per- 
petual peace  would  be  for  the  states  to  agree  to 
establish  a  league,  or  a  federation,  to  enforce  it. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION        233 

Now  there  was  a  fallacy  in  Kant's  argument  that 
has  a  bearing  on  the  subject  immediately  before 
us  today.  There  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  any 
state  ever  arose  from  an  agreement  of  individ- 
uals. The  ordinary  process  was  growth  out  of 
several  conditions.  An  enlarged  family  might 
become  a  state,  or  one  tribe  might  conquer  an- 
other and  enlarge  itself  into  a  state.  Kinship 
and  force  were  probably  the  chief  causes  in  pro- 
ducing the  state ;  and  reason  seems  to  have  played 
a  small  part.  Similarly,  law  grew  up,  not  as  the 
result  of  reason,  but  as  a  body  of  tribal  customs, 
reasonably  interpreted  by  the  wise  men  of  the 
early  state. 

There  is,  therefore,  no  analogy  between  the 
proposed  method  of  forming  a  great  super-state 
with  its  own  body  of  law,  the  object  of  which  is  to 
restrain  the  states  from  going  to  war,  and  the 
method  by  which  the  early  state  was  created.  In 
fact,  if  one  great  nation  were  to  conquer  the  rest 
of  the  world  and  impose  its  peace  on  all  the  world, 
as  it  would  do,  we  should  have  a  process  more 
analogous  to  the  origin  of  the  early  state.  And 
that  is  one  way  of  having  peace.  Within  the 
last   years   it   has   seemed   a   horribly   possible 


g34      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

method;  for  if  Mittel-Europa  becomes  a  fact,  it 
will  have  such  predominating  power  that  it  is 
difficult  to  see  what  will  stop  its  march  to  general 
authority. 

Pointing  out  Kant's  fallacy  weakens  his  argu- 
ment as  such,  but  it  leaves  us  in  such  a  dilemma 
that  we  are  prone  to  pronounce  his  suggestion 
worth  trying  as  an  escape  from  conquest  by  one 
great  power.  For  if  the  world  is  tending  toward 
unity  through  conquest,  who  can  doubt  that  it 
would  be  better  to  anticipate  the  process,  save  a 
great  sum  of  human  suffering,  and  by  agreement 
found  the  world  federation  which  is  the  same 
result  to  which  ages  of  war  will  lead  us.  That 
we  could  have  such  a  super-state  by  contract  is 
not  to  be  doubted.  It  would  be  as  possible  as  the 
creation  of  the  United  States  of  America  by 
agreement. 

Another  argument  of  the  peace  advocate  is  that 
the  old  system  by  which  the  world  was  kept  in 
equilibrium,  the  balance  of  power,  has  broken 
down,  and  cannot  be  trusted  to  preserve  the  peace 
of  the  future.  Its  chief  characteristic  was  that 
several  states  mutually  checked  one  another.  If 
one  manifested  an  intention  that  was  alarming 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION       235 

to  the  rest  they  combined  to  restrict  the  action  of 
the  aggressor.  The  several  states  were  with  re- 
gard to  one  another  in  a  condition  mobile  enough 
to  permit  any  state  to  shift  from  one  side  to  an- 
other as  the  situation  demanded.  Now  this  con- 
dition no  longer  exists.  There  has  developed  a 
mid-continental  alliance,  apparently  expecting 
to  continue  to  act  as  one  state  for  practical 
purposes,  which  in  itself  threatens  to  dominate 
Europe.  To  hold  it  in  check  calls  forth  all  the 
united  force  of  the  other  states  and  then  success  is 
obtained  only  through  the  greatest  amount  of 
preparedness.  Such  a  condition  is  anything  but 
the  old  system  which  was  to  work  through  bal- 
ance and  concert  of  action. 

The  central  position  of  the  Germans  and  Aus- 
trians  gives  them  an  inmiense  advantage,  if  the 
world  is  to  go  on  in  its  national  rivalries.  On  the 
west  lie  the  two  nations  who  are  today  doing  most 
to  hold  them  in  restraint,  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain. The  former  could  never  stand  against  Ger- 
many alone,  and  the  latter  is  remote  enough  from 
the  German  frontier  to  make  it  improbable  that 
her  forces  could  reach  that  spot  in  time  to  prevent 
the  Germans  from  gaining  the  initial  advantage 


THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

which,  in  a  state  of  efficient  preparation  is  the 
only  military  success  that  either  side  can  hope 
to  win.  In  the  face  of  a  strong  and  threatening 
Germany  it  would  be  very  likely  that  these  two 
nations  would  have  to  make  a  more  than  formal 
alhance.  Even  if  that  happened,  it  is  possible 
that  Germany  would  construe  it  as  a  threat  and 
begin  war. 

The  only  other  strong  check  on  the  central 
powers  is  Russia,  now  in  a  sad  state  of  change. 
What  her  future  is  going  to  be  is  still  problem- 
atic. It  is  a  stupendous  task  for  so  large  a  na- 
tion, composed  of  landlords  and  peasants  for  the 
most  part,^  to  pass  from  an  autocracy  to  a  self- 
governing  nation.  It  took  France,  a  smaller 
country,  from  1789  to  1879  to  pass  through  the 
various  changes  and  counter-changes  by  which 
she  reformed  her  government  into  a  republic.  It 
is  safe  to  say  that  in  the  Russian  development 
the  changes  will  come  more  rapidly,  but  it  is  not 
impossible  that  in  this  country  a  period  of  pro- 
longed unrest  is  ahead.  Under  such  circum- 
stances Russia  could  hardly  be  counted  on  to  give 
much  aid  to  the  Western  nations  who  wished  to 
restrain  Germany.     In  fact,  so  fluid  would  be  the 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION        237 

state  of  her  society  that  she  might  well  become 
the  victim  of  German  ambition  and  contribute 
valuable  parts  of  her  empire  to  swell  the  resources 
of  her  aggressive  western  neighbors. 

One  insecure  spot  must  be  pointed  out  in  this 
argument.  It  is  the  continuous  close  alliance  of 
Germany  and  Austria-Hungary.  If  that  breaks 
down  the  whole  argument  fails.  At  the  present 
time  it  is  impossible  to  say  what  may  happen  in 
this  respect.  Much  will  depend  on  the  new  em- 
peror of  the  Dual  Empire.  That  he  has  a  very 
difficult  problem  before  him  is  without  ques- 
tion. On  one  hand  is  the  intense  Hungarian 
aversion  to  absorption  by  Germany,  on  the  other 
the  passionate  desire  for  union  by  the  German 
people  in  the  Dual  Empire.  It  is  supposed  that 
the  emperor  does  not  favor  absorption;  but  it 
seems  certain  that  he  is  not  able  at  this  time  to 
take  an  open  stand  against  it. 

The  strong  part  Germany  has  taken  in  saving 
Austria  from  Russia  gives  Germany  a  firm  hold 
over  the  imagination  of  the  Austrian  people.  It 
is  possible  that  financial  aid  has  also  been  ex- 
tended to  such  an  amount  that  Austria  would  be 
embarrassed  if  called  on  to  pay  back.     Nor  is  the 


238      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

kaiser  in  Berlin  in  a  mood  to  brook  defiance  from 
Vienna.  If,  therefore  Kaiser  Karl  wishes  to  be 
free  of  his  too  intimate  dependence  on  Kaiser 
Wilhelm,  he  will  find  it  to  his  advantage  to  con- 
ceal his  desire  for  the  time  being.  It  is  probable 
that  we  shall  not  know  the  present  true  state  of 
feelings  in  Austria  for  several  years  after  the 
war.  But  unless  she  is  very  well  Germanized,  it 
would  seem  that  she  must  soon  realize  that  she  is 
playing  a  losing  game  in  the  combined  movement. 
The  real  advantages  of  this  war,  if  any  are  ob- 
tained, are  German  advantages.  It  is  German 
trade,  German  hultur,  and  German  prestige  that 
are  being  enhanced  by  the  war.  Austria  as  Aus- 
tria is  not  reaping  advantages  commensurate 
with  the  gains  of  her  greater  partner. 

The  financial  argument  seems  to  be  much  on 
the  side  of  the  peace  advocate.  Let  us  consider 
the  situation  in  which  the  European  states  will 
find  themselves  after  the  return  of  peace.  Bank- 
ruptcy is  a  relative  term,  if  we  so  interpret  it. 
That  is  to  say,  if  the  people  are  willing  to  bear 
patiently  their  great  burdens  they  will  bear  them, 
and  the  debts  that  have  been  acquired  will  be 
shouldered.     If  one  nation  repudiates  this  debt, 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION       239 

or  scales  it  down,  it  is  probable  that  the  others 
will  do  the  same,  since  to  continue  to  carry  the 
debt  would  leave  the  faithful  nation  at  a  disad- 
vantage with  the  other  nations  in  reference  to 
future  struggles  with  one  another. 

No  one  knows  as  yet  just  who  owns  the  bonds 
in  the  several  nations.  From  Germany  we  hear 
that  they  are  widely  held.  It  is  the  policy  of  the 
government  of  any  nation  to  distribute  a  heavy 
debt  as  widely  as  possible ;  and  we  have  in  recent 
history  instances  of  great  patriotism  in  assuming 
debts  of  this  kind.  Now  it  is  fair  to  say  that 
the  more  widely  the  debt  is  distributed,  the 
greater  its  likelihood  of  permanency.  The 
larger  the  number  of  poor  people  who  own  it,  the 
harder  it  will  be  to  lessen  the  burden  of  the  na- 
tion. It  follows  that  in  this  case  the  immense 
interest  charge  is  likely  to  persist  as  a  permanent 
encumbrance  on  the  economic  life  of  the  country. 

On  the  other  hand,  let  us  say  that  it  turns  out 
that  the  debt  is  not  very  widely  distributed  after 
all,  or  that  after  the  war  it  follows  the  course  of 
most  national  debts  and  passes  into  the  hands  of 
the  rich.  Then  we  have  the  situation  likely  to 
promote  class  friction.     The  taxes  necessary  to 


mo      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

pay  the  interest  will  fall  on  the  mass  of  people, 
who  will  probably  come  to  believe  that  they  are 
taxed  for  the  benefit  of  the  wealthy.  Class  jeal- 
ousy will  lead  to  suggestions  of  repudiation. 
Such  a  course  is  more  than  ordinarily  easy  in 
Germany,  France,  and  Russia,  where  there  are 
well  organized  socialist  parties,  already  keenly 
suspicious  of  the  capitalists. 

Thus,  whether  the  debt  is  widely  distributed  or 
not,  it  contains  a  menace  to  society.  In  one  case 
it  constitutes  such  a  burden  that  it  absorbs  the 
financial  strength  of  the  government.  In  the 
other  it  invites  the  most  formidable  struggle  of 
the  poor  against  the  rich  that  the  world  has  seen 
in  a  century. 

Such  a  situation  is  bad  enough  in  itself,  but  it 
does  not  directly  affect  the  question  of  peace,  our 
main  consideration  at  this  time ;  for  the  debt  will 
exist  as  a  result  of  the  war,  and  nothing  in  the 
view  of  the  friends  of  peace  can  prevent  it.  But 
through  whichever  of  the  two  contingent  courses 
it  goes,  the  state  will  have  difficulty  in  continuing 
the  old  system. 

Let  us  say  that  we  have  a  permanent  great 
debt  with  a  huge  interest  fund,  and  the  state 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION       241 

wishes  to  add  to  the  taxes  in  order  to  keep  up  its 
measures  of  preparedness.  The  result  must  be 
to  produce  uneasiness  in  the  minds  of  the  tax- 
payers. In  Germany,  for  example,  the  interest 
charge  and  the  provision  for  pensions  on  account 
of  the  present  war  will  probably  be  considerably 
more  than  a  billion  dollars  a  year.  Added  to  the 
ordinary  expenses  of  government  it  will  make  a 
burden  more  than  double  that  of  1913.  Can  the 
government  go  on  providing  armaments,  that 
may  lead  to  another  war,  without  jeopardizing 
the  loans  that  are  already  issued  ?  In  the  face  of 
such  heavy  taxation  it  would  not  be  surprising 
if  the  people  sold  their  holdings  of  bonds  to  the 
capitalists  and  later  turned  toward  repudiation. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  to  the  interest  of 
the  capitalists  to  favor  moderate  expenditures 
for  armaments  and  armies,  lest  the  patience  of  the 
people  under  their  burdens  might  be  exhausted. 

But  suppose  the  debt  was  not  distributed 
widely  in  the  first  place,  and  suppose  it  was  re- 
pudiated after  a  class  struggle,  or  for  any  other 
reason  scaled  down.  The  result  would  be  a  se- 
vere blow  to  credit,  and  in  the  future  it  might 
be  so  difficult  to  raise  funds  that  war  could  not 


M2      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

be  carried  on.  No  nation  can  afford  to  contem- 
plate war  if  it  has  not  borrowing  capacity.  If 
the  debts  of  one  war  are  repudiated  those  of  an- 
other may  also  be  repudiated.  It  behooves  the 
capitalists,  therefore,  to  support  a  policy  which 
will  make  armed  conflict  impossible.  While 
bonds  benefit  the  banker  when  issued  up  to  a  cer- 
tain point,  they  can  in  some  conditions  become 
his  most  serious  difficulty.  So  many  perils  await 
the  capitalist  from  a  renewal  of  struggles  like  the 
present,  that  it  is  not  too  much  to  count  upon 
him  as  a  supporter  of  peace  until  the  financial 
situation  in  Europe  shall  become  better  than  it 
will  be  for  many  a  day.  It  is  his  true  interest  to 
support  a  federated  peace,  which  will  tend  to 
make  his  bonds  secure. 

As  to  the  influence  of  autocracy,  the  advocate 
of  peace  must  admit  that  it  is  by  nature  hostile 
to  his  system  of  cooperative  peace.  Such  co- 
operation must  depend  on  mutual  confidence  and 
trust  between  nations;  and  it  is  natural  for  dis- 
trust to  exist  between  republican  and  autocratic 
states.  The  whole  trend  of  autocracy  is  to  self- 
assertion.  As  it  exists  in  Germany  today  it 
could  hardly  be  relied  on  to  take  its  place  in  any 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION  MS 

union  of  states  which  would  involve  the  subordi- 
nation of  individual  national  interests  to  the  com- 
mon good. 

Granting  this,  the  advocate  of  peace  can  assert 
that  Germany  must  eventually  give  up  autoc- 
racy. As  the  only  great  nations  that  hold  to  this 
relic  of  a  departed  age  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  are  becoming  anachronisms.  They  are 
set  against  the  spirit  of  the  twentieth  century. 
If  they  tide  over  the  crisis  that  now  confronts 
them  they  will  encounter  more  furious  storms  at 
a  later  time,  and  eventually  autocracy  must  be 
broken  down.  The  argument  rests  on  faith  in 
progress.  It  is  the  result  of  confidence  in  the  in- 
nate quaUties  of  human  nature.  So  many  times 
in  the  past  ages  have  the  people  risen  against 
bad  government,  that  it  is  safe  to  say  they  will 
repeat  the  process  until  all  inequaUty  shall  have 
been  reduced. 

German  autocracy,  a  survival  of  a  past  cen- 
tury, exists  only  because  it  takes  for  its  object 
the  good  government  of  a  parliamentary  system. 
In  intelligence  and  honesty  it  is  not  like  the  an- 
cient system.  The  resemblance  is  only  in  forms. 
The  republican  says:     "I  will  give  the  people 


2U      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

just,  intelligent,  and  honest  government."  The 
German  autocrat  says:  "I  will  do  all  these 
things";  and  he  redeems  his  promise.  His 
brother  of  the  eighteenth  century  had  no  such 
purpose,  being  so  certain  of  his  position  that  he 
did  not  have  to  promise  the  people  anything. 
The  German  autocrat  lives  in  fear  of  an  over- 
throw. Perhaps  some  day  he  will  make  a  slip — 
it  may  be  from  the  action  of  an  unwise  emperor 
or  a  selfish  party  clique — and  away  will  go  the 
whole  system. 

Last  summer  a  crisis  arose  in  Berlin.  The 
very  life  of  the  autocracy  seemed  about  to  be 
taken.  It  was  saved  finally  by  a  narrow  margin, 
and  with  the  making  of  promises  which  seem 
a  long  step  forward.  The  people  were  assured 
that  such  was  their  meaning.  If  the  promises  are 
broken,  there  will  be  a  reckoning.  It  may  be 
said  that  there  will  never  again  be  so  good  an 
opportunity  to  force  the  granting  of  parliamen- 
tary reforms.  That  statement  is  contestable. 
The  autocracy  needs  the  support  of  the  people  at 
present,  in  order  to  bring  Germany  through  the 
crisis  that  has  arisen  from  the  action  of  the 
autocracy,  and  it  may  seem  from  that  standpoint 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION       245 

that  the  people  never  had  and  will  never  have  an 
equally  good  opportunity  to  strike  a  blow.  But 
the  call  of  patriotism  is  strong  in  Germany,  and 
if  the  liberally  minded  persons  were  to  stand  de- 
liberately for  the  defeat  of  the  war  credits  unless 
they  were  given  the  reforms  they  demanded,  it  is 
doubtful  if  the  people  would  support  them.  It  is 
hard  to  carry  a  country  through  a  great  political 
revolution  while  the  very  life  of  the  country  is 
threatened. 

After  war  comes  a  time  of  questioning.  The 
German  people  will  have  reason  to  ask  them- 
selves what  has  been  done  to  them.  The  burdens 
of  taxes,  the  loss  of  commerce,  the  wrecks  of 
human  life  through  maiming,  and  the  great  gaps 
in  population  through  death,  all  these  things  can 
but  come  to  the  minds  of  the  people.  At  that 
time  the  press  must  lose  something  of  its  rigorous 
control,  for  it  is  impossible  that  when  the  Ger- 
mans get  over  the  feeling  that  their  country  is  in 
danger  they  will  continue  to  tolerate  a  press 
whose  every  word  is  dictated  by  the  one  thought 
of  keeping  the  people  solidly  united  in  war  senti- 
ment. If  it  should  happen  that  the  empire  has 
an  emperor  who  is  not  trusted  by  the  people  it 


246      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

may  be  that  the  questioning  will  sweep  away 
many  old  doubts  and  forms. 

These  things  should  not  be  taken  as  prophecy, 
but  as  possibilities  for  tempering  the  opinion  that 
Germany  is  destined  to  be  permanently  auto- 
cratic. The  advocate  of  an  enduring  peace  has 
a  right  to  think  a  self-governing  Germany  well 
within  the  bounds  of  possibility  before  another 
decade  has  elapsed.  If  such  a  thing  happens, 
certainly  one  of  the  most  serious  obstacles  to 
peace  will  have  been  removed. 

I  shall  venture  to  put  one  more  argument  into 
the  mouth  of  the  advocate  of  peace.  Probably 
he  has  not  used  it  as  I  am  going  to  use  it,  but  it 
works  his  way;  for  it  shows  that  a  tremendous 
fate  threatens,  unless  some  cooperative  move- 
ment is  established  to  avert  it.  Stated  briefly  it 
is  this :  Through  the  ages  runs  a  law  of  unifica- 
tion in  society,  and  it  seems  probable  that  the 
world  has  today  come  to  the  point  at  which  the 
unifying  force  is  likely  to  take  a  long  stride  for- 
ward, a  force  which  may  operate  in  one  of  two 
directions.  I  mean  that  with  the  next  century 
unification  seems  imminent  by  conquest,  if  not  by 
common  consent. 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION   24*7 

It  is  not  easy  to  say  that  the  process  of  concen- 
tration in  human  society  is  a  law  in  the  sense  in 
which  there  is  law  in  natural  science.  But  there 
is  a  general  social  tendency,  seemingly  irrepres- 
sible, operating  steadily  from  the  beginning  of 
history,  for  the  political  units  to  be  larger  and 
ever  larger.  If  this  tendency  is  not  a  law  it  is  an 
extremely  strong  force ;  and  we  may  well  ask  if  it 
is  not  about  to  take  one  of  its  great  steps  forward. 

A  glance  at  the  past  will  show  how  the  process 
has  gone  on.  In  ancient  times  diminutive  states 
were  absorbed  by  larger  but  still  very  small 
states,  which  in  turn  were  welded  into  so-called 
confederacies,  or  leagues,  which  at  last  became 
integrated  states.  The  concentration  went  for- 
ward in  cycles,  one  empire  rising  in  power  until  it 
ruled  most  of  its  known  world,  and  then  it  broke 
into  pieces  through  its  lack  of  cohesive  power. 
Thus  it  was  with  Babylon,  Assyria,  Persia, 
Greece,  and  Rome.  Whenever  the  bubble  burst 
the  process  of  unification  began  again  immedi- 
ately, and  on  a  larger  scale.  After  the  fall  of 
Rome  it  was  again  set  in  motion  in  an  area  that 
included  most  of  Europe,  the  unifying  hand  be- 
longing to  Charlemagne,  king  of  the  Franks. 


248'      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

His  personal  valor  won  the  triumph  of  his  will, 
but  his  empire  fell  away  soon  after  he  relaxed  his; 
hold  upon  it. 

Then  began  a  rebuilding  process.  Feudal 
states  evolved  out  of  clashing  duchies,  counties, 
and  bishoprics.  Immediately  feudal  states  be- 
gan to  devour  one  another.  With  each  century 
the  unit  of  government  became  larger.  At  last 
rose  the  great  power  of  Spain,  so  great  that  it 
became  a  threat  to  other  powers,  and  then  fol- 
lowed a  series  of  wars  to  decide  whether  or  not 
Spain  should  be  the  supreme  state  in  Europe, 
and  Spain  lost.  A  century  later  France  seemed 
to  be  seeking  to  establish  herself  in  the  same  kind 
of  supremacy,  and  again  the  combined  force  of 
Europe  was  necessary  to  break  her  purposes. 
Still  later  came  the  Napoleonic  wars,  in  which 
Europe  seemed  for  a  moment  to  be  subjected  by 
one  central  will,  but  again  it  was  saved  through 
great  suffering.  To  some  people  it  seemed  that 
the  Napoleonic  attempt  would  be  the  last. 

Of  these  modern  struggles  in  Europe  it  is  seen 
that  each  has  been  harder  than  the  struggle  that 
preceded  it.     That  is  because  in  each  the  imple- 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION       ^49 

merits  and  organization  of  warfare  were  im- 
proved as  compared  with  the  former  struggle,  and 
because  states  were  stronger  and  more  capable  of 
endurance.  It  is  also  evident  that  each  of  these 
great  wars  was  the  result  of  the  ambition  of  one 
sovereign,  supported  by  a  strong  and  well  united 
nobility,  while  in  each  case  the  most  effective  re- 
sistance was  offered  by  the  states  in  which  some 
degree  of  self-government  had  been  adopted. 

The  struggle  that  now  exists  is  the  highest 
manifestation  of  this  tendency  to  unification  that 
the  world  has  seen  since  the  fall  of  Rome.  Al- 
though Napoleon  seemed  at  certain  moments  in 
his  career  to  stand  nearer  absolute  success  than 
Germany  now  stands,  he  never  really  gained  as 
much  as  the  kaiser  now  holds ;  for  he  won  his  suc- 
cesses against  the  poorly  trained  and  dispirited 
troops  of  Prussia,  Austria,  and  Spain,  while  the 
Germans  have  won  what  they  have  won  against 
some  of  the  best  troops  of  history.  Moreover, 
Napoleon's  power  was  founded  on  his  suc- 
cess solely,  while  the  German  victories  rest  on 
the  long  established  and  certain  foundation  of  the 
German  empire.     It  seems  reasonable  to  say  that 


^50      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Europe  stands  today  nearer  to  unification  than 
it  has  stood  since  the  fall  of  Charlemagne's 
power. 

Two  great  combinations  are  fighting  for  mas- 
tery. One  has  the  avowed  purpose  of  extending 
its  power  until  it  is  in  a  fair  way  to  absorb  the 
rest  of  the  states  one  after  the  other.  The  other 
group  fights  to  beat  off  the  fate  that  threatens, 
and  it  acknowledges  that  it  cannot  succeed  unless 
it  crushes  its  opponents  into  such  a  state  as  will 
take  from  them  the  desire  and  the  power  to  at- 
tempt another  war  for  supremacy.  Whichever 
side  wins,  the  other  will  feel  an  impulse  to  con- 
tinue to  act  in  alliance.  And  we  may  have  a 
Europe  of  two  great  federal  states,  with  the 
little  states  at  their  mercy. 

For  example,  how  can  Great  Britain  and 
France  ever  be  opponents  again,  as  in  the  old 
days?  The  sense  of  common  sacrifices  would  of 
itself  make  them  more  than  friends,  but  the  con- 
sciousness that  each  depends  on  the  other  in  deal- 
ing with  the  great  danger  will  never  fail  them, 
and  it  will  force  them  into  some  kind  of  political 
union.  In  the  same  way,  we  should  expect  to 
see  a  greatly   altered  relation  between   Great 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION       251 

Britain  and  her  colonies.  Three-quarters  of  a 
million  of  colonial  defenders  constitute  a  contri- 
bution that  demands  reward.  As  the  colonies 
depend  on  the  mother  country  for  some  important 
elements  of  defense,  and  Great  Britain  cannot 
comfort  herself  with  the  assurance  of  safety  un- 
less she  has  a  broad  imperial  power  for  its  basis, 
it  would  seem  natural  to  expect  some  kind  of  im- 
perial union.  As  to  Belgium,  when  she  escapes 
from  the  grasp  of  Germany,  what  mind  has  the 
ingenuity  to  foresee  her  fate?  If  she  relies  on 
the  promise  of  neutralization,  she  is  again  tempt- 
ing fate.  If  she  is  annexed  to  France,  with  some 
kind  of  autonomy,  German  enmity  will  be 
aroused. 

Probably  her  fate  is  to  be  bound  up  with  the 
fate  of  the  other  small  states  of  Europe,  states 
which  in  the  present  war  are  hardly  entirely 
sovereign.  Holland,  Denmark,  Norway,  Swe- 
den, Switzerland,  Greece,  and  Portugal  have  lost 
something  of  the  power  to  direct  their  internal 
aifairs.  In  war  they  have  had  a  lesson  of  the 
necessity  of  bending  to  the  will  of  an  external 
government,  which  they  will  probably  remember 
many  times  in  the  days  of  peace.     When  once  a 


^52      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

state  has  yielded  at  the  dictation  of  a  neighbor, 
and  made  money  out  of  it,  the  next  time  it  is 
pressed  yielding  becomes  an  easier  thing.  The 
fate  of  these  small  states  in  a  possible  era  of  fierce 
competition  between  two  great  groups  would  be 
very  perplexing.  In  an  era  of  peace  through 
federation,  says  the  advocate  of  peace,  it  would 
be  much  happier. 

In  short,  it  is  a  practical  question  that  our 
idealist  puts  to  us.  Here  is  a  world  that  has  gone 
mad,  shall  it  not  turn  to  reason  again?  The  old 
system  has  broken  down,  shall  we  try  to  make  it 
work  again?  To  do  so  will  lead  us  to  just  the 
disaster  that  now  overwhelms  us.  Shall  we 
not  try  a  plan  which  will  not  cost  us  in  money 
half  what  the  old  system  of  preparation  cost,  and 
which  if  it  fails  cannot  be  more  of  a  failure  than 
the  old  system  has  proved?  If  autocracy  stands 
in  the  way,  let  us  hope  that  autocracy  will  give 
way  before  the  march  of  the  spirit  of  the  times. 
And  finally,  the  law  of  unification  is  working  so 
strongly  in  these  days  of  international  relations, 
that  we  are  at  last  at  the  point  at  which  we 
cannot  longer  elect  to  remain  distinct  in  our  na- 
tional activities.     We  must  choose  between  a 


ARGUMENTS  FOR  FEDERATION       253 

world  state  through  conquest,  and  a  world  state 
through  mutual  agreement.  Which  shall  we 
take?  To  try  to  go  on  with  the  states  entirely- 
distinct,  is  to  invite  their  conquest  by  a  great 
state. 


CHAPTER  XII 

A   FEDERATION   OF   NATIONS 

Taking  into  consideration  the  obstacles  and 
the  advantages  summarized  in  the  two  preceding 
chapters  what  are  we  going  to  do  when  the  war 
comes  to  an  end?  The  easiest  and  most  likely 
thing  is  to  adjust  ourselves  as  quickly  and  quietly 
as  possible  to  the  peace  that  is  given  to  us,  take 
up  the  old  problems  of  living  as  nearly  as  we  can 
where  we  left  them  in  1914 — or  in  1917,  when 
the  war  began  for  the  United  States — and  trust 
to  our  good  stars  to  guide  us  to  a  happy  haven. 
But  if  there  is  one  thing  this  war  has  shown,  it 
is  that  trusting  to  stars  is  not  a  safe  protection 
against  war.  The  only  thing  sensible  people 
ought  to  count  on  in  these  days  is  the  judgment 
of  their  capable  and  efficient  minds.  And  it 
seems  that  the  suggestion  of  the  men  who  wish  to 
obtain  peace  by  cooperation  is  worthy  of  the  most 
careful  debate  by  men  who  have  the  best  interest 
of  humanity  at  heart. 

When  the  war  ends  it  may  be  that  the  world 

254 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  255 

will  not  have  arrived  at  the  time  when  such  a 
scheme  can  be  adopted,  but  we  should  not  be 
hasty  in  saying  so.  It  is  not  a  scheme  to  be  dis- 
posed of  by  newspaper  editors,  who  rarely  have 
time  to  weigh  the  conditions  of  such  a  serious  mat- 
ter, or  of  senators  and  representatives,  whose 
views  arise  out  of  party  interests,  or  of  high 
officials  as  a  class,  who  are  usually  overburdened 
with  administrative  matters.  It  is  a  thing  for 
all  the  people  to  consider,  and  in  order  that  it 
may  have  the  fairest  and  most  conspicuous  hear- 
ing, there  should  be  a  great  world  congress,  not 
composed  of  theorists  merely,  but  of  the  most 
practical  statesmen,  who  will  take  up  the  matter 
in  a  spirit  of  friendliness,  with  the  intention  of 
adopting  the  scheme  if  it  can  be  received  in  a 
manner  that  warrants  the  hope  of  success. 

Every  nation  in  the  world  has  reason  to  desire 
the  establishment  of  an  enduring  peace;  but  the 
United  States  has  a  larger  interest  in  such  an 
issue  of  the  war  than  any  other  nation.  Since  we 
became  a  nation  we  have  gone  on  developing 
along  peaceful  lines.  Having  had  no  reason  to 
fear  our  neighbors  and  being  so  remote  from 
Europe  that  we  were  not  likely  to  be  molested 


256      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

from  that  part  of  the  world,  we  formed  our  insti- 
tutions on  the  basis  of  peace.  Our  public  ideals, 
our  sense  of  citizenship,  the  aims  of  our  lawmak- 
ing have  all  been  such  as  are  natural  for  a  nation 
that  has  nothing  to  fear  from  external  enemies. 

One  result  of  the  present  war  is  to  relegate 
these  ideals  into  the  junk-heap  of  institutions,  un- 
less we  can  be  assured  that  peace  is  a  certainty. 
Under  a  system  of  competition  between  states  we 
cannot  afford  to  be  less  ready  for  war  than  any 
other  great  nation.  We  must  have  a  large  navy 
and  a  great  army  ready  to  meet  the  blows  of  any 
power  that  feels  that  it  has  reason  to  interfere 
with  our  peaceful  development.  We  must  be- 
come a  militaristic  republic,  a  thing  which  seems 
against  nature.  When  such  an  attempt  has  been 
made  in  the  past,  the  result  has  been  an  oligarchy. 
In  the  United  States  it  would  probably  lead  to  a 
sad  clash  of  social  classes  mingled  with  vicious 
party  politics  and  timidity  in  the  national  legisla- 
ture. And  yet,  under  a  continuation  of  the  old 
system  it  would  be  folly  to  endeavor  to  get  along 
without  an  army  and  navy  large  enough  to  pro- 
tect us  from  the  initial  swoop  of  some  powerful 
adversary. 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  257 

If  from  this  fate  the  advocate  of  coopera- 
tion can  offer  an  escape,  it  behooves  us  to  listen  to 
his  scheme.  We  should  weigh  it  carefully  and 
be  wilhng  to  take  some  kind  of  a  chance  to  secure 
its  adoption,  if  in  it  there  is  the  possibility  of  suc- 
cessful operation. 

To  be  perfectly  fair  to  those  who  suggest 
leagues  or  federations  we  should  remember  that 
we  are  not  dealing  with  the  ideas  of  pacifists,  as 
such.  The  schemes  that  are  set  forth  by  the 
friends  of  lasting  peace  come  from  men  who  are 
giving  all  their  energies  to  the  prosecution  of  the 
war.  They  believe,  as  much  as  any  of  us,  that 
the  war  should  be  pressed  with  every  ounce  of  the 
nation's  strength.  They  are  fighting  as  hard  as 
any  one  in  the  country,  and  they  desire  the  defeat 
of  Germany  as  much  as  any  soldier  or  statesman 
in  the  world.  They  are  fighting  to  establish  a 
basis  on  which  the  peace  of  the  world  can  be  built. 
They  are  not  cranks,  and  even  if  they  are  mis- 
taken, they  are  honestly  trying  to  call  mankind 
to  the  better  way. 

One  of  their  suggestions  is  a  league  of  peace, 
to  be  composed  of  the  civilized  nations.  As  we 
have  seen,  it  is  loosely  organized  and  does  not 


258      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

allow  the  central  authority  of  the  league  enough 
power  to  punish  a  state  that  tries  to  withdraw 
from  the  league.  Nor  does  it  grant  the  central 
authority  the  right  to  punish  a  state  which,  after 
submitting  its  case  to  the  proposed  tribunal  of 
arbitration  and  losing  the  decision,  decides  to  go 
to  war  in  defiance  of  the  tribunal's  judgment. 
What  would  Germany  do,  for  example,  if  she 
had  lost  such  a  judgment  and  did  not  wish  to 
accept  her  defeat?  Strong  and  well  prepared 
for  war,  she  might  disregard  all  respect  for  the 
opinion  of  the  world,  if  she  felt  that  her  future 
was  at  stake,  and  we  can  hardly  doubt  that  her 
own  people  would  support  her. 

Connected  with  the  idea  of  a  league  is  the  plan, 
advocated  by  those  who  place  respect  for  law 
above  all  other  considerations,  for  creating  a  high 
court  of  judicature,  with  judges  selected  from  all 
nations,  which  shall  have  authority  to  try  and 
give  judgment  on  all  disputes  of  nations.  As  a 
part  of  a  strongly  organized  federation  such  a 
court  would  have  great  influence,  but  if  it  existed 
under  a  league  it  could  hardly  have  enough 
authority  to  secure  the  obedience  of  the  great 
states.     As  for  the  small  states,  they  nevef  give 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  259 

trouble  any  how,  except  as  they  act  in  association 
with  some  great  state,  or  as  they  are  threatened 
by  some  great  power.  No  union  for  peace  can 
accomplish  its  object  that  does  not  deal  with  the 
great  states,  and  any  scheme  suggested  may  leave 
the  small  states  out  of  consideration.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  small  states  are  deeply  interested 
in  forming  such  a  union,  since  it  would  give  them 
a  safety  they  could  hardly  get  otherwise. 

The  proposed  plans  for  a  league  of  peace  and 
for  an  international  court  of  arbitration  were  an- 
nounced before  the  war  or  in  its  early  stages. 
They  were  made  with  an  eye  to  the  most  that 
the  nations  could  be  induced  to  give  up  of  their 
control  over  their  own  actions.  It  is  possible  that 
their  authors  would  not  follow  the  same  plans  if 
they  were  forced  to  make  them  today.  The  war 
has  shown  us  several  things.  It  has  revealed 
Germany's  reason  for  opposing  steadily  all  the 
real  peace  plans  at  the  Hague  conferences.  It 
has  shown  us  what  fate  awaits  the  world  after 
the  war,  unless  there  is  a  return  to  reason  and 
cooperation.  It  is  possible  that  in  writing  out 
a  plan  for  peace  today  the  gentlemen  who  met  in 
Carpenters'  Hall,  Philadelphia,  in  June,  1915, 


260      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

would  feel  justified  in  supporting  a  -stronger 
proposition. 

Mr.  H.  N.  Brailsford,  in  a  book  called  A 
League  of  Nations,  London,  1917,  announces  the 
outline  of  a  working  scheme,  which  he  hopes  the 
friends  of  peace  will  consider.  Its  chief  features 
are :  1.  An  international  court  of  justice  to  con- 
sider and  pass  on  justiciable  cases,  with  a  council 
of  conciliation  to  pass  on  non- justiciable  cases, 
and  a  pledge  by  the  states  that  they  will  not  make 
war  nor  mobilize  their  troops  until  the  court  or 
council  has  within  a  stipulated  time  passed  on  the 
several  matters  in  dispute.  2.  An  executive  of 
the  league  to  take  steps,  military  or  economic, 
to  enforce  the  obligations  of  the  members  of  the 
league.  3.  The  guarantee  of  the  right  of  seces- 
sion together  with  the  possibility  of  expelling  a 
state.  4.  A  consideration  of  disarmament  on 
land  and  sea.  5.  An  international  commission 
to  see  that  all  the  signatory  powers  have  access  to 
raw  material  in  manufactures,  with  a  pledge  to 
permit  trading  among  themselves  without  dis- 
crimination and  to  follow  the  "open  door"  policy 
in  trade  with  the  undeveloped  regions  of  the 
world. 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  261 

In  this  scheme  we  see  the  influence  of  the  war. 
The  author  is  brought  to  see  that  some  form  of 
central  authority  to  coerce  a  state  is  necessary. 
On  the  other  hand,  he  does  not  allow  his  league 
to  become  a  law-making  body,  an  omission  that 
goes  far  to  weaken  the  united  efforts  of  the 
league.  Guaranteeing  the  right  of  secession,  also 
shows  that  the  author  of  the  plan  is  unwilling  to 
merge  the  nations  into  a  great  state,  in  which  they 
will  each  give  up  a  portion  of  their  sovereignty. 
His  plan  is  a  little  stronger  than  the  American 
plan  but  it  nevertheless  falls  short  of  being  a  fed- 
eration. 

If  we  are  to  make  a  serious  attempt  to  obtain 
enduring  peace  by  cooperation  it  behooves  us  to 
start  on  the  basis  of  sufficient  force  to  insure 
that  the  attempt  will  be  worth  while.  If  that 
cannot  be  done,  it  is  unwise  to  make  the  attempt, 
since  to  trust  ourselves  at  this  juncture  to  that 
which  we  have  good  reason  to  believe  insufficient 
only  lulls  us  to  a  false  sense  of  security  and  dis- 
sipates resolution  that  might  with  better  effect 
be  used  in  an  opposite  direction.  If  we  do  not 
have  peace  through  cooperation  we  must  main- 
tain   a    sharp    state    of    preparation    for    war. 


a62      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

Furthermore,  no  people  can  be  rallied  to  a  scheme 
which  seems  insufficient  to  them.  Give  them  that 
which  they  can  trust  and  they  can  perhaps  be 
made  to  support  it,  in  spite  of  the  inconveniences 
they  find  in  it. 

Probably  it  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  only 
form  of  united  action  that  can  be  relied  on  is  a 
federation  with  enough  cohesive  force  to  guard 
against  secession,  repress  any  constituent  state 
that  defies  the  united  will,  make  laws  that  concern 
the  purposes  for  which  the  federation  is  formed, 
exercise  the  right  of  interpreting  those  laws  by  a 
system  of  federal  courts,  and  maintain  an  execu- 
tive that  can  make  itself  obeyed.  It  need  not 
have  these  extensive  functions  for  all  the  areas  of 
government,  but  it  should  have  them  for  those 
things  that  concern  the  declaration  of  war  and  the 
preservation  of  peace.  It  means  that  to  escape 
an  era  of  conflict  ending,  perhaps,  in  a  world 
united  through  conquest  as  the  Roman  Empire 
was  united,  we  establish  by  agreement  a  world 
united  through  federation,  as  the  United  States 
of  America  were  united.  A  league  of  nations, 
under  the  plans  suggested  above,  would  be  only 
a  half-way  house  that  would  lead  to  rupture  and 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  ^63 

failure  or  to  some  future  struggle  out  of  which 
a  world  taught  by  experience  might  possibly  form 
"a  more  perfect  union." 

Some  of  the  fundamental  ideas  of  a  federation 
were  embodied,  as  we  have  seen,  in  the  plans  of 
the  Abbe  St.  Pierre  and  the  philosopher,  Kant. 
Living  at  a  time  when  the  state  was  conceived  as 
the  seat  of  power,  they  trusted  to  force  to  execute 
the  will  of  the  suggested  government  that  was  to 
provide  peace.  Bentham,  however,  was  deeply 
impressed  with  morality  as  a  force  for  good  gov- 
ernment, and  he  was  willing  to  trust  his  proposed 
system  to  the  reasonable  impulses  of  men.  To 
him  it  is  possible  to  reply  that  if  men  were  so 
reasonable  that  they  would  respect  an  agreement 
to  settle  disputes  by  arbitration,  they  would  be 
reasonable  enough  to  avoid  the  differences  which 
run  into  such  disputes.  In  our  modern  world 
reason  thrives  best  when  it  is  reenforced  by  au- 
thority. 

The  attempt  of  Alexander  I,  of  Russia,  to  ob- 
tain some  practical  realization  of  the  principle  of 
a  federated  Europe  in  behalf  of  peace  followed 
these  lines  as  closely  as  could  be  expected,  but,  it 
must  be  confessed,  in  a  very  lame  way.     The 


264      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

failure  of  his  efforts  has  been  taken  as  proof  that 
the  idea  is  impracticable.  But  it  does  not  fol- 
low that  it  is  impracticable  to  the  same  extent  and 
in  the  same  way  today  as  in  1815.  No  Metter- 
nich  now  controls  the  policy  of  the  majority  of 
the  European  courts.  Republican  institutions 
exist  to  an  appreciable  extent  in  most  of  them. 
The  mind  of  Europe  is  more  nearly  a  unit  today 
than  a  century  ago,  and  commerce,  travel,  and 
international  sympathy  bind  nations  together  as 
never  before.  Moreover  all  these  unifying  forces 
are  growing  rapidly.  When  the  feeling  engen- 
dered by  the  war  subsides,  and  it  always  does 
subside  after  a  war,  the  nations  will  be  more  con- 
scious of  one  another  and  less  willing  to  chal- 
lenge one  another  than  before  they  engaged  in 
the  present  appalling  struggle.  In  these  things 
there  is  a  hope  that  the  federation  of  Europe  for 
the  preservation  of  peace  would  be  more  possible 
than  in  the  times  of  Metternich.  I  do  not  mean 
that  all  obstacles  are  removed,  but  they  are  fewer 
than  formerly. 

Considering  these  things  I  find  myself  driven, 
in  closing  my  essay,  to  a  serious  examina- 
tion of  the  possibility  of  creating  a  world  federa- 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  265 

tion  out  of  the  chaos  that  now  floats  over  the 
globe — not  an  integrated  world  empire,  with 
power  over  all  phases  of  political  action,  but  a 
federation  that  will  have  authority  to  regulate  the 
forces  that  make  for  war.  If  such  a  thing  could 
be  created  and  accepted  by  the  states  of  the  world, 
it  would  make  the  present  struggle,  with  all  its 
horrors,  the  best  and  most  fortunate  event  that 
has  come  to  humanity  since  the  beginning  of  the 
Christian  era.  If  the  war  should  result  in  the 
thorough  defeat  of  the  present  regime  in  Ger- 
many, followed  by  the  creation  of  a  world  fed- 
eration into  which  Germany  should  be  forced  to 
come,  with  her  pride  so  reduced  that  she  could 
be  kept  obedient  to  the  federation  until  the  virus 
of  world  power  should  get  out  of  her  system,  the 
world  would  have  passed  a  milestone  in  civiliza- 
tion, and  for  our  part  in  it  future  generations 
would  thank  us  to  the  end  of  time. 

The  organization  of  the  American  Union  in 
1787-1789  was  a  similar  process  on  a  smaller 
scale.  So  many  of  its  features  are  analogous  to 
conditions  that  suggest  themselves  in  connection 
with  the  proposition  of  a  world  federation  that  it 
is  worth  while  to  recall  them.     If  we  are  not  led 


266      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

to  conclude  that  a  similar  step  should  be  taken 
at  this  time  in  the  larger  sphere,  we  shall  at  least 
have  a  clearer  idea  of  what  such  a  federation 
would  mean,  and  it  may  happen  that  we  shall 
conclude  that  it  is  not  so  difficult  a  thing  to  estab- 
lish as  appears  on  first  sight. 

Before  the  war  for  independence  the  American 
colonies  it  is  true,  were  not  as  separate  as  the 
present  European  states,  but  they  were  so  dis- 
tinct in  their  ideals  and  purposes  that  no  one 
thought  their  union  possible.  When  Franklin 
proposed  a  very  mild  sort  of  concentration  in 
1754  his  suggestion  was  rejected  in  the  colonies 
because  it  involved  the  surrender  of  some  of  the 
colonial  separateness.  Had  no  pressure  come 
from  the  outside  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  would 
have  forced  the  thirteen  colonies  to  come  together. 

The  external  pressure  was  the  conviction  that 
Great  Britain  was  about  to  adopt  a  policy  by 
which  the  interests  of  the  colonies  would  be  sub- 
servient to  the  interests  of  British  traders,  thus 
destroying  their  partially  avowed  hope  of  a  dis- 
tinctly American  policy.  Then  came  seven  years 
of  war  and  four  years  of  fear  lest  Great  Britain 
should    recover    through    American    dissension 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  267 

what  she  had  lost  in  the  trial  of  arms.  Under 
such  conditions  the  newly  liberated  states  were 
willing  to  form  the  American  union. 

A  similar  pressure  on  the  nations  will  exist  in 
the  burden  of  preparedness  and  the  danger  of  a 
renewal  of  the  present  struggle.  The  last  three 
years  of  conflict  are  more  burdensome  to  the 
world  than  the  seven  years  of  the  American  revo- 
lution to  the  states  engaged  against  Great  Brit- 
ain. Moreover,  the  danger  of  chaotic  conditions 
in  the  future  is  as  great  as  the  danger  that  con- 
fronted the  Americans  in  1787.  Every  period  is 
a  critical  period  in  history,  but  that  which  follows 
the  present  struggle  is  especially  important. 

When  our  revolution  ended  a  majority  of  our 
people  thought  the  old  system  good  enough. 
The  men — and  there  were  many  of  them — ^who 
pointed  out  the  advantages  to  the  western  world 
of  a  great  federated  state  were  pronounced  ideal- 
ists. "Practical"  men  meant  to  go  on  living  in 
a  "practical"  way.  But  the  idealists  were  led  by 
Washington,  Madison,  and  Hamilton,  and  the 
logic  of  events  came  to  their  aid.  Dissensions 
appeared,  taxes  were  not  paid,  and  the  national 
debt  seemed  on  the  verge  of  repudiation.     Then 


268     THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

the  country  was  willing  to  listen  to  the  idealists ; 
and  the  American  federated  state  was  estab- 
lished. 

It  was  received  with  derision  by  the  publicists 
of  Europe.  They  could  not  believe  that  republi- 
can government  would  succeed  in  an  area  as  large 
as  that  of  the  thirteen  states.  Their  fears  were 
not  realized  and  today  most  of  their  descendants 
live  under  republican  government  of  some  form 
or  other.  We  should  not  blame  them  too  much. 
They  had  never  seen  republican  government  op- 
erated on  a  large  scale,  and  they  were  not  able 
to  imagine  that  it  could  operate  on  a  large 
scale.  If  they  could  have  seen  it  working  with 
their  mind's  eye,  they  would  have  had  confidence 
in  its  operation.  The  Americans  were  accus- 
tomed to  using  their  imagination,  and  seeing  the 
"experiment"  working  in  their  imagination,  they 
could  adopt  it  and  make  it  work. 

The  greatest  obstacle  to  "federation"  in  the 
American  constitutional  convention  was  the  jeal- 
ousy of  small  states  toward  the  large  states. 
Since  it  would  have  been  unwise  to  leave  any 
state  out  of  the  proposed  system,  the  small  states 
were  in  a  position  to  make  demands.     When  they 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  269 

were  allowed  equality  in  the  senate  they  became 
quite  reasonable.  This  obstacle  could  hardly 
exist  in  the  formation  of  a  great  federation  for 
the  elimination  of  war ;  for  the  small  states  would 
probably  be  the  first  to  accept  such  a  plan,  as  our 
small  states  were  most  willing  to  adopt  our  con- 
stitution, once  it  was  prepared.  It  would  give 
them  as  perfect  security  as  they  could  desire, 
and  without  such  a  guaranty  their  continued  ex- 
istence is  always  precarious. 

Next  to  the  fears  of  the  small  states  was  the 
unwillingness  of  many  people  in  the  states  to  give 
up  the  idea  that  only  a  state  should  control  the 
happiness  of  its  citizens,  and  that  the  union,  if 
formed,  would  destroy  or  lessen  individual  lib- 
erty. This  idea  inhered  in  whatever  idea  of  state 
sovereignty  the  people  of  the  day  held.  To  form 
a  federation  to  enforce  peace  would  undoubtedly 
limit  to  some  extent  the  sovereignty  of  the  pres- 
ent states  of  Europe.  But  sovereignty  in  itself  is 
worth  nothing.  It  exists  to  give  in  general  some 
forms  of  life  and  dignity  to  states.  If  a  sur- 
render of  part  of  a  state's  sovereignty  will  give 
that  state  immunity  from  wars  perpetually,  is  it 
not  sovereignty  well  exchanged?    No  American 


^70      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

state  suffered  because  it  gave  up  control  over  its 
right  to  make  war,  but,  on  the  contrary,  it  gained 
immensely.  Such  a  right  is  a  costly  necessity,  a 
thing  to  be  held  tenaciously  as  long  as  we  are  in 
a  condition  which  makes  wars  necessary,  but  to 
be  given  up  as  quickly  as  we  can  do  without  it. 

To  enter  a  federation  would  mean  that  individ- 
ual nations  would  give  up  the  right  to  expand 
their  territories.  Germany  could  not  acquire 
more  territory  under  such  a  system,  unless  she 
got  it  by  agreement  of  the  parties  concerned. 
The  British  empire  could  become  no  larger  by 
any  forceful  process.  But  this  would  not  be  a 
hardship.  The  only  real  justification  of  expan- 
sion is  to  enlarge  trade  areas.  A  federation  to 
eliminate  war  would  necessarily  adopt  a  policy 
which  allowed  all  states  an  "open  door"  in  trade. 
This  was  one  of  the  essential  things  in  the  forma- 
tion of  our  union ;  for  we  read  that  no  state  shall 
interfere  within  its  borders  with  the  rights  of  the 
citizens  of  other  states  to  trade  there.  Under 
such  circumstances  territorial  expansion  becomes 
useless. 

When  the  American  states  were  trying  to  form 
that  simple  kind  of  union  that  was  expressed  in 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  271 

the  articles  of  confederation,  Maryland  long  re- 
fused to  join.  She  was  jealous  of  the  great  size 
of  her  neighbors  and  especially  of  Virginia, 
whose  claim  to  the  Northwest  was  in  general  not 
disputed.  Experience  showed  that  her  fears 
were  groundless.  Virginia  not  only  never  be- 
came a  menace  to  Maryland,  but  she  soon  realized 
that  her  wide  boundaries  were  worthless  to  her 
under  a  system  which  guaranteed  her  against 
quarrels  with  her  neighbors,  and  as  a  result  she 
surrendered  her  Northwestern  lands.  Under  a 
federation  an  undeveloped  part  of  Asia  or  Africa 
would  be  open  as  freely  to  Germans  as  to  others 
for  trade,  settlement,  and  the  happiness  of  life, 
just  as  our  Northwest  was  open  to  Virginians, 
Pennsylvanians,  and  New  Englanders  alike. 
The  only  thing  that  Virginia  gave  up  in  relin- 
quishing her  lands  was  the  right  to  call  herself  a 
big  state,  that  is,  self-glorification,  a  thing  the 
nations  would  have  to  give  up  in  a  federation. 
But  might  it  not  be  well  exchanged  for  the  right 
to  call  themselves  safe  from  warfare? 

When  the  American  constitution  was  being  de- 
bated the  small  states  declared  they  would  not 
"federate"   unless   they   were   given   privileges 


272      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

which  guaranteed  them  against  absorption  by  the 
large  states,  while  the  large  states  declared  they 
would  not  "federate"  unless  it  was  arranged  that 
the  small  states  should  not  have  the  power  to  de- 
feat measures  that  were  for  the  conmion  good. 
Each  side  was  very  honest  in  suspecting  the  other, 
and  great  patience  and  persistence  were  necessary 
to  bring  them  together  in  a  compromise  which 
gave  neither  what  it  at  first  demanded.  For 
us  it  is  interesting  to  observe  that  in  actual  prac- 
tice there  has  never  been  a  time  when  the  large 
states  seemed  to  threaten  to  devour  the  small 
states,  nor  a  time  when  the  small  states  placed 
their  welfare  against  any  measure  that  concerned 
the  general  good  of  the  country.  The  union 
formed,  the  people  began  to  debate  questions  that 
had  nothing  to  do  with  this  or  that  state,  general 
policies  that  cut  across  great  sections  of  the  fed- 
eration, without  regard  to  the  states  as  such. 

It  seems  that  if  a  federation  of  Europe  were 
once  formed  a  development  might  be  expected  of 
a  somewhat  similar  nature.  At  least,  it  is  not 
unlikely  that  the  clashes  predicted  by  the  doubt- 
ers would  not  be  as  violent  as  they  fear.  It 
seems  certain  that  at  once  a  new  class  of  issues 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  273 

would  engage  the  minds  of  the  pohticians,  issues 
that  would  spring  from  the  general  interests  that 
were  conceived  essential  to  life  in  the  new  group- 
ing. It  is  not  possible  to  say  what  clashes  might 
grow  out  of  these  general  issues,  but  it  is  probable 
that  the  genius  of  man  would  be  as  competent  to 
take  care  of  them  as  to  direct  the  issues  that 
will  arise  if  the  world  goes  on  under  a  system 
like  that  now  in  use ;  for  clashes  we  must  have  in 
any  event.  After  aU,  humanity  has  to  manage 
its  own  problems,  and  there  will  never  be  a  gov- 
ernment under  which  it  will  not  have  all  it  can 
do  to  make  the  doubts  of  today  resolve  themselves 
into  the  confidence  of  tomorrow. 

In  our  American  constitution-making  one 
often  heard  the  question,  "What  will  become  of 
the  liberties  of  the  citizen  of  the  state  under  the 
federation?"  The  answer  was  well  made  at  the 
time :  "Will  not  the  citizen  of  the  state  still  be  the 
citizen  of  the  state,  and  will  not  the  state  continue 
to  guarantee  him  all  that  it  can  now  guarantee 
him?  Does  he  not  also  pass  under  the  protection 
of  the  federation  as  truly  as  the  citizens  of  any  of 
the  states?  All  that  the  federation  proposes  to 
do  is  to  take  charge  of  the  functions  that  concern 


^74      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

the  things  for  which  the  federation  is  founded, 
and  these  are  things  to  which  the  states  are  not 
so  well  adjusted  as  a  united  government."  And 
so  it  proved  in  practice.  No  American  has  ever 
had  reason  to  think  his  liberty  lessened  because 
the  union  was  formed ;  and  he  has  been  immensely 
stronger  in  all  his  rights  on  the  high  seas,  in  trav- 
eling abroad,  in  being  safe  from  the  burdens  of 
foreign  wars,  and  in  his  rights  of  trade  in  the  ut- 
termost parts  of  the  earth;  for  he  has  been  the 
citizen  of  a  great  federation  of  small  states. 

Applying  the  analogy  to  the  suggested  federa- 
tion of  the  world  it  appears  that  under  such  a 
system  the  citizen  of  France,  Great  Britain,  Rus- 
sia, or  the  United  States  would  in  nowise  lose  his 
rights  under  his  own  government,  and  he  would 
gain  vastly  in  relief  from  burdens.  He  would 
no  longer  have  to  think  of  wars,  his  trade  rela- 
tions would  be  adjusted  in  such  a  way  that  no 
other  man  could  have  what  he  did  not  have.  In 
short,  for  all  the  purposes  for  which  the  federa- 
tion was  founded  he  would  stand  on  equal  footing 
with  any  other  man,  and  for  the  purposes  for 
which  his  own  state  existed  he  would  have  all  the 
rights  he  had  before.     His  only  losses  would  be 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  275 

in  casting  off  the  burdens  that  grow  out  of  inter- 
national rivalry  under  the  present  system. 

One  of  the  things  for  which  the  American 
union  was  created  was  the  payment  of  the  revolu- 
tionary debts.  Compared  with  the  debts  the 
colony  had  incurred  individually  before  the  revo- 
lution, and  compared  with  their  ability  to  pay 
them  at  the  time,  these  debts  were  large,  although 
they  proved,  under  the  union,  a  very  small  bur- 
den. It  was  the  sense  of  security  under  a  gov- 
ernment which  had  eliminated  the  possibility  of 
interstate  wars  that  made  the  burden  light. 

The  amount  of  indebtedness  that  the  several 
nations  in  the  present  war  have  contracted  seems 
appalling.  It  would  become  a  comparatively 
light  burden,  if  we  could  feel  that  for  the  future 
the  world  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  pay  it.  The 
waste  of  interstate  rivalry,  the  burden  of  prepara- 
tions for  future  wars,  the  loss  to  industry  through 
uncertainties  on  account  of  wars,  all  these  things 
would  disappear  from  the  consideration  of  the 
financiers,  the  credit  of  a  federated  world  would 
become  excellent,  and  bonds  that  are  likely  to  be 
quoted  very  low  when  the  artificial  stimulus  they 
get  from  patriotism  is  taken  away  would  be  con- 


276      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

sidered  better  investments  than  any  bonds  ever 
offered  under  the  existing  system  of  states.  The 
capitalists  of  the  world,  like  the  American  cap- 
italists of  1787-1789,  should  be  the  most  earnest 
supporters  of  federation. 

In  the  United  States  a  great  deal  has  been  said 
about  "entangling  alliances."  As  the  term  was 
used  a  century  ago  it  meant  an  alliance  that  was 
likely  to  make  us  parties  to  the  quarrels  of  Euro- 
pean states,  one  against  the  other.  Into  such  a 
maze  of  selfish  maneuvers  it  would  never  be  well 
for  us  to  enter.  But  to  take  our  place  in  a  fed- 
eration to  preserve  peace  would  be  quite  another 
thing.  That  it  would  pledge  us  to  the  discharge 
of  a  duty  is  not  to  be  doubted;  but  we  should  be 
entering  no  intrigue.  We  should  be  doing  the 
most  patriotic  thing  possible;  for  the  very  es- 
sence of  the  act  would  be  to  protect  ourselves 
from  the  possibility  of  being  drawn  into  "en- 
tangling alliances"  with  Europe.  Let  us  sup- 
pose that  the  old  system  is  continued,  and  that 
Germany  has  a  mind  to  pay  off  what  she  may 
consider  an  old  score.  Suppose  she  tries  to  set 
Mexico  up  against  us,  or  to  induce  Japan  to 
attack  the  Philippines,  or  to  interfere  with  any 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  m 

weaker  American  government  in  such  a  way  as 
to  threaten  the  integrity  of  the  Monroe  doctrine, 
have  we  not  an  "entanghng  aUiance"  on  hand? 
If  Germany  emerges  from  the  present  war  strong 
enough  to  threaten  the  world  as  before  the  war, 
when  other  nations  found  it  necessary  to  form 
ententes  against  her,  we  shall  not  dare  remain 
outside  of  some  kind  of  alhance  that  will  be 
formed  to  check  her  pretensions.  World  federa- 
tion is  the  guaranty  against  the  formation  of 
"entangling  alliances"  on  the  part  of  the  United 
States. 

In  drawing  the  parallels  between  the  forma- 
tion of  our  union  and  the  possible  creation  of  a 
federation  of  nations,  it  is  hard  to  avoid  the  infer- 
ence that  the  two  systems  lead  to  the  same  end, 
federated  general  government.  And  yet  they 
are  not  the  same.  Our  union  was  created  to  take 
over  a  large  area  of  government  which  the  indi- 
vidual states  could  not  conduct  successfully.  It 
has  a  direct  bearing  on  the  citizens  of  the  states, 
it  even  has  its  own  citizenship,  although  it  was  a 
long  time  after  1787  before  it  was  defined.  It 
has  popular  elections,  a  postal  system,  and  hun- 
dreds of  other  things  which  no  one  would  allot  to 


278      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

the  kind  of  federation  discussed  here.  It  has 
been  cited  only  for  the  argument  that  can  legiti- 
mately be  derived  from  analogous  conditions  re- 
lating to  the  difficulties  of  forming  the  union. 

A  world  federation,  on  the  other  hand,  could 
have  only  one  main  purpose,  the  preservation  of 
peace.  No  other  bonds  should  knit  it  together 
except  those  which  exist  for  that  purpose.  They 
would  be  strong  enough  for  the  strain  that  would 
be  put  upon  them,  and  no  stronger.  They  would 
be  made  for  a  specific  object  by  persons  who 
would  be  careful  that  they  were  properly  made. 
A  federation  of  this  kind  could  not  be  adopted 
until  it  was  approved  by  the  authorities  in  the 
constituent  nations,  which  would  guarantee  that 
it  did  not  sacrifice  the  individuality  of  those 
nations.  In  fact,  so  great  would  be  the  obstacles 
at  this  point  that  it  is  safe  to  say  that  there  would 
be  more  danger  that  the  federation  would  be  too 
weak  rather  than  that  it  would  be  too  strong. 

Here  ends  this  statement  of  the  arguments  for 
the  only  possible  plan  of  cooperation  that  will,  if 
adopted,  give  the  world  enduring  peace.  It 
would  be  easier  to  form  a  league  to  enforce  peace 


A  FEDERATION  OF  NATIONS  S79 

by  arbitration  and  moral  suasion  than  to  form  a 
federation  with  power  sufficient  to  enforce  its 
decrees.  But  a  league  would  in  all  probability 
be  flouted  by  the  states  as  often  as  their  interests 
seemed  to  them  to  make  it  advisable.  Reverting 
to  the  analogy  of  our  own  formative  period  in 
national  government,  a  league  would  be  like  our 
articles  of  confederation,  weak  and  insufficient 
because  they  did  not  authorize  the  central  govern- 
ment to  coerce  a  recalcitrant  state.  As  a  step 
toward  a  more  desirable  end  the  articles  of  fed- 
eration were  worth  while:  as  a  similar  step  a 
league  of  nations  might  be  better  than  nothing, 
but  it  would  not  lead  to  the  end  to  which  the 
world  is  looking. 

The  idea  of  a  federation  of  nations  has  been 
behind  many  a  philosopher's  dream.  Jesus 
looked  forward  to  it  when  he  offered  the  world 
"my  peace,"  and  many  another  has  held  that 
somewhere  in  the  shadowy  future  a  millennial  era 
of  super-government  and  peace  will  fall  upon 
the  earth.  It  would  be  a  great  thing  if  at  this 
day  we  could  take  a  step  toward  the  realization 
of  an  ideal  whose  universality  attests  its  desir- 
ability.    The  "fruits  of  Waterloo"  were  lost  a 


^80      THE  LOST  FRUITS  OF  WATERLOO 

century  ago  by  a  wide  margin,  due  to  the  less  per- 
fect comprehension  the  world  then  had  of  the 
advantages  of  federated  peace.  If  they  are  lost 
at  the  end  of  this  war  it  will  be  by  a  smaller 
discrepancy.  Some  time  they  will  be  secured, 
not  because  men  have  dreamed  of  them;  but  be- 
cause, in  such  a  case  at  least,  dreams  are  but  "sup- 
pressed desires." 

The  writer  of  a  book  can  do  no  more  than  raise 
his  voice  to  the  people  who  do  things.  To  that 
large  class  who  make  things  happen  he  can  only 
give  impulse  and  hope.  His  cry  goes  to  those 
who  govern,  to  those  who  direct  the  press,  and  to 
all  citizens  who  feel  responsibility  for  the  forma- 
tion of  good  public  opinion.  If  he  speaks  to 
them  faithfully  and  without  prejudice  or  mere 
enthusiasm,  he  has  done  all  he  can  do.  The  re- 
sults are  on  the  knees  of  the  gods. 


INDEX 


Adams    John   Quincy    and   the  disruption  of,  69.    See  Holy- 
Monroe  Doctrine,  79.  Alliance. 

Agadir,  171.  Alsace  and  Lorraine,  93. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Conference  of,  American  Peace  Society,  37. 

66.  Armageddon,   1-5,    15. 

Albania,  in  the  Balkan  war  of  Austria  and  the  Greek  war  of 


1912-1913,  89,  125,  126;  or- 
igin of,  106,  108,  121. 
Alexander  I,  of  Russia,  155; 
his  peace  plans,  36,  45-63; 
his  personal  qualities,  46;  his 
education,  46-48;  and  the 
Treaty  of  Tilsit,  49;  eyes 
opened  to  Napoleon,  50;  his 
friendship  for  France,  51; 
**grouped"  by  Castlereagh, 
52;  signs  treaty  of  Chau- 
mont,  52;  enters  Paris  in 
1814,     54;     at     Congress     of 


independence,  77;  and  the 
revolution  of  1848,  86;  and 
Congress  of  Berlin,  89,  113, 
114;  and  Balkan  War  of 
1912-1913,  89;  and  the  Triple 
Alliance,  93;  acquires  rights 
in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
115;  and  the  revolt  in  Crete, 
119;  takes  over  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  120;  interest  in 
the  Balkan  War  of  1912- 
1913,  124-126,  128.  See  Met- 
ternich. 


Vienna,  55;  and  Poland,  56;      Austria-Hungary,   see   Austria, 
and   the    Holy   Alliance,   59-      Autocracy,  an  obstacle  to  per- 


64;  and  Baroness  Kriidener, 
60;  and  the  Conference  of 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  66;  at  Con- 
ference at  Troppau,  68-70; 
his  change  of  policy,  70;  and 
the  Greek  war  of  indepen- 
dence,  77;    and   a   federation       Balance    of   Power,    90;    under 


manent  peace,  216-224;  qual- 
ities of,  217;  in  Germany,  219, 
220-222;  in  Russia,  219;  fu- 
ture bearing  of  German  fi- 
nances on,  242-246. 


of  nations,  263. 
Algeciras,  Conference  at,  168 
Alliance,  the  Treaty  of,  65;  the 
Quadruple,    65,    66,    67;    the 
Quintuple,  66,  67,  68,  69,  79; 


Bismarck's    policy,    93;    after 
Bismarck,  96;  affected  by  the 
Entente  Cordiale,  99;  by  the 
Triple  Entente,  100,  101. 
Balance  of  Power,  failure  of  the 


281 


28a 


INDEX 


theory,  157,  162;  breaks  down 
in  practice,  234-236. 

Balkan  States,  history  of,  103- 
131;  Turkish  rule  over,  104; 
spirit  of  nationality  in,  108; 
growing  power  of,  119;  a 
"tinder-box,"  120;  the  war 
against  Turkey,  122-127;  The 
Balkan  League,  122. 

Balkan  War  of  1912-1913,  89. 

Belgium,  and  the  revolution  of 
1830,  79. 

Bentham,  Jeremy,  on  perpetual 
peace,  32-34;  and  a  federa- 
tion of  nations,  263. 

Berlin,  Congress  of,  89. 

Bethman-HoUweg,  and  the 
Moroccan  question,  171. 

Bismarck,  builder  of  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  91;  policy  to- 
wards France,  92,  93;  and 
the  Three  Emperors'  League, 
93;  and  the  Triple  Alliance, 
93-94;  his  retirement,  95,  143; 
his  German  policy,  140-143; 
not  for  Pan-Germanism,  148; 
his  foreign  policy,  157. 

Boer  war,  Germany's  attitude 
in,  97,  99. 

Bosnia,  108;  Austria  acquires 
rights  in,  115;  taken  over  by 
Austria,  120,  121. 

Brailsford,  H.  N.,  his  idea  of  a 
league  of  nations,  260. 

Bryce,  Lord,  attitude  toward 
federated  peace,  15. 

Bulgaria,  origin  of,  105,  106;  its 
position  under  Turkey,  108; 
national  feeling  in,  109;  at 
the  Conference  of  Paris,  110; 
in  the  war  of  1877,  113;  "Big 


Bulgaria,"  114;  acquires  East 
Rumelia,  117;  growing  power 
of,  119;  declares  complete  in- 
dependence, 120;  in  the  Bal- 
kan War  of  1912-1913,  122- 
127. 
Biilow,  Chancellor  von,  171. 

Canning,  George,  and  the  Span- 
ish Colonies,  78 ;  and  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  79;  welcomes 
end  of  the  Alliance,  83. 

Carnegie  Endowment  for  Inter- 
national Peace,  38. 

Cartels,  compared  with  trusts, 
xiii-xvi. 

Castlereagh,  Lord,  154;  his  rela- 
tions with  Alexander  I,  51; 
and  treaty  of  Chaumont,  52; 
goes  to  Paris,  55;  his  idea  of 
the  Concert  of  Europe,  65; 
and  the  Treaty  of  Alliance, 
65-67;  at  Troppau,  68,  69;  his 
relation  to  the  Concert  of  Eu- 
rope, 74;  his  object,  81. 

Chaumont,  Treaty  of,  52-53; 
Castlereagh  on  the  application 
of,  69. 

"Christian  Republic"  of  Henry 
IV,  24,  25. 

Concentration,  laws  of,  in  so- 
ciety, xii-xvi;  progress  of, 
247-251. 

Concert  of  Europe,  theory  of, 
49,  53,  65;  its  character,  81; 
its  condition  after  the  end  of 
the  Alliance,  84;  and  the 
struggle  of  Mehemet  Ali,  85; 
and  the  Crimean  War,  86; 
and  other  mid-century  wars, 
88;  and  Congress  of  Berlin, 


INDEX 


«83 


89;  and  the  Balkan  War  of 
1912-1913,  89,  124-127;  its 
new  meaning,  90;  and  the 
revolution  of  the  Greeks,  107; 
and  the  Crimean  War,  110; 
defied  by  Moldavia  and  Wal- 
lachia.  111;  and  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  114,  116;  and 
Crete,  118;  defied  by  Balkan 
League,  123;  incompetent  to 
deal  with  the  situation  of 
1913-1914,  130;  and  the  Mo- 
roccan incidents,  167-173; 
failure  of,  in  1914,  180-182, 
201,  234-236. 

Conference  of  Paris,  see  Paris. 

Congo,  French,  given  up,  172. 

Congress  of  Berlin,  89,  113. 

Congress  of  Vienna,  disappoint- 
ments of  the,  55;  cause  of  its 
failure,  58. 

Congress  of  London  on  Balkan 
situation,  1913,  124. 

Contract  theory  of  the  origin  of 
the  state,  232-234. 

Crete,  revolt  in,  118. 

Crimean  War,  86,  109. 

Cuza,  John,  111. 

Cyprus,  handed  over  to  Great 
Britain,  116. 

Debt,  public,  makes  for  feder- 
ation, 238-242. 

Delcass6,  Th^ophile,  his  foreign 
policy,  98,  100,  101,  163-168; 
and  the  Fashoda  incident, 
162;  building  up  French  colo- 
nial power,  163-168;  dismissed 
at  the  demand  of  Germany, 
167. 

Democracy,    not    an    absolute 


safeguard    against    recurring 

wars,  223. 
Dual  Alliance,  95y  96. 
Dueling,  how  abolished,  232. 
Dum-dum  bullets,  3,  5. 

Economic  competition  as  an  ob- 
stacle to  peace,  206-211. 

Economic  laws  not  unchange- 
able, 210;  sometimes  opposed 
to  nationality,  216. 

England,  see  Great  Britain. 

"Entangling  alliances"  and  a 
federation,  276. 

Entente  Cordiale,  The,  formed, 
99,  162. 

Fashoda  Incident,  the,  98, 162. 

Federation,  definition  of,  23. 

Federation  of  Nations,  why  it 
would  now  have  better  chance 
of  success  than  in  1815-1818, 
72-76 ;  discussion,  261-264 ; 
why  a  federation  is  better 
than  a  league,  261-273;  anal- 
ogy  with  the  American  con- 
stitution, 267-276;  differences 
pointed  out,  277 ;  the  idea  held 
up,  278-280;  arguments  for, 
229-253. 

Ferdinand,  Crown  Prince  of 
Austria,  178,  180. 

Fez,  the  French  in,  171. 

Finances,  national  debts  make 
for  federation,  238-242,  275. 

France,  attitude  toward  feder- 
ated peace,  15;  Alexander  I*s 
friendship  for,  51-53;  and  the 
Spanish  colonies,  78 ;  the  revo- 
lution of   1830,   79;   and  the 


284 


INDEX 


wars  of  Mehemet  Ali,  85;  and 
the  revolution  of  1848,  86; 
and  the  Crimean  War,  86; 
War  against  Prussia,  188;  in 
Franco-Prussian  War,  91 ; 
later  relations  with  Germany, 
91;  new  attitude  towards 
Great  Britain,  97;  influence 
of  Delcass6,  98;  and  Entente 
Cordiale,  99;  and  Triple  Enr- 
tente,  100;  and  the  revolu- 
tion of  the  Greeks,  107;  ex- 
tends rule  over  Tunis,  116;  in 
Franco-Prussian  War,  141 ; 
military  training  in,  147;  for- 
eign policy  under  Delcass6, 
163-168;  in  Morocco,  164,  166- 
173;  gives  up  the  Congo  for 
Morocco,  172;  her  position 
after  war  with  Prussia,  201; 
future  relations  with  Great 
Britain,  250. 

Francis  Joseph,  of  Austria,  178. 

Franco-Prussian  War,  88;  and 
the  Balance  of  Power,  90. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  his  propo- 
sal for  union,  266. 

Frederick  William  III  and  the 
Holy  Alliance,  62. 

Freedom  of  the  seas,  159. 

Gentz,  Frederick  von,  on  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  55-57,  58. 

George,  Lloyd,  attitude  toward 
federated  peace  15. 

Gerard,  James  W.,  xiii. 

Germany,  attitude  of,  toward 
federated  peace,  13;  opposed 
plans  of  Hague  Conference, 
38;  and  the  revolutions  of 
1848,    86;    under    Bismarck's 


policy,  93-95;  under  his  suc- 
cessors, 95;  policy  during  the 
Boer  War,  97;  growing  an- 
tagonism toward  Great  Brit- 
ain, 97;  later  relations  with 
Austria,  91;  and  Three  Em- 
perors' League,  93;  his  influ- 
ence for  peace,  94,  95;  under 
his  successors,  94;  attitude 
during  the  Boer  War,  99; 
gets  nothing  at  the  Congress 
of  Berlin,  117;  and  the  Balkan 
War  of  1912-1913,  125,  128; 
ideals  and  organization  of, 
132-153;  her  broken  faith, 
132-134;  and  Mittel-Europa, 
134;  a  better  Germany,  134, 
136,  146-148;  development  of 
pernicious  ideals  in,  136-138; 
under  the  heel  of  Napoleon, 
138;  re-making  the  army  of 
Prussia,  139;  under  Bis- 
marck's lead,  140-143;  Kultur 
of,  144;  and  Militarism,  146- 
148;  the  work  of  intellectual 
leaders,  148-152 ;  national  ego- 
tism, 153;  peaceful  attitude 
under  Bismarck,  157;  under 
Wilhelm  II,  158;  growth  of 
manufactures,  158;  building 
a  navy,  159;  growing  military 
power  of,  160;  Pan-German 
hopes,  161;  isolated  by  Del- 
cass^  during  the  Boer  War, 
162;  eyes  turned  to  Turkey, 
165;  in  the  Moroccan  inci- 
dents, 166-173;  attempt  to 
win  over  Great  Britain,  174; 
alarmed  by  growing  power  of 
rivals,  176;  her  plans  in  be- 
ginning the  Great  War,  177; 


INDEX 


285 


short-sighted  policy  in  war, 
182,  183;  a  mild  treatment 
after  her  defeat,  194,  196-202 ; 
economic  reasons  for  engag- 
ing in  war,  209;  autocracy  in, 
219,  220-222,  224;  parties  in, 
225;  influence  of  munition 
makers,  226;  influence  of  the 
military  men,  227;  future  in- 
fluences on  surrounding  na- 
tions, 235-240;  future  rela- 
tions with  Austria,  237-239; 
influences  of  finances,  238- 
242 ;  autocracy  threatened, 
242-246;  in  a  possible  league 
of  peace,  258;  reasons  for  op- 
posing, 259.  See  also  Bis- 
marck; see  Prussia. 

Grand  Design,  of  Henry  IV,  24, 
25. 

Great  Britain,  attitude  toward 
federated  peace,  15;  attitude 
towards  peace  in  the  Napol- 
eonic wars,  45;  approached  by 
Alexander  I  to  establish  a 
peace  agreement,  48;  and  the 
Spanish  American  colonies, 
78;  and  Turkey,  85;  and  the 
Crimean  War,  86;  and  the 
Conference  of  Paris  of  1856, 
87;  policy  during  Bismarck's 
era,  QQ'^  new  attitude  towards 
Germany,  96 ;  new  attitude  to- 
wards France,  97;  forms  the 
Entente  Cordiale,  99;  and  the 
revolution  of  the  Greeks,  107; 
in  the  Crimean  War,  109;  at 
the  conference  of  Paris,  110; 
influence  over  Turkey,  112, 
115-117;  at  Congress  of  Ber- 
lin, 113,  115-117;  and  Cyprus, 


116;  and  Suez  Canal,  116;  in 
Persia,  128,  174;  imperiled  by 
German  success,  133,  134; 
former  isolation  in  Europe, 
157;  and  the  German  naval 
program,  159;  reenters  Conti- 
nental politics,  162;  position 
in  Egypt  recognized,  166; 
supports  France  in  third 
Moroccan  incident,  172;  nec- 
essary for  her  to  enter  the 
war,  182;  probable  course  if 
Russia  becomes  aggressive, 
202;  future  relations  with 
France,  250. 

Greece  and  Balkan  War  of 
1912-1913,  89. 

Greece,  beginnings  of  modern, 
107;  the  revolt  against  Tur- 
key, 107;  acquires  Thessaly, 
117;  and  Cretan  revolution, 
118;  growing  power  of,  120; 
in  the  Balkan  War  of  1912- 
1913,  122-127. 

Greek  war  of  independence,  77. 


Hague  Conferences  to  promote 

peace,  the,  37. 
Hague    tribunal    and    the    Mo- 
roccan question,  169. 
Hatred  as  an  implement  in  war, 

195-197. 
Hegel,  his  relation  to  the  peace 

plans,  35;  philosophy  of  war, 

35,  220. 
Henry   IV,   his   Grand  Design, 

24. 
Hertling,    Chancellor    von,    on 

federated  peace,  13. 
Herzegovina,   108;   Austria   ac- 


INDEX 


quires  rights  in,  115;  taken 
over  by  Austria,  12^0,  121. 
Holy  Alliance,  36;  history  of, 
59-64;  terms  of,  61;  discussed, 
62-64;  compared  with  the 
Treaty  of  Alliance,  66;  taken 
up  by  Metternich,  72. 

Internationalism,  10-12. 

Italy,  attitude  toward  federated 
peace,  15;  wars  for  libera- 
tion, 88;  and  the  Triple  Alli- 
ance, 93;  and  her  right  to 
Tripoli,  164;  weakened  rela- 
tion with  the  Triple  Alliance, 
164,  174;  war  in  Tripoli,  174. 

Japan — effect  of  her  war  with 
Russia,  99;  alliance  with 
Great  Britain,  100. 

Junkers,  character  of,  141,  145. 
See  Autocracy. 

Kant,  Immanuel,  his  plan  for 
peace,  34;  error  in  his  theory, 
232-234;  and  a  federation  of 
nations,  263. 

Kriidener,  Baroness,  60. 

Kultur,  discussion  of,   144-146. 

La  Harpe,  Frederic  C6sar  de, 
46,  47,  48,  50. 

League,  definition  of,  23. 

League  of  peace,  probable 
working  of,  257-261.  See 
Federation  of  Nations. 

"League  to  Enforce  Peace," 
formed  in  1915,  39. 

Lincoln,  President,  his  way  of 
dealing  with  conquered  peo- 
ple, 195. 


Mars,  his  Day,  6,  20. 

Maryland,  hesitating  to  accept 
union,  271. 

Mehemet  Ali,  84-86. 

Metternich,  Prince,  154,  and 
the  Holy  Alliance,  62;  and 
the  Treaty  of  Alliance,  65 ;  on 
the  situation  in  Naples,  67; 
at  Troppau,  68;  gets  support 
of  Alexander  I,  70-72;  and 
the  Greek  war  of  independ- 
ence, 77;  end  of  his  power, 
83;  his  influence  not  existent 
to-day,  264-276. 

Military  Class  in  Germany,  in- 
fluence of,  227. 

Mittel-Europa,  134,  141,  177, 
185;  its  strength,  if  estab- 
lished, 185;  how  to  prevent 
its  formation,  186 ;  future  of, 
237. 

Moldavia,  105,  110;  united  with 
Wallachia,  111. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  79. 

Montenegro,  origin  of,  106, 
108;  opens  the  Balkan  War, 
123;   takes   Scutari,  124,   126. 

Morocco,  French  rights  in,  164; 
position  of,  166;  German  in- 
terference   in,    167-173. 

Munition  makers,  influence  of, 
226. 

Naples,  revolution  in,  67,  73,  76. 

Napoleon  I,  repressing  his 
spirit,  18;  hatred  felt  for,  43; 
and  Russia  in  1807,  49;  his 
severe  treatment  of  Prussia, 
138-140. 

Napoleonic  wars,  and  perma- 
nent peace,  17-21. 


INDEX 


287 


Nationality,  an  obstacle  to  per- 
manent peace,  214. 
Nicholas  II,  of  Russia,  37. 
Novi-Bazar,  sanjak  of,  122. 

Obstacles  to  permanent  peace, 
205-228. 

Pan-Germanism,  148,  161;  be- 
hind the  Great  War,  177-179. 

Panther,  the,  at  Agadir,  171. 

Paris,  conference  of,  86-110; 
Declaration  of,  87. 

Patriotism,  false,  an  obstacle 
to  peace,  211. 

Peace  Societies,  development 
of,  37. 

Penn,  William,  his  plan  for 
peace,  26,  32. 

Persia,  occupied  by  Great  Brit- 
ain and  Russia,  128,  174. 

Phillips,  W.  A.,  on  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance,  67. 

Pitt,  William,  reception  of 
Alexander  I's  suggestions, 
47,  48,  65. 

Poland,  Alexander  I*s  support 
of,  56',  revolution  in,  80. 

Prussia,  supported  peace  pol- 
icy of  tsar  in  1815,  17;  war 
against  Austria,  88,  91; 
against  France,  91;  creates 
the  German  Empire,  91.  See 
Germany,  Holy  Alliance,  and 
Frederick  William  III. 

Quadruple  Alliance.  See  Alli- 
ance. 

Quintuple  Alliance.  See  Alli- 
ance. 


Revolutionary  movement  of 
1830,  79-80. 

Rousseau,  his  plan  for  peace, 
31,  35. 

Rumania,  origin  of  105,  106; 
under  Russian  protection, 
108;  national  feeling  in,  109; 
Russian  protectorate  abol- 
ished, 110;  union  of  Moldavia 
and  Wallachia,  111;  in  the 
war  of  1877,  113;  growing 
power  of,  120;  enters  the 
Balkan  War  of  1912-1913, 
127. 

Russia,  recent  progress  of 
events  in,  8-11;  friendly  to 
peace  under  Alexander  I,  17- 
19,  45;  and  the  Greek  war  of 
independence,  77;  and  Tur- 
key, 84;  in  the  Crimean  War, 
86,  109;  and  war  of  1877,  88; 
and  Bismarck,  93;  and  Dual 
Alliance  with  France,  95; 
effect  of  Russo-Japanese  war, 
99;  enters  Triple  Entente, 
100;  and  the  revolution  of 
the  Greeks,  107;  nourishes 
Balkan  hopes,  109;  at  the 
Conference  of  Paris,  110;  war 
against  Turkey  in  1877,  112; 
her  hopes  for  a  "Big  Bul- 
garia," 114;  unable  to  aid 
Serbia  in  1908,  121;  and  the 
Balkan  War  of  1912-1913, 
126-128;  in  Persia,  128,  174; 
possible  future  aggression  of, 
202;  autocracy  in,  219;  un- 
certain part  in  the  future, 
236.     See  Alexander  I. 

San  Stefano,  treaty  of,  88,  113. 


£88 


INDEX 


Scharnhorst,  military  reforms 
in  Prussia,  140. 

Serbia,  in  Balkan  War  ot 
1912-1913,  89;  origin  of,  105, 
106;  desire  for  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  108,  115;  na- 
tional feeling  in,  109;  be- 
comes autonomous,  108;  in 
the  war  of  1877,  113;  growing 
power  of,  120;  and  Austria's 
assumption  of  power  in  Bos- 
nia and  Herzegovina,  120- 
122;  in  the  Balkan  War  of 
1912-1913,  122-127. 

"Self-preservation,  the  law  of," 
212. 

Shuster,  Morgan  W.,  175. 

South,  reconstruction  of  not  a 
model  for  Germany,  194,  196- 
199. 

Spain,  revolution  in,  67,  73,  76; 
Alexander  I  and,  77;  revolu- 
tion of  its  colonies,  77,  78. 

St.  Pierre,  Abb6  Castel  de,  27- 
29,  263. 

Stein,  Baron  vom,  168. 

Submarines,  and  the  United 
States,  183;  if  they  succeed, 
184;  if  they  fail,  185-204. 

Suez  Canal,  116. 

Sully,  Duke  of,  24. 


Tariffs  and  obstacles  to  per- 
petual peace,  207-209. 

Three  Emperors'  League,  the, 
93,  142,  157. 

Tilsit,  Treaty  of,  49. 

Treaty  of  Alliance,  the,  65. 

Treitschke,  Heinrich  von,  his 
ability,   149;   his   ideals,   150, 


177;  his  influence,  151;  his 
histories,  151. 

Triple  Alliance  formed,  93, 
142,  157;  its  influence,  95, 
157;  balanced  by  the  Triple 
Entente,  101,  102;  weakened 
by  Italy,  164,  174,  201. 

Triple  Entente  formed,  100;  its 
influence,  162,  173,   174. 

Tripoli,  164. 

Troppau,  conference  at,  67,  68, 
69,  71,  72,  74. 

Trusts  compared  with  cartels 
xiii-xvi. 

Turkey  and  the  Greek  war  of 
independence,  77;  and  Me- 
hemet  Ali,  84-86;  and  the 
Crimean  War,  86;  and  war 
of  1877,  88;  rule  over  Balkan 
States,  104;  revolt  of  Greece 
against,  107;  and  Crimean 
war,  109-111;  under  British 
influence,  112;  war  of  1877, 
112;  and  Crete,  118;  and  the 
Balkan  War  of  1912-1913, 
122-127;  position  of  in  1913, 
128 ;  approaching  friendship 
with  Germany,  165;  and  the 
war  in  Tripoli,  174. 

Turks,  conquer  Constantinople, 
104;  hold  on  the  Balkans, 
104.     See    Turkey. 

"Turks,  the  Young,"  123. 

Tunis,  under  French  rule,  116, 
164. 

Union,  the  American,  as  a 
model  for  a  federation  of  na- 
tions, 265. 

United  States,  the,  their  part 
in  the   Great   War,  189-193; 


INDEX 


28^ 


constitution  of,  the  adoption 
of,  267-276;  an  "experi- 
ment," 267.  See  Union,  the 
American. 


Venezelos,   Eleutherios,   118. 
Vienna,    threatened    by    Turks, 
104. 


Wallachia,     105,     110;     united 

with  Moldavia,  111. 
War,  the  Great,  the  real  cause 

of,    154-156;    and    Pan-Ger- 


manism, 177,  178,  179;  the 
beginning  of,  177-179;  the 
changing  character  of,  188. 

Wilhelm  I,  142;  II,  ideals  of, 
142;  his  part  in  the  war,  143; 
his  character,  158;  changed 
German  policy  under,  158- 
160;  lands  in  Tangiers,  167; 
his  sons  uninjured  in  the 
war,  223. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  his  attitude 
toward  a  federated  peace,  v, 
12;  address  of  January  22, 
1917,  12;  peace  views  of,  192. 


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